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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
 
 On July 28-29, 1999, the Mid-America Earthquake (MAE) Center and the Institute for 
Business & Home Safety (IBHS) co-hosted their first insurance industry research needs 
workshop at the Peabody Hotel in Memphis, Tennessee.  The title of the workshop was Mid-
America Earthquake Insurance Workshop – New Research Needs.  The workshop was by 
invitation only and addressed the research needs of insurers of personal lines, commercial lines 
and reinsurance.  Invitations went to the top 50 insurance company groups writing the largest 
volume of earthquake insurance in Mid-America. 
 
 During the first day of the workshop the authors of commissioned papers made 
presentations and the attendees had an opportunity to comment and question any findings and 
issues presented.  On the second day, the workshop attendees broke up into two working groups, 
those representing personal lines and those representing commercial lines and reinsurance.  
Based on the previous day’s discussion and overall goal of the workshop, each group was to 
identify specific earthquake research needs and prioritize them.  A facilitator and secretary was 
assigned to each working group. 
10.  
 During the workshop numerous research needs and issues were identified.  Although there 
was a long list of research needs identified, some very general and some very detailed, it appears 
the highest priority needs can be identified into two general categories, improved understanding 
of the seismic hazard and retrofit and performance of structures.  In addition, to the general 
category of research needs, education of the consumer was also identified as a high priority. 
 
 In the case of research needs for understanding the seismic hazard, the MAE Center and its 
partners, like the United States Geological Survey, are devoting significant resources toward 
solving this problem, with special emphasis on reducing the uncertainty in defining the hazard.  
However, with respect to understanding the performance of structures there were specific 
research needs identified the MAE Center has not been addressing.  That research includes the 
performance of residential construction and retrofit solutions.  As a result and as discussed in the 
proceedings, the MAE Center has established and is funding a pilot project on residential 
construction with representatives of the insurance industry as advisors.  It consists of the 
evaluation of the seismic performance and assessment of the vulnerability of a common class of 
light-frame construction (wood frame structures with brick veneer) using cyclic static tests of 
representative component subassemblies and dynamic tests of wall systems.  In addition, the 
Center is in the process of developing a program on the seismic performance and vulnerability of 
residential construction consisting of unreinforced masonry basements and crawl spaces. 
 
 In addition to discussing potential projects for specific residential construction and retrofit 
solutions, during the personal lines breakout session of the workshop, two recommendations 
were made related to the formation of an insurance industry seismic research consortium to 
consider ongoing funding of focused research by the Center.  The first was for the IBHS 
Research Advisory Committee (RAC) to act as a focal point for the insurance industry and the 
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second for the MAE Center to prepare a proposal for the formation of such a consortium.  While 
this was discussed in the closing session no formal recommendations were made at that time.  
However, the MAE Center and IBHS through the Collaboratory are pursuing the establishment 
of the consortium. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. GENERAL 
 
 On July 28-29, 1999, the Mid-America Earthquake (MAE) Center and the Institute for 
Business & Home Safety (IBHS) co-hosted their first insurance industry research needs 
workshop at the Peabody Hotel in Memphis, Tennessee.  The title of the workshop was: Mid-
America Earthquake Insurance Workshop – New Research Needs.  The workshop was by 
invitation only and addressed the research needs of insurers of personal lines, commercial lines 
and reinsurance.  Invitations went to the top 50 insurance company groups writing the largest 
volume of earthquake insurance in Mid-America. The invitees were chief executive officers and 
their chief loss prevention expert(s).  State Insurance Commissioners representing those states 
where insurance companies were writing the largest volumes were also invited.  Although a 
targeted limit of 50 attendees was originally established, the workshop was in such high demand 
65 people actually attended.  The workshop agenda is shown in Appendix A. 
 
 The workshop was also conducted in compliance with the federal antitrust laws that 
prohibit agreements that might unreasonably interfere with free and open competition.  Thus, at 
the beginning of the workshop an antitrust announcement was made that all activities of the 
workshop would comply with the IBHS Antitrust Compliance Statement as shown in Appendix 
B. 
 
 
1.2. PLANNING COMMITTEE 
 
 An Insurance Workshop Planning Committee (IPC) representing the insurance industry and 
the MAE Center organized the workshop.  The IPC consisted of insurance industry 
representatives from personal lines, commercial lines and reinsurers.  The IPC was co-chaired by 
James E. Beavers, Deputy Director of the MAE Center and Harvey Ryland, President of IBHS.  
The other eight members of the IPC were: 
 
Peter Colket     Dennis Fasking   
Vice President     Senior Actuary 
American Re-Insurance Company  Allstate Insurance Group 
Princeton, New Jersey    Northbrook, Illinois 
 
Dale Lauer     Gary Patterson 
Senior Vice President    Information Officer 
SAFECO American States Center for Earthquake Research Info 
Indianapolis, Indiana  Memphis, Tennessee 
 
 
 
 
 2
Dan Polenda     Anselm Smolka 
Vice President     Seismoligist 
SAFECO American States   Munich Reinsurance Company 
Indianapolis, Indiana    Muenchen, Germany 
 
Teri Spalding     Peggy Young 
Manager Research    Administrative Assistant 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. Central United State              
Bloomington, Illinois  Earthquake Consortium 
      Memphis, Tennessee 
 
 
1.3. WORKSHOP GOALS 
 
The IPC met to evaluate the needs of the insurance industry and to determine the structure 
of the workshop.  It was agreed that the purpose of this workshop should be to develop insurance 
industry research needs to better understand how to estimate future expected losses from 
earthquakes in Mid-America and to find ways to reduce those expected losses.  Based on current 
understanding of the seismic hazard and expected losses, and the associated uncertainties, the 
IPC established the following fourteen goals for the workshop: 
 
1. Establish a better understanding as to what really happened during the New Madrid 
earthquakes of 1811 and 1812; 
2. Establish a better understanding of the seismic hazard as it is today; 
3. Further evaluate the seismic uncertainty related to the recent Science article (A. 
Newman et al., Science 284, 619 (1999)) and the implications to the insurance 
industry; 
4. Summarize what the future holds for risk-based building codes and their 
implementation and effective enforcement; 
5. Discuss cost effective retrofit strategies of existing structures to reduce losses; 
6. Evaluate the need for accessing structural details on the built environment; 
7. Present some cases studies of success in mitigation and reduction of losses; 
8. Establish what role the insurance industry should play in the development of codes 
and standards for new design and retrofit of existing structures; 
9. Evaluate measuring the reduction of existing loss exposure verses cost of 
mitigation; 
10. Evaluate potential for losses from future earthquakes, both direct and indirect; 
11. Identify key uncertainties in loss estimation and the difficulties determining sound 
probable maximum and average annual losses; 
12. Establish what the insurance industry should do to help reduce losses; 
13. Identify key education needs for the public and the insurance industry; and  
14. Identify key research needs for reducing losses through mitigation in order to make 
earthquake insurance available, affordable and equitable to all parties. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
 
 
2.1. MID-AMERICA EARTHQUAKE CENTER 
 
 The Mid-America Earthquake (MAE) Center was founded in 1997 by the National Science 
Foundation (NSF).  It is a consortium of seven core institutions.  These institutions are Georgia 
Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech), Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Saint 
Louis University, Texas A&M University, University of Illinois, University of Memphis and 
Washington University in St. Louis.  The headquarters of the Center resides within the 
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering at the University of Illinois. 
 
 As stated in its 1999 annual report to the NSF, the Center’s vision is Research combined 
with education can help to reduce significant economic losses that are expected with a future 
earthquake in Mid-America.  The mission of the Center is to Develop and disseminate new 
information on the physical, technical, economic and social attributes of the earthquake problem 
that are unique to the central and eastern United States.  To accomplish the Center’s vision and 
mission, research projects have been coordinated within three primary thrust areas: network 
vulnerability, facility retrofit, and hazard evaluation.  These thrust areas conform to the strategy 
of the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP).  NEHRP was initiated in 
1977 by the U.S. Congress to help minimize the effects of earthquakes.  An act passed in April 
of 1999 by the U.S. House of Representatives re-authorized the NEHRP for the next two fiscal 
years. 
 
 The Center is a cross- and multi-disciplinary center where seismologists, geophysicists and 
geologists at Saint Louis University and the University of Memphis combine their talents with 
geotechnical engineering researchers at Georgia Tech and the University of Illinois.  Structural 
engineering researchers at Texas A&M University, Georgia Tech, Washington University, MIT 
and the University of Illinois research response and behavior of the built environment that is 
translated to the impact on communities and national networks in accordance with assistance of 
researchers in the social sciences, economics and urban planning at Texas A&M University, 
MIT, Georgia Tech, Washington University and the University of Illinois. 
 
 One of the Center’s main functions is to establish and maintain an Industry/Users 
Collaboration, Outreach, and Technology Transfer (ICOTT) Program.  The ICOTT Program has 
the following specific missions: (1) Complement and support the education thrust area by 
involving partners in all education activities of the Center; (2) Complement and support the 
research thrust areas by bringing partners to the research program for planning, project selection, 
participation and implementation; (3) Develop and foster intellectual ties with engineers and 
scientists from industry and government to facilitate a seamless two-way flow of ideas, 
knowledge and advances; and (4) Develop a sustainable funded ICOTT Program within the 
Center involving business, industry and government.  
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2.2. INSTITUTE FOR BUSINESS AND HOME SAFETY 
 
 The Institute for Business and Home Safety (IBHS) was founded by the property casualty 
insurance industry and only insurers and reinsurers can be members.  Other disciplines contribute 
to the Institute’s work as associate members.  Each year natural disasters take a huge toll in 
deaths and injuries, property damage and economic loss.  An even greater tragedy is the fact that 
much of this devastation can be reduced through existing mitigation techniques and greater 
public awareness of them.  IBHS’ vision is: The planning and construction of the Nation’s built 
environment will incorporate structural and nonstructural loss reduction initiatives, enabling the 
public and business communities to live and work in an atmosphere of personal safety, financial 
security and social stability.  The mission is to reduce deaths, injuries, property damage, 
economic losses and human suffering caused by natural disasters.  The member insurance 
companies of IBHS envision a nation in which its citizens insist on building the safest and most 
damage resistant structures possible to protect themselves.  To enable its vision to become a 
reality, IBHS’ members have directed it to fulfill this critically important mission. 
 
 To implement the mission, IBHS is guided by its Strategic Plan that has the following key 
result areas: (1) public outreach, (2) community land use, (3) new building construction, (4) 
retrofit of existing structures and (5) information management.  Public outreach will ensure that 
all stakeholders (policy and decision makers, the insurance industry, businesses, emergency 
managers, the media, planners, lenders, designers, builders, and the general public) are aware of 
natural hazards, understand the associated risks, know how to reduce these risks, and desire to 
reduce the level of risk to which they are exposed.  Community land use will promote locating 
structures out of high risk areas that are subject to floods and wildland fires, and where feasible, 
earthquakes and windstorms.  Construction of new buildings will ensure that all new structures 
will be designed, engineered and constructed using up-to-date techniques and materials that 
mitigate natural disaster risks.  The Institute would also like to encourage research and 
development of effective mitigation materials and techniques that are more affordable to the 
owner than currently available.  Measuring the vulnerability of existing structures will promote 
the strengthening of structures to mitigate natural disaster losses through a process called 
“retrofitting.”  Information management will provide for the collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of natural disaster loss and mitigation information. 
 
 
2.3. A COLLABORATORY 
 
 Previous studies of the potential losses from a repeat of the 1811-1812 New Madrid 
earthquakes have shown that the total losses could be as high as $200 billion, exceeding the 
insurance industry’s capacity to handle them.  The probability of such an event occurring in the 
next 25 years is on the order of 2%.  Thus, the residents of Mid-America live in an earthquake 
zone where very large earthquakes are infrequent but for which the consequences are very 
devastating.  This is a decidedly different situation compared to those who live in more 
seismically active California.  However, a more likely earthquake, the repeat of the Charleston, 
Missouri, earthquake of 1895 having a magnitude of 6.8 has about a 50% probability of 
occurring in the next 25 years.  It has been shown by recent loss estimation studies that this 
earthquake could result in total losses between $4 and $10 billion, although one loss number 
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projected has been as high as $60 billion (see commissioned paper No. 6).  Thus, even in a 
moderate earthquake in Mid-America, the potential for large losses is significant.  Finally, it is 
believed by many that a moderate earthquake is over due. 
 
American Re1 provided information on the insurance industry’s portfolio of earthquake 
insurance premiums in the portion of Mid-America that surrounds the New Madrid Seismic 
Zone.  The premium value is well over $100 million.  In addition, research showed that 
depending on insurance company, state, personal verses commercial lines, percent deductible 
and seismic zone the premium rate may range from 0.01 percent to 0.2 percent of the insured 
liability.  It was also found that the percentage of homeowners who have purchased earthquake 
insurance ranged from as low as 1 percent to as high as 90 percent, depending on seismic zone.  
Assuming the average premium rate for homeowners is 0.025 percent and half of the above 
premium is for homeowner insurance, the earthquake insured liability becomes $200 billion.  
Assuming the percentage of homeowners who have earthquake insurance is 15 percent, the 
potential earthquake insured liability market is $1.3 trillion.  As the public becomes educated as 
to the risk of self-insurance, they will seek to transfer that risk to the insurance industry.  Thus, 
the insurance industry portfolio will continue to grow and be at risk.  As a result, it is also in the 
best interest of the insurance industry to take research steps to reduce future earthquake losses, 
including fire following earthquake. 
 
 The MAE Center and IBHS are both deeply interested in minimizing the future losses of 
earthquakes and have initiated a research collaboratory toward taking the steps required to 
reduce earthquake losses in Mid-America.  The workshop and these proceedings represent the 
first products of this collaboration. 
 
 
 
3. WORKSHOP ACTIVITIES 
 
 
3.1. PROCESS 
 
The process for conducting this workshop was set up to get the maximum input from the 
insurance industry on what are its unmet earthquake research needs by addressing the fourteen 
goals established by the IPC.  To set the stage using the identified goals, thirteen discussion 
papers were commissioned as shown in Table 1.  Seven of these papers were on the state of some 
of the research and knowledge of earthquakes and earthquake engineering prepared by members 
of the engineering and seismology community and primarily addressed issues related to the first 
seven goals.  Six of the papers were on insurance issues prepared by members of the insurance 
community primarily related to the last seven goals.  The commissioned papers were distributed 
to all attendees two weeks prior to the workshop and are included in their entirety in Appendix 
C.  In addition to the commissioned papers, Mr. Bill Thomas, Senior Vice President and Chief 
Operations Officer at SAFECO and an IBHS Board Member, made the dinner presentation to the 
attendees that is also included in Appendix C. 
 
                                                 
1 Communications with Peter K. Colket, Vice President, American Re, May 15, 1999. 
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 During the first day of the workshop the authors of the commission papers made 
presentations on their papers and the attendees had an opportunity to comment and question any 
of the findings and issues presented.  On the second day, the workshop attendees broke up into 
two working groups, those representing personal lines and those representing commercial lines 
and reinsurance.  Based on the previous day’s discussion and overall goal of the workshop, each 
group was to identify specific earthquake research needs and prioritize them.  A facilitator and 
secretary was assigned to each working group.   
 
 
 
Table 1.0 Insurance Workshop Commissioned Papers  
 
1. The MAE Center Approach to Understanding Earthquakes in Mid-America, Daniel P. 
Abrams, Mid-America Earthquake Center  
 
2. What Really Happened in 1811 and 1812 and Will It Happen Again?, Arch Johnston, 
Center for Earthquake Research and Information  
 
3. Will New Maps Lower or Raise the Hazard?, Robert Herrmann, A. Akinci and R. Ortega, 
Saint Louis University 
 
4. Seismic Design Requirements of the Future, Gerald H. Jones, Multihazard Mitigation 
Council of the National Institute of Building Sciences  
 
5. Future Issues of Seismic Retrofit, J.D. Dolan, Virginia Polytechnic Institute  
 
6. The Insurance Industry’s Role in Building Codes and Loss Mitigation Advocacy, David 
Unnewehr, American Insurance Association  
 
7. Building Code Effectiveness Grading Schedule for Seismic Design, Ralph Dorio, 
Insurance Services Office  
 
8. The Need for Insurance Support of Seismic Retrofit, Paul Devlin, Institute for Business 
and Home Safety  
 
9. What do the Uncertainties do to the Insurance Industry?, Anselm Smolka, Munich 
Reinsurance Company  
 
10. Reducing Seismic Losses for a Large Commercial Line—The Anheuser-Busch 
Approach, Michael Griffin and Alan Scott, EQE International  
 
11. The Need for Seismic Retrofit—Unreinforced Masonry Basements, Stephen M. Marlin, 
USAA  
 
12. Mid-America at Risk:  Insurance and Natural Disaster, Walter W. Hays, American 
Society of Civil Engineers  
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13. Earthquake Benefit/Cost Study – Can Mitigation as a Public Value Be Accomplished 
Without it?, Dennis Fasking, Allstate Insurance
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 Following the working group sessions the workshop closed with a plenary session with the 
two facilitators presenting the results of the respective working groups.  As discussed earlier, the 
workshop agenda is shown in Appendix A.  The participant list is shown in Appendix D. 
 
 
3.2. SUMMARY OF COMMISSIONED PAPERS 
 
3.2.1. Introduction.  To provide the reader with the key points of each commissioned paper 
provided in Appendix C and to link the commissioned papers together the following sections 
represent an abridged summary of each paper, linking them as appropriate to each other and the 
fourteen goals.  
 
3.2.2. The MAE Center Approach to Understanding Earthquakes in Mid-America.  As 
discussed above, the MAE Center’s vision statement is:  Research combined with education can 
help to reduce significant economic losses that are expected with a future earthquake in Mid-
America.  Since its inception in October of 1997, the central focus of the Center has been to 
reduce earthquake losses through research and education.  The better the public and the private 
sectors are informed on their earthquake risk in the eastern and central United States the more 
they can protect their investments in construction and business. 
 
 Academic research in the past has been typically done through individual investigator 
grants.  Ties with industry were not necessarily strong because links with universities were 
through individual faculty members who each had to develop their own alliances.  This 
interaction can be increased substantially through the coordinated structure of the MAE Center.  
The Center’s research thrust areas of network vulnerability, facility retrofit and hazard evaluation 
are directed largely through extensive involvement of potential end users of the research.  The 
consensus opinion that is formulated through these programs on future research directions and 
interpretations of research results is uncommon in a traditional academic setting.  The focus of 
these programs on development of practical products that will reduce losses in future 
earthquakes is also unique and attractive to industry practitioners.  This same analogy can be 
used successfully by the Center, IBHS and the insurance industry to reduce losses from future 
earthquakes.  There is a need for the research community to understand that the personal lines 
portion of the insured portfolios of the larger insurance companies are comprised of large 
numbers of relatively homogeneous structures.  The costs of data collection and analyses for 
such structures would need to be addressed since personal lines and small commercial insurers 
would not have the same ability to pass along those costs to the property owner as part of their 
insurance premium as is possible for large commercial risks. 
 
 Based on the Center’s four programs areas, the three research thrust areas and the ICOTT 
Program area, and a fifth program, an Education Program, it is clear that the Center’s work 
supports the achievement of all fourteen goals.  However, the MAE Center’s specific goal for 
this forum is to help refine the research interests of the insurance industry, define a common 
agenda for reducing the severe effects of earthquakes on Mid-America, and establish an action 
plan that will exploit these complementary interests in the most effective manner possible. 
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3.2.3. What Really Happened in 1811 and 1812 and Will It Happen Again?  As noted 
above, one third of the MAE Center’s research is on evaluating the hazard.  The New Madrid 
Seismic Zone (NMSZ) is the most active seismic area east of the Rocky Mountains and in Mid-
America.  Scientist and engineers have been studying the NMSZ for the past 25 years, yet much 
is yet to be learned.  However, to understand what is in store for the future, one must understand 
what has happened in the past.  That is why this paper was commissioned for the workshop, i.e., 
to further enhance the achievement of Goals 1, 2 and 3. 
 
 As discussed in the paper, a sequence of powerful earthquakes struck the mid-Mississippi 
River Valley, central United States, in the winter of 1811 and 1812. The sequence included at 
least six (possibly nine) events of estimated moment magnitude M = 7 and two of M ~–  8.  The 
last two probably exceeded the size of any continental western U.S. earthquake, even the 1906 
San Francisco earthquake.  No fewer than 18 of these events were felt on the Atlantic seaboard 
or in Washington D.C., at least 1000 km east, which implies moment magnitude M >~  6.0-6.5.  
Over time, this earthquake series took the name of the small riverboat town New Madrid, which 
lay at the heart of the epicentral zone and which in 1811 was the largest settlement on the river 
between the Ohio River and Natchez.  The name has proven apt, for New Madrid by 
happenstance marks the intersection of three of the six fault segments currently illuminated by 
microseismicity and believed to be rupture planes of the principal 1811-1812 earthquakes. 
 
 The question today remains to be: Just how active is the NMSZ?  At first glance, the 
Mississippi River and its surrounding expanse of nearly level flood plains would seem to be 
evidence of a region that is tectonically and seismically dead.  However, seismological, geodetic, 
and most paleoseismological data suggest a surprisingly short recurrence interval for major 
earthquakes in the NMSZ, on the order of a thousand years or less, with deformation rates 
comparable to those at plate margins. 
 
 The simplest interpretation of paleoliquefaction results is that, in addition to the 1811-1812 
events, there were at least two strong ground-shaking earthquakes in the past 2000 years.  
Evidence for one of these, which likely occurred between A.D. 800 and A.D. 1000, is clear at 
Reelfoot scarp and north of New Madrid.  There is also evidence for liquefaction of this age near 
Marked Tree, Arkansas to the south, and at several sites near Blytheville, Arkansas.  Evidence 
for a liquefaction-producing event between A.D. 1400 and A.D. 1600 is found in the Blytheville 
area and may be present in the Reelfoot area and at the northernmost sites.  Moreover, there is 
evidence, presently inconclusive, of liquefaction ages both younger than (~ A.D. 1600) and older 
than (prior to A.D. 600) these two age ranges.  Thus, 1811 was not the first time in the Holocene 
that the New Madrid region experienced strong ground shaking.  The data all are consistent with 
as few as two and as many as four earthquakes in the 2,000 years prior to 1811.  These data 
strongly suggest that the New Madrid Seismic Zone is not tectonically and seismically dead and 
the earthquakes are indeed in the future.  It is just a matter of when. 
 
 Since the NMSZ is still seismically active from all of the smaller earthquake activity and 
because of what has happened in the past, today’s seismic hazard maps must reflect this activity.  
This knowledge represents the foundation of the NEHRP Maps discussed below. 
 
 10 
3.2.4. Will New Maps Lower or Raise the Hazard?  The question that is always asked when a 
new generation of mapping occurs is will the new findings result in the hazard going up or will it 
be reduced?  Since a portion of the MAE Center’s Hazard Evaluation Program represents the 
development of enhanced mapping concepts, this question was posed for this workshop.  The 
results of this paper and the associated work enhance Goals 1, 2 and 3, in particular, Goal 2. 
 
 The estimation of earthquake ground motion has advanced significantly since the inception 
of the NEHRP two decades ago.  Better instrumentation, accumulated recordings of ground 
motion, better understanding of earthquake physics and the expected recurrence rates of 
earthquakes have permitted improved estimates of expected ground motion in terms of peak 
acceleration, velocity or response spectral ordinates.  The confidence in these estimates permits 
detailed mathematical modeling of structural response and inference of damage thresholds.  The 
improved estimates are also accompanied by an awareness of what is not known because of the 
lack of data. 
 
 Recently, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) developed the 1996 Seismic Hazard 
Maps.  These maps represent state-of-the-art understanding of what the seismic hazard is on a 
national scale in the United States.  Shortly thereafter, the 1996 maps were transformed to be 
used in building codes through Project 97and became known as the 1997 NEHRP Maps.  Project 
97 was a joint effort between the USGS and the Building Seismic Safety Council to establish just 
how the NEHRP Maps would be used in the building code process.  The maps are probabilistic 
in nature and are now being used as the basis for the seismic hazard in the International Building 
Code (IBC) and the NEHRP Guidelines for the Seismic Rehabilitation of Buildings, (FEMA 273).  
The IBC and FEMA 273 are discussed below in Section 3.2.5.  Because of the differences 
between previous seismic hazard maps and the new 1997 NEHRP maps representing the central 
United States, the MAE Center is examining the assumptions that went into the current maps and 
are doing research to advance those maps. 
 
 The 1997 NEHRP maps define the seismic hazard throughout the central and eastern 
United States at what is called the B/C Boundary.  The B/C Boundary is the boundary between 
rock and a very stiff soil.  They do not represent the seismic hazard at the surface where the 
overburden soil has to be considered.  The MAE Center probabilistic seismic hazard maps are 
meant to carefully evolve from the 1997 NEHRP maps and represent the seismic hazard at the 
surface.  All steps will be documented so that deviations from the 1997 maps are justified.  The 
efforts of the MAE Center are directed toward reducing uncertainty and to eliminate the use of 
soil factors currently used in defining the seismic hazard at the surface.  In addition the MAE 
Center efforts complement the internal and external USGS research programs in the NMSZ.  
This task is not taken lightly, since the numbers resulting from these computations have 
economic significance.  It is likely that in some locations better scientific understanding of the 
seismic hazard will cause it to go up and in other locations cause it to go down.  The MAE 
Center is aware of the needs of the insurance community.  Certainly cooperative efforts are 
required. 
 
 In addition to the MAE Center advancing the 1997 NEHRP maps, during 2000 the USGS 
has begun a national process of updating those maps.  The results of the MAE Center’s research 
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will be folded into that process.  Thus, future MAE Center seismic hazard maps will reflect the 
advances made during the development of the 2000 NEHRP Maps. 
 
3.2.5. Seismic Design Requirements of the Future.  As noted above, great progress has been, 
and is being, made in understanding the seismic hazard in Mid-America.  It is also true that great 
progress has been made for the engineering and building industry toward better design of the 
built environment for earthquakes.  In fact, in reference to the title of this commissioned paper, 
the future of seismic design requirements is here and the resulting discussion achieves Goal 4 of 
the workshop. 
 
With the recent publication of the IBC this past January 2000, cities and other jurisdictions 
in the United States now have a single model building code available for adoption for the first 
time.  In addition, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) recently published the 
NEHRP Guidelines for the Seismic Rehabilitation of Buildings, (FEMA 273).  A selection for 
varying performance objectives for the rehabilitation of existing buildings is now possible.  The 
NEHRP Guidelines offer the owner, designer and the public an informed choice for the extent of 
rehabilitation, recognizing that triggers in existing codes frequently do not require rehabilitation.   
 
 Design professionals have, for years, advocated greater use of "performance codes" in 
contrast to the more common "prescriptive codes".  The new IBC still has many of the 
prescriptive requirements from the previous codes.  However, to move the new code in the 
direction of a truly performance code, like the NEHRP Guidelines, the International Code 
Council (ICC) has created a Building Performance Code (BPC) Committee and a Fire 
Performance Code Committee to develop a "Performance Code" which can be used as an 
alternate to the IBC.  The BPC Committee has published the Intent, Scope and Performance 
structure for developing performance provisions.  They have developed structure and linkage 
between topics and objective standards and have accepted numerous objectives, functional 
statements, and performance requirements.  These items have been published in the Guidelines 
for Use of ICC Performance Code.  The BPC Committee is basing its proposed Seismic 
Provisions on Vision 2000 developed by the Structural Engineers Association of California, and 
future designers will be expected to: (1) Specify Performance Requirements, (2) Define 
Earthquake Hazard Design Levels, (3) Define Performance Levels and (4) Define Seismic 
Hazard Exposure Group. 
 
 The principles of performance based codes have been recognized as very desirable for 
centuries, but the execution of such design and construction has been measured by prescriptive 
or "deemed to comply" regulations.  However, today it is clear that performance codes are here 
to stay and will be used extensively in the future.  The insurance industry is interested in 
matching the performance codes to the risk of loss in more of a risk-based performance code.  It 
should take careful note of the potential consequences and work cooperatively to solve the 
problems that surely will be encountered as performance codes become norm rather than the 
exception. 
 
3.2.6. Future Issues of Seismic Retrofit. Section 3.2.5 briefly mentions the NEHRP 
Guidelines but primarily discusses the future of the IBC.  Indeed, while recent building codes 
(last 15 – 20 years) have been revised extensively in an effort to address performance problems 
 12 
associated with seismic resistance, they have primarily focused on new building construction 
rather than existing construction.  However, the huge volume of existing construction also should 
be retrofitted when possible to improve the life-safety of the structure and reduce damage 
associated with seismic events.  The cost of loss of life, repair and expenses associated with loss 
of use can be astronomical when compared to the cost associated with retrofitting buildings to 
improve performance.  While it is politically unattainable to require the retrofit of all buildings 
with significant seismic risk, many buildings should be considered for retrofit from a pure 
economic standpoint, while others should be considered from a societal or safety concerns.  
Thus, this commissioned paper was chosen to address seismic retrofit and to provide some 
information related to Goals 5 and 6. 
 
 The NEHRP Guidelines are for the retrofit or rehabilitation of existing buildings.  In 
addition FEMA has continued to publish the Recommended Provisions for Seismic Regulations 
for New buildings and Other Structures (FEMA 302).  While there are dissimilarities between 
FEMA 273 and FEMA 302, both documents provide guidance in designing buildings to resist 
earthquakes.  The Provisions have continually updated since the mid 1980’s and have begun to 
mature.  The Provisions were used as the foundation for the seismic provisions of the IBC, while 
the Guidelines are still in their infancy.  As mentioned above in Section 3.2.5, the future of 
seismic design is here.  However, the adoption and enforcement of the IBC for new buildings 
and the use of the Guidelines for rehabilitation of, or retrofitting, existing buildings would be 
more widely applied if incentives rather than mandates were made for their use.  Retrofitting 
buildings can reduce the risk of damage or collapse of buildings, and while quantifying the 
change in risk might be difficult, insurance is one of the potential motivation tools. 
 
3.2.7. The Insurance Industry’s Role in Building Codes and Loss Mitigation Advocacy. 
While it is stated above that the future of seismic design is here, the implementation of state-of-
the-art seismic design in local codes is nonexistent in many parts of the United States.  This 
paper was commissioned to discuss the insurance industry’s role for the improvement of local 
building codes and it discusses many of the issues related to Goal 8. 
 
Passage and rigorous enforcement of comprehensive statewide building codes has 
significant potential for reducing both catastrophe and more routine property losses.  However, 
currently, only 23 states in the U.S. mandate a model code or state code to cover all buildings 
and occupancy classifications.  Twenty states do not have state-mandated building codes 
covering the entire state, but generally have codes governing building activity in larger cities. An 
additional eight states mandate building codes for commercial and institutional property, but 
exempt one and two-family dwellings which are typically much more vulnerable to wind, hail, 
and other sources of loss. A number of states in hurricane-prone areas including Texas, 
Louisiana and several other Gulf coast states and earthquake-prone areas such as Missouri still 
have no widespread or statewide building code requirements.  Missouri, in fact, has a legislative 
prohibition on the ability of all but its largest jurisdictions to enact and enforce a building code. 
 
 The American Insurance Association (AIA) supports enactment of statewide 
comprehensive building codes in all states.  State-wide codes have the advantage of uniformity 
and clarity that help to promote training and better understanding of code provisions by 
developers, builders, sub-contractors, building materials manufacturers, and building officials. 
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These attributes ultimately will lead to better compliance and enforcement than currently exists. 
Comprehensive and uniform codes often help lower costs and increase efficiency for builders 
who can deal with one document rather than a confusing patchwork of regulations from one 
jurisdiction to the next. 
 
 In addition to building codes, AIA supports land use planning as an effective loss 
mitigation tool that can help people, insurers, local communities, and disaster agencies by 
limiting building in very hazardous areas subject to repeat losses, or ensuring that areas with 
higher risks are subject to higher standards of protection.  AIA also supports a rate structure that 
encourages homeowners to undertake steps to mitigate losses.  State insurance department 
should allow insurers to use higher deductibles for customers that do not take steps to mitigate 
losses.  The insurance industry should also seek ways of involving the mortgage lending industry 
in strategies to encourage mitigation such as lower cost loans for homeowners who undertake 
retrofitting or those building or purchasing homes with superior construction with respect to life 
safety and property loss reduction. 
 
 AIA and industry coalitions should continue to look for opportunities for increasing the 
number of states with statewide risk-based building codes and for improving existing codes and 
enforcement. 
 
3.2.8. Building Code Effectiveness Grading Schedule for Seismic Design.  As discussed 
above in Section 3.2.7, there is a lack of enforcement and uniformity of building code adoption 
throughout the United States.  Similar to the previous commissioned paper, this paper also 
discusses issues related to Goal 8. 
 
Following Hurricane Andrew, the Insurance Services Office (ISO) developed the Building 
Code Effectiveness Grading Schedule (BCEGS) to rate the building codes in effect in a 
particular community as well as how the community supports and enforces those codes.  It was 
based upon a program designed by IBHS’s predecessor organization, the Insurance Institute for 
Property Loss Reduction, and turned over to ISO for implementation.  The BCEGS program was 
developed in conjunction with the three national model code groups (now the members of the 
ICC), IBHS and information from 1,500 building code officials.  Pilot testing was done in 154 
communities.  The result is a rating and underwriting tool based on a building code classification 
developed for each community.  The BCEGS concept is similar to that used for public protection 
classification, which classifies municipal fire suppression capabilities and has been used by 
insurers for decades. 
 
 Under the ISO rating system the following credits are given to communities (the specific 
rating criteria can be found in the commissioned paper in Appendix C): 
· buildings constructed under code-enforcement departments with classifications 1 through 3 
(exemplary code enforcement) are eligible for the maximum credit in the approved schedule 
· buildings constructed under code-enforcement departments with classifications 4 through 7 
are eligible for an intermediate credit in the approved schedule 
· buildings constructed under departments with classifications 8 and 9 are eligible for the 
minimum credit in the approved schedule 
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· buildings constructed under departments with a classification of 10 (minimal code 
enforcement) are not eligible for credits 
 
 ISO designates communities that fail to meet minimal BCEGS requirements, i.e., a 
classification of 10 as Class 99.  A Class 99 community basically means the community has no 
codes or code enforcement. 
 
 The results of the grading system were compared between the Western Seismic States 
region and the New Madrid States region.  In the Western Seismic States region, forty-one 
percent of the people live in Class 3 rated communities and zero percent live in Class 99 rated 
communities.  However, in the New Madrid region, only 2 percent of the people live in Class 3 
rated communities and a startling 34% of the people live in Class 99 communities.  As an 
example, Missouri, a state that has the Missouri Seismic Safety Commission, actually forbids 93 
of its 114 counties from enacting any building code for any reason, as briefly mentioned above in 
Section 3.2.8.  This situation clearly demonstrates that the public is at a much higher risk in the 
central and eastern United States from potential building failures than in the west.  As a result, all 
participants of this workshop must work together get adoption and enforcement of codes in all 
communities. 
 
3.2.9. The Need for Insurance Support of Seismic Retrofit.  This commissioned paper 
discusses issues of seismic retrofit related to Goals 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10.  The NMSZ includes the 
states of Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri and Tennessee.  As 
discussed in Section 3.2.8, 34% of the people in live in Class 99 communities.  Three of these 
seven states do not require their communities to have any building code for any purpose.  Two 
others have a statewide code but do not require it for houses.  The following is a thumbnail status 
of statewide codes in these seven states: 
 
 Arkansas: a non-current (1991) statewide code covers all occupancies. 
 
 Illinois: no statewide code. 
 
 Indiana: a statewide code does not cover one and two-family dwellings. 
 
 Kentucky: a statewide code covers all occupancies. 
 
 Mississippi: no statewide code. 
 
 Missouri: no statewide code. 
 
 Tennessee: a statewide code does not cover one and two-family dwellings. 
 
 Of this group, only Kentucky has an up-to-date code covering all occupancies.  Missouri is 
at the other extreme.  As noted above, Missouri actually forbids 93 of its 114 counties from 
enacting any building code for any reason.  And even where codes are in place, they are not 
always current. 
 
 When an earthquake hits, the property losses can be enormous.  The Northridge earthquake 
(1994) erased over 25 years of earthquake insurance premiums in California.  The common 
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estimate of the insured losses from Northridge is $12.5 billion.  The IBHS paid-loss database, 
which collects actual payments by insurers over time, indicates a total insured loss exceeding 
$15 billion.  Even this figure pales in comparison to projected total losses from two other, more 
likely, events: 
 
· Magnitude 6 in the New Madrid zone:  about $60 billion 
· Magnitude 7.8 in San Francisco:  about $200 billion 
 
In addition, it has been projected that the total losses from a repeat of one of the 1811-1812 New 
Madrid earthquakes of magnitude 8.0 would be on the order of $200 billion. 
 
 Retrofit is the only way to get at the massive inventory of vulnerable structures.  
Retrofitting a home or office for seismic resistance is fairly easy and inexpensive for 
nonstructural items like bookshelves, computers, water heaters and the like.  But it is often 
expensive and complex for the structural features of a building.  As a result, property owners are 
generally not inclined to undertake it.  The only way to succeed is to reduce the cost and 
complexity of retrofitting, as IBHS has demonstrated with residential roof sheathing in wind-
prone areas, and give property owners some incentive to act.  This can be done by identify new 
potential cost-effective retrofit techniques and conduct the research to verify the benefits of these 
techniques. 
 
3.2.10. What do the Uncertainties do to the Insurance Industry?  This paper addresses issues 
related to Goals 10, 11 and 12.  The question posed in the title can most easily shown by a graph 
shown in the paper (Appendix C).  The graph presents the results of two loss-estimation models 
offered for the region by different modeling firms.  The models differ to an acceptable degree in 
the low probability range of about 0.001 per annum.  For more rare and more frequent events the 
difference becomes larger to such an extent that the average annual loss calculated by these 
models varies by a factor of three. This is hardly a satisfactory situation, but it clearly 
demonstrates the problems we are faced with in view of the uncertainties about earthquakes in 
the Mid-America. 
 
 The uncertainties are caused by at least two factors, hazard uncertainty and vulnerability 
uncertainty.  Hazard uncertainties consist of understanding: (1) active earthquake sources and 
earthquake source zones, (2) maximum magnitude and seismicity rates, (3) attenuation of ground 
motion, (4) source depths, (5) stress drop, and (6) deep soil effects.  Vulnerability uncertainties 
consist of understanding: (1) construction style, (2) building regulations, (3) loss experience, and 
(4) the role of lower intensities. 
 
 Enormous progress has been made in elucidating Mid-America seismicity and risk in 
recent years.  However, open issues remain which introduce considerable uncertainties to risk 
assessment: 
 
· Activity of sources other than the 1811/12 source 
· Typical rupture modes (complex vs. simple events) 
· GPS measurements against other observations 
· The role of „deep“ events 
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· The role of stress drop 
· The influence of deep soil deposits 
· The frequency and degree of the damaging effect of low loss events and intensities. 
 
There is a wide scope for the scientific community and a great demand from the insurance 
industry for future research aimed at clarifying these issues and at reducing the concomitant 
uncertainties. 
 
3.2.11. Reducing Seismic Losses for a Large Commercial Line—The Anheuser-Busch 
Approach.  This paper presents a case example of mitigation to reduce losses and achieves Goal 
7 of the workshop.  EQE International has summarized a number of success stories as a result of 
its work in retrofitting existing structures in California.  The most notable was its work on the 
Anheuser-Busch Brewery in Van Nuys, California, approximately 25 km northwest of 
downtown Los Angeles in the general epicentral area of the January 17, 1994, Northridge 
Earthquake. 
 
The Anheuser-Bush Brewery was originally constructed in 1954 with a major addition in 
1981. The Brewery is a large industrial complex producing 12 million barrels of beer per annum.  
Some of the items that were of seismic resistance concern were the brewhouse, stockhouses, 
power plants, and fuel oil and firewater storage tanks.  The estimated cost to replace the Brewery 
was $1.3 billion.  
 
The retrofit project was conducted in three phases.  The first phase involved EQE meeting 
with the client, reviewing structural and equipment drawings; obtaining seismology, geology, 
and soils information; performing on-site reviews of the facilities; and determining the 
earthquake risk to the brewery in terms of the probable maximum loss (PML) if the brewery 
were subjected to a future earthquake.  The estimated PML on the brewhouse and stockhouses 
ranged from 30 to 50% and were designated as high to very high risk for collapse and business 
interruption.  The PML on the power plants ranged from 25 to 35% and were designated as 
moderate to high risk for damage/safety and business interruption.  The PML for the fuel oil and 
firewater storage tanks was at 50% considered very high risk for fire following earthquake. 
 
The second phase of the project involved decision making by the client and EQE acting on 
those decisions.  The client established a desired level of acceptable risk at 15% for damage with 
considerable importance placed on business interruption.  As a result, EQE was asked to perform 
detailed engineering analyses of potential strengthening options, cost/benefit analysis of those 
options and resulting conclusions and recommendations.   
 
The third phase of the project involved the actual project implementation of the most cost-
effective strengthening option.  Final design was performed, development of construction 
drawings and specifications as well as a construction schedule.  Construction on the retrofit 
project began in 1989 and was completed in1993 at a cost of $17 million represent only 1.3% of 
the total facility replacement cost of the facility.  The $17 million also included planned major 
facility process upgrades in addition to the seismic strengthening measures constructed. 
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 Following the Northridge earthquake, the damage of the Brewery was evaluated as light 
($35 million) with damage mainly to the nonretrofitted sections.  The retrofit designs achieved 
better performance than anticipated and initial operations resumed in four days and full 
production of the Brewery occurred within seven days.  Although the damage ($35 million) was 
twice the $17 million in retrofit costs, it was estimated that the retrofit resulted in a total avoided 
cost of over $750 million dollars in losses, or a 4200% payoff on investment in less than one 
year.  As a result of this experience, Anheuser-Bush has also completed a similar seismic retrofit 
project at its St. Louis brewery. 
 
3.2.12. The Need for Seismic Retrofit—Unreinforced Masonry Basements. It is important 
to note that the insurance industry in this country has limited experience with earthquakes.  Most 
of the events in recent years have been on the West Coast, California, Oregon and Washington.  
When we compare the West Coast to the Midwest, we anticipate some significant differences in 
soil types, ground water tables and building designs.  Typically, masonry construction does not 
perform well during an earthquake.  Moreover, we have very little experience with basements as 
the foundation system.  Most of our earthquake experience has been with slab on grade or pier 
and beam foundation systems, since basements are not typically used on the seismicly active 
West Coast.  Thus, this commissioned paper actually discusses one issue related to Goal 6, i.e., 
what are the specific structural details required to mitigate damage to unreinforced masonry 
basements. 
 
 To date, the insurance industry has been unable to estimate the amount of existing building 
stock exhibiting unreinforced masonry basements.  It is possible that there is a significant 
inventory, especially with older building stock throughout the New Madrid area.  When a major 
event occurs, we anticipate these structures to suffer catastrophic failure.  The failure of the 
foundation system will result in the failure of the building with extensive collapse of structures.  
These structural failures may well result in a higher frequency of injury and death to the 
occupants, particularly if the event occurs during evenings or weekends 
 
 The insurance industry believes there is a need for seismic retrofit for unreinforced 
masonry basements.  Today, nothing exists to help a homeowner determine if the basement is 
unreinforced and, if it is, how the homeowner should retrofit the basement.  Basement retrofit 
may be complex and is viewed today as probably being too costly for a homeowner to justify.  
What is needed is research and laboratory testing of designs to effectively retrofit unreinforced 
masonry basements.  The retrofit needs to be cost-effective, yet efficient, in reducing the 
probability of catastrophic structural failure.  Saying that “nothing exists” or that “it’s too 
complicated” is not the answer. 
 
3.2.13. Mid-America at Risk:  Insurance and Natural Disaster.  Insurance against natural 
hazards is a business involving: accountants, actuaries, salespersons, brokers, claims adjusters, 
managers, and executives; other property casualty insurance companies; reinsurance companies; 
and state regulators.   Insurance is a product providing value to the insured at the cost of a 
premium.  In theory, insurers can offer protection to the insured against any risk that they can 
identify, as long as they can obtain reliable information about the frequency and magnitude of 
potential losses, and they have the freedom to set realistic premiums.  Thus, this commissioned 
paper addresses all fourteen goals from a global perspective. 
 18 
 
Every year, the Earth's atmospheric, geologic, and hydrologic systems generate 100,000 
thunderstorms, 10,000 floods, thousands of landslides, over 100 earthquakes large enough to be 
damaging, hundreds of wildfires, scores of windstorms (hurricanes, cyclones, typhoons and 
tornadoes), and dozens of volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, and droughts.  Fortunately, extreme 
events (e. g., 500-year floods, category 5 hurricanes, magnitude 8 or greater earthquakes, large-
volume explosive volcanoes, large-volume landslides; tsunamis affecting the entire Pacific rim, 
wide spread, long-duration wildfires, and long duration droughts) and combinations of extreme 
events (e.g., earthquakes - tsunamis - landslides - floods -fires; or hurricanes - floods - landslides 
- coastal erosion) are rare occurrences.   
 
 The bad news of the 20th century is that insured losses and overall economic losses from 
natural hazards are increasing with time. Natural hazards do not respect geographic or political 
boundaries, seasons, schedules, time of day, a business’ balance sheet, or a community’s state-
of-preparedness, losses are increasing due to rapid growth of population and the increasing 
vulnerability of cities and megacities having large concentrations of people living and working in 
disaster-prone regions and buildings surrounded by fragile infrastructure, neither of which were 
planned, located, designed, and constructed to be resilient to floods, severe storms, earthquakes, 
landslides, volcanoes, wildfires, tsunamis, and droughts.  
 
 Natural disasters represent policy failures.  The financial sector, business, industry, 
governmental and non-governmental organizations, and the citizens and policy makers (i.e., 
mayors, city managers, city councils can work together as partners, as for example in the Central 
United States, to make natural disaster reduction a public value. 
 
3.2.14. Earthquake Benefit/Cost Study-Can Mitigation as a Public Value Be Accomplished 
Without it?  This commissioned paper gets down to specific discussion of benefit/cost studies 
and discusses issues primarily related to Goals 10, 12, 13 and 14. 
 
Stakeholders such as insurance companies will most likely require that Benefit/Cost studies 
be completed in order to begin to provide a widespread offering of financial incentives to their 
customers.  These studies could be accomplished if a process for collecting the necessary 
detailed structural information for specific structures could be devised.  Then using this 
information along with the existing catastrophe models to do the analyses would enable 
stakeholders such as the insurance companies to gather the information they are likely to need to 
financially justify the offering of mitigation incentives. 
 
 The MAE Center could potentially improve the Benefit/Cost analyses that would serve to 
encourage insurance companies or other stakeholders to provide mitigation incentives as follows:  
1.) by improving the models through focused research that reduces the uncertainty inherent in the 
catastrophe models in use today; and 2.) by promoting ways for gathering more construction 
information on each individual structure so that a more specific estimate of the expected losses 
for a specific structure could be determined instead of using default or average structural 
characteristics to do the estimating for the “as is built” condition and for certain “what-if?” 
mitigation alternatives.  But if these actions by the MAE Center are not done, it will not 
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necessarily preclude individual companies from completing their own Benefit/Cost analyses and 
then offer mitigation incentives based on analysis tools already available to them. 
 
 
 
4. BREAKOUT SESSION RESULTS 
 
 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 As discussed in Section 3.1, on the second day, the workshop attendees broke up into two 
working groups, those representing personal lines and those representing commercial lines and 
reinsurance.  The purpose of each group was to identify specific earthquake research needs and 
prioritize them.  Each working group was assigned a facilitator and secretary.   
 
 
4.2. PERSONAL LINES 
 
4.2.1. Key Discussion Points.  Dennis Fasking from Allstate Insurance was assigned as the 
facilitator of the Personal Lines Group and Gary Patterson from the Center for Earthquake 
Research and Information was assigned as the secretary.  Both were members of the Planning 
Committee.  Dennis opened the Personal Lines Breakout Session (PLBS) with a summary of the 
IPC purpose and goals of the workshop.  Following Dennis’ opening remarks key discussion 
points captured by Gary Patterson during the breakout session are provided below.  In addition, 
following each key discussion point, the MAE Center staff have responded (in italics) by 
identifying existing activities and, or, new initiatives that could close out the discussion point. 
 
· The MAE Center has a strong presence’s in the NMSZ; however, there is also a need 
for more research and emphasis on other seismic zones, for example, the Wabash 
Valley, East Tennessee and Charleston, South Carolina. 
 
The MAE Center long-range plan is to expand its Hazards Evaluation Program to 
these other areas.  At the most recent review of the Hazards Evaluation Program, 
specific discussion occurred about which areas should the Center move into next. 
 
· As presented in Section 3.2.12, the MAE Center should establish a research program 
on developing retrofit measures for unreinforced masonry basements. 
 
The MAE Center is in the process of developing a plan to begin conducting research 
on cost-effective retrofit measures for unreinforced masonry basements. 
 
· Similar to what was discussed in Sections 3.2.5 and 3.2.6, means of retrofitting of 
residential structures, including unreinforced masonry basements is needed.  
Residential structures can be retrofitted structurally and nonstructurally.  The 
insurance industry and the public need to know the cost effectiveness of retrofitting 
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structurally to maintain life safety and to reduce losses.  What can be done to 
establish cost-effective retrofit guidelines? 
 
Retrofit guidelines have been developed for seismic areas of the West Coast.  The 
MAE Center now has a project to take West Coast retrofit guidelines and modify them 
to be applicable to Mid-America.  This project is being funded jointly by State Farm 
Insurance Companies and the USGS.  In addition, the MAE Center has created a 
pilot project to study new cost-effective retrofit techniques with the members of the 
insurance industry as advisors. 
 
· Although, not specifically identified as a goal of this workshop, the issue of how the 
MAE Center could assist the insurance industry in a post-earthquake response mode 
was discussed. 
 
The MAE Center has a project (SG-1) that will provide state of the art 
communications between seismic stations and emergency managers.  This is a service 
that claims adjusters and insurance hazard coordinators could subscribe.  Using 
elements of this project a forum was recently held (April 2000) on the kick-off of the 
Rapid Earthquake Information System (REIS) for the New Madrid Seismic Zone. The 
REIS is sponsored by the Center for Earthquake Research and Information at the 
University of Memphis and the MAE Center.  The REIS is designed to provide 
information to scientists, government and private institutions, and the public within 
sufficient time to allow effective response to a damaging earthquake. 
 
· There needs to be a consumer education/awareness program about earthquake hazards 
in Mid-America and earthquake insurance.  As noted above in Section 2.3 there is at 
least a $20 billion portfolio insurance market in seven states.  It is believed that many 
consumers do not know that their homeowner policy does not cover earthquake 
insurance. 
 
As noted above, the MAE Center is has an Education Program to educate the public 
on the seismic hazard in Mid-America; however, it only deals with the hazard and 
mitigation of the risk, i.e., retrofit techniques, both structural and non-structural.  The 
MAE Center is willing to work with the insurance industry to educate the public on 
the issues of earthquake insurance, it availability and affordability. 
 
· The insurance industry needs to have concrete mitigation solutions to specific 
housing types and soil conditions so it can properly educate the public.  Thus, the 
insurance industry, as a whole, should fund research on residential-single family 
dwellings that is focused on specific mitigation measures.  A consortium of insurers 
might be formed to fund such research. 
 
As discussed above, the MAE Center has created and funded a pilot project to study 
new cost-effective retrofit techniques with the members of the insurance industry as 
advisors.  The advisors of this represent IBHS’ Research Advisory Committee, State 
Farm Insurance Companies and Allstate Insurance.  While this project is moving 
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forward, the MAE Center and IBHS are evaluating the establishment of a consortium 
of insurers that will fund research to develop cost-effective mitigation for single 
family dwellings. 
 
· Research on cost-effective mitigation techniques is needed for chimneys; 
unreinforced-masonry homes; soft structures, for example, homes with bedrooms 
above garages; connectivity between brick and stone veneer and wood framing, crawl 
spaces, conventional foundations and unreinforced basements.  In addition, the 
insurance industry needs to understand the relative performance of homes of different 
types of construction and age. 
 
Again, the MAE Center has funded the pilot project mentioned above.  However, this 
project can only address one small element of those listed above.  The project is 
looking at the connectivity between brick veneer and wood framing.  This project is 
funded by the Center at $60,000 and is a one-year project.  However, this project is 
only a beginning.  The MAE Center is now evaluating the establishment of a project 
on unreinforced basements. 
 
4.2.2. Prioritization of Insurance Industry Needs.  Following the breakout session discussion 
and the identification of the above “key discussion points,” the group developed a listing of 
thirteen prioritized “general needs” that would be of significant benefit to the personal lines 
insurance industry.  The needs are a mixture of research, planning and education.  The prioritized 
list is as follows: 
 
· Understanding the earthquake exposure in Southern Illinois. 
· Understanding the earthquake exposure in Mid-America. 
· Development of cost-effective retrofit techniques for residential structures to 
include unreinforced masonry basements, crawl spaces, chimneys, brick and stone 
veneer, garages, carports, etc. 
· Enhance consumer awareness of the risk and the corresponding expectations of 
earthquake damage and how that damage can be mitigated through retrofit. 
· Enhance consumer awareness on retrofit techniques, including which retrofit 
techniques are most cost-effective as a function of home construction, i.e., a 
prioritization of retrofit techniques. 
· Planning for post event communication with the public. 
· Understand and develop improved geotechnical database to reduce the uncertainty 
in seismic hazard, both pre- and post-event. 
· Need to develop effective communication models to establish stronger outreach 
relationships to the public. 
· Establish a rapid earthquake information system for post-earthquake response and 
recovery. 
· Must establish a global sharing of information. 
· Should establish a pilot city to study the issues of existing structures and the 
resulting needs. 
· Should conduct research on the performance of structures and use that knowledge 
to identify retrofit needs. 
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· Should establish a broadbased consortium of the insurance industry, including loss 
estimation modelers. 
 
Based on this list of prioritized needs, it appears that the top priority issue resulting from this 
breakout session is to better understand the seismic hazard.  This is in direct line with the MAE 
Center research program in that one of the three research thrust areas is the Hazard Evaluation 
Program.  The next area of research needs appears to be the development of cost-effective 
retrofit techniques of residential structures.  The third area of needs appears to be the education 
of the consumer. 
 
4.2.3. Recommendations.  In concluding their breakout session, the personal lines group made 
two general recommendations.  The first recommendation was that the Research and Advisory 
Committee of IBHS should serve as a focus group for future activities related to new research to 
support the insurance industry, including the formation of a broad based consortium identified as 
a key discussion point.  The Response and Recovery Committee of IBHS could be a focus group 
for future activities related to data and communications during the response and recovery phase 
of future earthquake events with communications. 
 
The second recommendation was that the MAE Center should put together a proposal with 
time frames and costs and identify deliverables to establish a consortium of insurance companies 
to fund earthquake research.  It was suggested that IBHS should serve as the medium for the 
formation as noted in the first recommendation. 
 
 
4.3. COMMERCIAL LINES AND REINSURANCE 
 
Dale, Dan, Peter and Anselm during changes of computers my detail files on this session 
where lost.  However, Dave Unnewehr and I have collaborated our hand written notes and 
memories as to what we did during this session.  If you have anything else you would like to add 
please do so.  Our recommendations section is not specific like the personal lines group, but my 
recollection is that this group wanted everything done at the same time.  I remember asking the 
question, if we only have $40,000 what would you do first and the group really didn’t want to 
make a choice.  I remember Dan or Dale finally making a choice(which may have been research 
on tilt-up construction) although Dave and I do not remember the specific.  However, after that 
choice was made, my recollection is that the group as a whole wanted it to go as I have 
discussed in the recommendation section (4.3.3) discussed below for the group. 
 
4.3.1. Key Discussion Points.  David Unnewehr from the American Insurance Association was 
assigned as the facilitator of the Commercial Lines and Reinsurance Group and Jim Beavers 
from the MAE Center was assigned as the secretary.  Similar to the personal lines group, the 
commercial lines and reinsurance group also came up with some key discussion points, many the 
same or similar to the personal lines group.  These discussion points are listed below with 
comment on related MAE Center activities. 
 
· The reinsurance industry and the insurance industry as a whole needs to have a 
better understanding, alone with the scientific community, on the seismicity rates 
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and event probabilities of earthquakes in Mid-America.  In addition, a better 
understanding of the effects of an earthquake at distance from the epicenter is 
needed.  Does the relationship change based on the size of earthquakes?  What 
about focusing effects?  These issues are all critical to pricing of insurance and 
Probable Maximum Loss considerations. 
 
This issue is similar to one raised by the personal lines group.  Again, one of the 
major research thrust areas of the MAE Center is the Hazards Evaluation Program.  
The issues mention here are part of the program. 
 
· There is uncertainty in the loss estimation models used by modelers that result in 
significant spreads in the data for commercial exposure to losses, including fire 
following earthquake.  The insurance industry needs to have a better understanding 
if the newer models are reducing this disparity. 
 
The MAE Center has been working with modelers and will continue to provide 
research results to the modelers so loss estimation models can be improved. 
 
· What should business continuation and recovery plans include to mitigate the loss 
to business property, revenues and human life? 
 
The MAE Center’s vision for its research products is that they will be implemented 
and as a result of that implementation, losses will be reduced in future earthquakes.  
If funded by the insurance industry, the Center could conduct research on the 
effectiveness of various elements of business plans to improve the reduction of 
losses from future earthquakes. 
 
· The insurance industry needs to understand the current state of commercial 
construction in Mid-America, i.e., will structures built to today’s codes reduce 
damage and injury compared to those structures built previously. 
 
It is generally believed that new construction, especially those jurisdictions using 
the latest seismic code requirements, will result in reduced damage and losses.  
This is one reason why the MAE Center has focused one of its research thrust areas 
on existing buildings.  In future earthquakes, the losses will come from the existing 
built environment and without the development of cost-effective retrofit 
technologies, the risks will not be reduced. 
 
· The insurance industry needs to better understand how tilt-up construction is being 
built and how much seismic resistance such construction has in Mid-America. 
 
The MAE Center is beginning to complete its research thrust area on Essential 
Facilities and move into the area of Industrial Facilities.  The MAE Center may 
begin addressing this issue at that time.  However, specific issues should be brought 
to the attention of the Center. 
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· The insurance industry should develop a Building Code Effectiveness Rating 
Schedule for earthquake design, similar to that for wind. 
 
The MAE Center is willing to work with the insurance industry to assist in the 
development of such a rating schedule. 
 
· The insurance industry needs to better understand which businesses will be more 
impacted as a result of an earthquake, e.g., loss of life from employees and 
customers, and be able to tell those businesses what they can do to mitigate the risk. 
 
As noted above, the MAE Center will be creating a new thrust area on Industrial 
Facilities.  While the field of Industrial Facilities does not capture all businesses, 
some of what is learned will be applicable to other business. 
 
4.3.2. Prioritization of Research.  The commercial lines and reinsurance group did not 
develop a prioritized list of activities.  In fact, the group thought that many of their concerns 
needed to be addressed in parallel.  However, they did list a similar set of research needs. 
 
· Understanding of the seismic hazard in Mid-America needs significant 
improvement. 
· Better definition of soil types throughout Mid-America needs to be developed and 
mapped. 
· There needs to be an inventory of the building types housing commercial lines. 
· There needs to be an inventory of commercial lines classifying them as to 
occupation by number of employees and members of the public.  This is important 
from a life safety perspective. 
· Research needs to be conducted on the performance of tilt-up construction in Mid-
America during earthquakes. 
· Research needs to be conducted on the performance of high-rise construction at 
great distances during a New Madrid type event. 
 
4.3.3. Recommendations 
 
The commercial lines and reinsurance group took more of a global approach to the Mid-
America earthquake problem and seemed to feel that all of the issues addressed during the 
workshop were important and extremely intertwined.  As a result, no specific recommendations 
were related to the research needs identified in Section 4.3.2.  The overriding theme of the group 
seemed to place a high priority on research on all fronts and to let the MAE Center determine the 
priority and specific recommendations based on further study and future research funds. 
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4.4. OTHER AREAS OF DISCUSSION 
 
In preparation for the workshop research and/or improved knowledge needs were identified 
by the insurance industry that were not fully captured in the notes of the breakout sessions.  From 
a claims department perspective, the insurance industry needs to know what specific components 
in a structure are likely to be damaged or destroyed for a given size earthquake and what can be 
done to retrofit those components.  This issue is actually covered by research on cost-effective 
retrofit technologies discussed above.  As this research progresses for various type structures 
specific components and retrofit strategies will be identified. 
 
Loss of power as it relates to food spoilage and fire ignitions following earthquakes were 
also identified as issues.  Contents and how they respond to earthquakes was raised as an issue, 
although contents are usually considered as part of the non-structural inventory discussed above.  
Land use and the enforcement of building codes was also mention as an issue.  The enforcement 
of building codes was a significant discussion during the workshop and at least four 
commissioned papers addressed the subject.  However, very little was mentioned about land use 
planning and land use planning did not come up in the breakout sessions as a major item.  
Perhaps this is due to the completeness and effectiveness of work by IBHS’s Land Use Planning 
Committee Land use planning will reduce losses in future earthquakes and could be an area of 
future research for the MAE Center. 
 
Translating damage estimates into insured claims losses for physical repairs and 
replacement of structures, for loss of contents, and for an insured’s coverage for additional living 
expenses were also addressed as issues and would need to be addressed in any measurement of 
the relative effectiveness of structural strengthening actions. 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 The Mid-America Earthquake Insurance Workshop – New Research Needs was a success.  
It represents the first time IBHS, the insurance industry and the MAE Center had sat down to 
discuss common issues and needs.  It allowed IBHS and the insurance industry to better 
articulate their earthquake research needs and provided the MAE Center with potential direction 
for the future. 
 
 As discussed above in Section 4, numerous research needs and issues were identified.  
Although there is a long list, some very general and some very detailed, it appears the highest 
priority research needs can be identified into two general categories, improved understanding of 
the seismic hazard and retrofit and performance of structures.  In addition, to the general 
category of research needs, education of the consumer was also identified as a high priority. 
 
 In the case of research needs for understanding the seismic hazard, the MAE Center and its 
partners, like the United States Geological Survey, are devoting significant resources toward 
solving this problem, with special emphasis on reducing the uncertainty.  However, with respect 
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to understanding the performance of structures, there were specific research needs identified that 
the MAE Center has not been addressing.  That research being the performance and retrofit of 
residential construction.  As a result and as noted above, the MAE Center has established and is 
funding a pilot project on residential construction with representatives of the insurance industry 
as advisors.  The research project consists of the evaluation of the seismic performance and 
assessment of the vulnerability of a common class of light-frame construction (wood frame 
structures with brick veneer) using cyclic static tests of representative component subassemblies 
and dynamic tests of wall systems.  In addition, the Center is in the process of developing a 
program on the seismic performance and vulnerability of residential construction consisting of 
unreinforced masonry basements and crawl spaces. 
 
 As discussed in the personal lines breakout session two recommendations were made 
related to the formation of an insurance industry seismic research consortium.  The first was for 
the Research Advisory Committee of IBHS to act as a focal point of the insurance industry and 
the second for MAE Center to prepare a proposal for the formation of such a consortium.  While 
this was discussed in the closing session no formal recommendations were made at that time.  
However, the MAE Center and IBHS through the Collaboratory are pursuing the establishment 
of the consortium. 
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MID-AMERICA EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE WORKSHOP 
--- 
NEW RESEARCH NEEDS 
 
 
PEABODY HOTEL 
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE 
 
JULY 28 AND 29, 1999 
 
PROGRAM AGENDA 
 
 
Tuesday, July 27 
 
5:00- 7:00 pm  Early Arrival Sign-In/Package Pick-Up (Forest Room) 
6:00- 7:00 pm  Hosted Reception (IBHS) (Forest Room) 
 7:00 pm  Planning Committee Dinner (Brinkley Room) 
 
Wednesday, July 28 
 
7:00 am Sign-In/Package Pick-Up and Continental Breakfast (Foyer Venetian Room) 
 
  8:00 am Welcome, Introductions, Purpose - Jim Beavers/Harvey Ryland (Venetian Room) 
 
  8:10 am Anti-Trust Announcement - Anti-Trust Monitor 
 
  8:15 am Mid-America Earthquake Center and Earthquake Insurance Issues - Dan 
Abrams, Mid-America Earthquake Center, University of Illinois. 
 
  8:45 am Panel 1- Moderator, Harvey Ryland, IBHS 
  Seismic Design Requirements of the Future , Gerry Jones, Retired 
Building Code Official and Chairman, Multi-Hazard Mitigation Council, 
National Institute of Building Sciences. 
  The Insurance Industries Role in Building Codes, Dave Unnewehr, 
American Insurance Association 
  Building Code Effectiveness Grading Schedule for Seismic Design, 
Ralph Dorio, Insurance Services Office  
  
10:15 am Break 
 
10:40 am Panel 2 -  Moderator, Dennis Fasking, Allstate Insurance 
  Future Issues of Seismic Retrofit, Dan Dolan, Virginia Tech  
 The Need for Insurance Industry Support of Seismic Retrofit, Paul 
Devlin, IBHS 
 Retrofit Experience with Personal Lines, Steve Marlin, USAA 
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12:10 pm Lunch (Forest Room) 
 
  1:30 pm Panel 3 - Moderator, Jim Beavers, Mid-America Earthquake Center, University 
of Illinois 
 What Really Happened in 1811 and 1812 and Will It Happen 
Again?  Arch Johnston, Mid-America Earthquake Center Hazards 
Evaluation Program Coordinator and University of Memphis 
 Will New Maps Lower or Raise the Hazard? Bob Herrmann, Mid-
America Earthquake Center and Saint Louis University 
 What Do the Uncertainties Do To the Insurance Industry?  Anselm 
Smolka, Munich Reinsurance. 
  
3:00 pm Break 
 
3:30 pm Reducing Seismic Losses for a Large Commercial Line -- The Anheuser-
Busch Approach, Michael Griffin, EQE International. 
 
4:00 pm Mid-America at Risk--What You and Insurance Can Do.  Walter Hays, 
American Society of Civil Engineers. 
  
 4:50 pm Breakout Session Instructions 
  
 5:00 pm Close 
 
 6:00 pm Hosted Reception (IBHS) (Forest Room) 
 
  7:00 pm Dinner (Forest Room) 
Speaker:  Mr. Bill Thomas, Sr. VP, Personal Lines Underwriting, SAFECO 
 
Thursday, July 29 
 
  7:00 am Continental Breakfast (Foyer Venetian Room) 
 
  8:00 am Earthquake Benefit/Cost Study -- Can Mitigation As A Public Value Be 
Achieved Without It? Dennis Fasking, Allstate Insurance (Venetian Room) 
 
  8:30 am Breakout Sessions -- 1) Commercial Lines (Venetian Room) and 2) Personal 
Lines (Louis XVI Room) 
 
10:30 am Break 
 
11:00 am Plenary Session -- Prioritizing Insurance Research Needs (Venetian Room) 
 
12:30 pm Close of Workshop 
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Antitrust Compliance Statement 
 
The Institute for Business and Home Safety strives to conduct all its activities in compliance 
with the antitrust laws.  The federal antitrust laws prohibit all agreements, which unreasonably 
interfere with free and open competition.  The McCarran-Ferguson Act allows the insurance 
industry to operate under a limited federal antitrust exemption, subject to insurance regulation by 
the states.  With the exception of acts of boycotts, coercion and intimidation, which are matters 
saved for federal antitrust enforcement, the states provide for the regulation of insurance and 
enforcement sanctions.  State regulators are administering the insurance industry in areas such as 
rates, unfair trade practices, claims practices, solvency, as well as others. 
 
The extent of the limited exemption is not well defined and antitrust concerns are serious 
matters, particularly in the area of pricing.  Price fixing and conspiracies to set prices are, per se, 
violations of the federal antitrust laws.  Other than that, application of the antitrust laws to a 
particular set of circumstances can be ambiguous.  Therefore, this meeting will err on the side of 
caution to avoid any chance that you as participants may be subject to prison and/or treble 
damages.  Most importantly, remember that discussions in violation of antitrust laws are no less 
punishable if they take place outside of this meeting room. 
 
The following subjects will give rise to antitrust problems.  We will not be discussing them as 
part of any joint activities. 
 
· Raising, lowering or stabilizing actual rates 
 
· Restricting the availability of insurance 
 
· Allocating markets, territories or insureds 
 
· Boycotting in any form 
 
· Actual or future prices 
 
· Profit levels 
 
· Credit terms 
 
· Premium costs 
 
· Quoting or not quoting certain classes or types of risks 
 
If any company participating in this meeting were to transact its business with respect to any one 
of the above topics in a manner similar to a participant who is a competitor, the discussion of that 
topic at this meeting may be offered as evidence of the existence of a conspiracy in violation of 
the antitrust laws. 
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The MAE Center Approach to  
Understanding Earthquakes in Mid-America 
 
 
Daniel P. Abrams 
 
 
Director, Mid-America Earthquake Center 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This introductory paper provides an overview of the goals and programs of the Mid-America 
Earthquake Center and serves as a preface to this workshop on insuring against earthquake 
losses.  A brief description of the vision, mission and goals of the Mid-America Earthquake 
Center is followed by a discussion on how the Center will reduce earthquake losses through 
research and education.    Examples are given that demonstrate how the insurance industry can 
work with the Center in developing more accurate risk assessment tools through the sharing of 
researchers and facilities and by forming a cooperative research group. 
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Introduction 
 
Since its inception in October of 1997, the central focus of the Mid-America Earthquake Center 
has been to reduce earthquake losses through research and education.   The better the public and 
the private sectors are informed on their earthquake risk in the eastern and central United States 
the more they can protect their investments in construction and business.  
 
Attention to the Mid-America earthquake problem is slowly developing among practicing 
engineers, architects, planners, developers, and industry and community leaders.  The insurance 
industry has become aware of the significant loss potential of an infrequent, but high 
consequence event like the New Madrid earthquake (approximately $200 billion) and requires 
more precise estimates of the risk.   Communities are concerned about their loss potential (the 
FEMA Project Impact program has designated disaster resistant communities in each state) and 
are starting to take measures to mitigate potential effects of multiple hazards including 
earthquakes.   State and federal transportation departments acknowledge the vulnerability of 
national highway, waterway, railway and airway networks to an earthquake in the central United 
States.   Though investments in seismic retrofit are not routine in Mid-America, benefit-cost 
studies have shown seismic rehabilitation to be prudent for system-wide communities or nation-
wide networks when indirect business losses and public health and safety issues are considered.  
 
If research of the MAE Center over a ten-year period can reduce losses from a repeat of the New 
Madrid earthquake by as little as 10%, the savings in expected losses will be approximately a 
thousand times the research investment.  Moreover, mitigation practices based on large, but 
infrequent earthquakes can help to reduce losses for the more frequent, lesser ground motions 
that are quite likely to occur even over the short life of an engineering research center.   A repeat 
of an event such as the 1898 Cairo-Charleston earthquake has over a 50% probability of 
occurrence in the next fifty years. The reduction in earthquake losses through research and 
education for even a moderate earthquake can exceed the investment by many times.  
 
 
 
Reducing Losses through Research and Education 
 
 
Vision, Mission and Goals of the MAE Center 
 
The principal long-term goal for the Mid-America Earthquake Center is to reduce potential 
losses resulting from future earthquakes through improved evaluation of seismic hazards and 
development of cost-effective retrofit strategies.  This vision for earthquake engineering practice 
will be obtained in part if the research, education and outreach programs of the MAE Center 
make a difference for the better in reducing economic losses and insuring the health and safety of 
the public.  To accomplish this long-term goal, the research thrust areas of the Center 
incorporates the discovery process in a holistic and integrated fashion with emphasis on the 
systems aspects of earthquake hazard mitigation. 
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The mission of the MAE Center is to develop and disseminate new information on the physical, 
technical, economic and social attributes of the earthquake problem that are unique to the eastern 
and central United States.  To accomplish this mission, research projects are coordinated within 
three primary thrust areas: network vulnerability, facility retrofit, and hazard evaluation.   These 
coordinated research programs aim specifically at systematic seismic risk reduction plans.  
Programs and subsequent projects are organized in a complementary, cross- and multi-
disciplinary, manner to identify and evaluate possible seismic hazards, and to develop loss 
reduction strategies for the built environment.  
  
Nearly all of the engineering research of the MAE Center is focused on mitigating the effects of 
future earthquakes.  However, other issues such as response, recovery and post-earthquake 
reconstruction are within the MAE Center’s domain of interest, since the Center is viewed as the 
regional center for studies of earthquakes that occur east of the Rocky Mountains. 
  
As adopted from the strategic plan of the National Earthquake Loss Reduction Program, the four 
major goals of the MAE Center are:  
 
1. Improve engineering of the built environment.  
2. Improve data for construction standards and codes.  
3. Continue development of seismic hazards and risk assessment tools.  
4. Develop an understanding of societal impacts and responses related to earthquake 
hazard mitigation. 
Under each one of these goals, a series of targets and intended products are listed ranging from 
development of improved analytical techniques and seismic risk assessment methodologies to 
identification of social, economic and political factors that facilitate and hinder the adoption and 
implementation of seismic safety measures.  A complete listing of these goals, targets and 
products can be found on the MAE Center website (http://mae.ce.uiuc.edu). 
 
Thrust Area Research 
 
Formulation of the Center strategic plan was founded on the creation of parallel engineering 
research programs, or thrust areas, on facilities and networks.  The objective of the facilities 
programs is to develop cost-effective retrofit strategies for building structures across a 
community, whereas the objective of the networks programs is to reduce earthquake losses to 
national systems through selective retrofit of critical components.   Two parallel programs were 
envisioned in the Center proposal so that a third program on hazard evaluation could feed into 
both programs.   The overall schedule of these three programs is shown in Figure 1 for an 
anticipated ten-year life of the Center.  
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The first facilities program is directed at those building structures that must remain operable 
immediately following an earthquake to ensure public health and safety.  Retrofit of these 
essential facilities are generally dependent on community-wide concerns for access in response 
and recovery operations rather than on simply recovering the repair costs for the amount of direct 
damage.   These systems include firehouses, police stations, school buildings if used for 
emergency shelters, hospitals and clinics.   The structural system is usually quite simple with a 
wall or frame structure of a few stories.   Technology developed on how these building systems 
respond to earthquakes will be transferred to subsequent programs on industrial and commercial 
buildings.  Retrofit strategies for these building types will be based more on economical 
concerns for building owners rather than on public health and safety across a community.  Since 
the structural systems for industrial and commercial buildings may entail different materials and 
construction types than the low-rise essential facilities, progression of the facilities thrust area 
shall broaden to a variety of building types.   The coordinator of the Essential Facilities Program 
is Professor Barry Goodno at Georgia Institute of Technology. 
 
The networks track is starting with a coordinated research program on national transportation 
systems.   This program is intentionally conceived with a high leverage potential by including the 
four basic types of transportation networks of Mid-America (highways, railways, waterways and 
airways).   The nodes and links of transportation networks represent the coarsest mesh of 
networks and are thus the easiest to identify.  These systems are studied initially also because of 
the interests in transportation engineering at the core institutions (Illinois, Georgia Tech, 
Washington University, MIT and Texas A&M) and the ongoing federal and state programs on 
infrastructure renewal of transportation structures.   Subsequent networks programs are 
envisioned on telecommunication and power systems that will benefit from the network 
vulnerability models developed in the first phase on transportation. The coordinator of the 
Telecommunication NetworksTelecommunication Networks
Industrial FacilitiesIndustrial Facilities
Forecasted ProgramsForecasted Programs
Transportation NetworksTransportation Networks
Active ProgramsActive Programs
Essential FacilitiesEssential Facilities
Power NetworksPower Networks
Commercial FacilitiesCommercial Facilities
Figure 1    Thrust Area Research Programs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Hazard Evaluation
Year
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Transportation Networks Program is Professor Tim Stark at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign. 
 
The Hazard Evaluation Program is intended to provide basic information on expected ground 
motions to the other two programs.   The nature of research in seismology and geophysics tends 
to be extended over a long period of time because of the monitoring of instrumentation networks 
over several years.   Unlike engineering research where projects of a two or three year duration 
can be sequenced and phased, hazard evaluation projects tend to be more continuous and provide 
information intermittently as the ground is shifting. The coordinator of the Hazards Evaluation 
Program is Professor Arch Johnston at the University of Memphis. 
 
A complete listing, and a two-page task statement, of all research projects in these three thrust 
areas can be found on the MAE Center website (http://mae.ce.uiuc.edu). 
 
 
Products and Deliverables from MAE Center Research 
 
One aspect of a center approach, unlike that of traditional single investigator projects, is that a 
strong emphasis can be placed on development of tangible implementation products.   Categories 
of research projects grouped by discipline (seismology, geotechnical engineering, structural 
engineering and social-economic) are shown around the perimeter of the diagram shown in 
Figure 2.   Projects in each of these categories comprise the coordinated research thrust areas 
described earlier.    
 
Figure 2   Flow of Research Outcomes to Systems-Level Implementation Products
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Figure 2 depicts the flow of research outcomes to system-level products that can be implemented 
to achieve earthquake loss reduction.  Each of these groups of implementation products will help 
achieve one or more of the four fundamental goals of the center.  Regional hazard maps will 
transfer technology from seismological research to engineering practitioners.   Retrofit strategies 
developed through engineering research will benefit communities as well as national 
transportation networks.   Software developed within the MAE Center will encapsulate much of 
the fundamental research for easy retrieval by practitioners. Inventory data for construction 
across communities and national networks will be translated to practice in GIS formats for easy 
dissemination.  The ultimate deliverable of the essential facilities program will be an enhanced 
level of public safety.   The ultimate deliverable of the transportation networks program will be 
reduced economic losses across the national transportation system.  
 
 
Education 
 
Education programs are needed to transfer knowledge developed through Center research and 
thus reduce losses through more effective engineering practices.  However, educating only 
engineers on only Center research is an overly narrow approach.  Educational programs can play 
a much more direct role by instructing people of all ages and occupations to the possible 
earthquake hazard in Mid-America and mitigation methods.  This broader focus on education 
will indeed make a much larger impact on reducing losses in future earthquakes than just 
appealing to the engineering community with products that the MAE Center has produced.   
 
The education program of the MAE Center consists of a series of projects that serve as vehicles 
to deliver knowledge and information to the end user.  The recipients of the MAE Center 
education projects are inclusive of all age groups, technical backgrounds and occupations and 
range from students in primary and secondary schools to undergraduates and graduates, 
practitioners and the general public.  The mission of the Center’s education program is to transfer 
knowledge gained from new discoveries, existing technology and collateral associations to these 
recipient groups. Mechanisms for transfer of knowledge to the recipients are the projects that are 
conceived and funded through the Center’s education program.  These mechanisms, or vehicles 
for knowledge flow, can be grouped in four basic categories: (a) innovative educational 
technologies, (b) teaching modules, (c) cross-disciplinary forums, and (d) instructional materials.     
Education projects are distributed across the core institutions and are coordinated by Professor 
Phil Gould at Washington University.   Descriptions of each education project are available on 
the website as well.  
 
 
 
How the MAE Center can Interact with the Insurance Industry 
 
 
In the past, nearly all academic research was done through individual investigator grants.   Ties 
with industry were not necessarily strong because links with universities were through individual 
faculty members who each had to develop their own alliances with industry. This interaction can 
be increased substantially through the coordinated structure of a research center.   The MAE 
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Center research thrust areas are directed largely through extensive involvement of potential end 
users of the research.  The consensus opinion that is formulated through these programs on future 
research directions and interpretations of research results is uncommon in a traditional academic 
setting.  The focus of these programs on development of practical products that will reduce 
losses in future earthquakes is also unique and attractive to industry practitioners.  The few 
examples, which follow, help to demonstrate these concepts relative to the interests of the 
insurance industry. 
 
 
Assessing Earthquake Risk 
 
As described earlier, the three coordinated research thrust areas of the MAE Center provide the 
research integration to help improve on the accuracy of evaluating future earthquake hazards and 
on the effectiveness of prescribing retrofit strategies. A few definable products of these programs 
will be a new set of hazard maps for Mid America, new methods for retrofitting existing 
buildings and bridges, improved loss assessment methodologies for communities and national 
transportation networks, and mitigation action plans for community leaders to follow.  
 
The technology and skills developed by these research teams will be transferable to address the 
needs of a specific group such as the insurance industry.   For example, with the existing Center 
expertise and staffing, associated projects can be envisioned that will provide modeling tools for 
specifying earthquake risk at a particular location.   Not only can this technology improve on 
probability estimates for earthquakes of a particular intensity at a specific site, estimates can also 
be given as to the level of damage for a particular type of construction in its existing and 
retrofitted state.   With future development of risk modeling tools, damage probabilities for 
buildings, bridges and other structures can be obtained by specifying their location coordinates.    
Data generated from these models can then be used to assess the risk and assign premium and 
deductible rates.  Data can also be used to evaluate reduction in rates for retrofitted structures 
which can serve to motivate building owners to take precautionary measures.  
 
 
Access to Center Research Facilities 
 
The research facilities of the MAE Center core institutions are linked for convenient access by 
industry.  Existing structural engineering laboratories at the University of Illinois, Georgia Tech, 
Washington University, and Texas A&M have facilities for the static and dynamic testing of 
structural components and assemblages.   Large-scale replicas of buildings as tall as thirty-five  
feet can be tested at the new Georgia Tech structures laboratory.   Reduced-scale models of civil 
engineering structures can be tested dynamically on the University of Illinois earthquake 
simulator. 
 
With the cooperation provided by core institutions at the University of Memphis and Saint Louis 
University, a network of instrumentation is in place monitoring ground motions in the New 
Madrid seismic zone.  In addition, GIS stations are in place to monitor movements across the 
New Madrid fault. 
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The MAE Center has access to shared testing facilities at the US Army Construction Engineering 
Research Laboratory (CERL) in Champaign, Illinois, and the US Army Waterways Experiment 
Station (WES) in Jackson, Mississippi.   The Building and Fire Research Laboratory at the 
National Institute of Standards in Gaithersburg, Maryland has also offered the use of its testing 
facilities for MAE Center experiments.  Each of these government laboratories will provide 
access to their facilities on a cost-reimbursable basis for equipment rental and testing services. 
 
The triaxial earthquake and shock simulator at CERL has recently been upgraded for testing of 
structures with six simultaneous components of earthquake ground motions.   This earthquake 
simulator is located on University of Illinois property and is one of the best in the country.   The 
largest geotechnical centrifuge in the United States is located at WES and is presently being used 
for a MAE Center research project.  
 
 
Cooperative Research Programs 
 
One model for multi-corporation research involvement used by the NSF Engineering Research 
Centers program is to assemble a group of related industries to solve common problems through 
cooperative research.   This concept has worked well for industries involved in manufacturing 
and product development because research expenses can be shared by a number of corporations.   
A similar analog can exist with the insurance industry where several firms or corporations are 
interested in improving the accuracy of risk assessment models.   Through cooperative funding, a 
substantial research base can be established that can be directed at those problems of most 
interest to the insurance industry.    
 
Cooperative research between the insurance industry and the MAE Center can be done to: (a)  
better understand the seismology of Mid-America and thus increase the accuracy of re-
occurrence probabilities for a particular level of seismic intensity, (b) examine vulnerability of 
existing forms of construction and thus help to further refine seismic risk and set premiums, and 
(c) investigate cost-effective retrofit methods for reducing damage to particular types of 
construction and thus help to reduce claims. One of the purposes of this workshop is to explore 
how the insurance industry and the Mid-America Earthquake Center can work together for their 
mutual benefit.  The concept of developing a cooperative research program is a good candidate 
for discussion. 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
Because the Mid-America Earthquake Center is still fairly young, much of its future is yet to be 
determined.  Workshops such as this provide an excellent means for determining how industry 
can develop long-standing ties with the MAE Center, and in so doing, help define the Center’s 
future endeavors and resulting success. 
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The three research thrust areas of the Center as well as its education and outreach activities are 
complementary to interests of the insurance industry.   The goal of this forum is to help refine 
interests of the insurance industry, define a common agenda for reducing the severe effects of 
earthquakes on Mid-America, and establish an action plan that will exploit these complementary 
interests in the most effective manner possible.   
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ABSTRACT 
 
Continental North America's greatest earthquake sequence struck on the western frontier of 
the United States. The frontier was not California but the valley of the continent's greatest 
river, the Mississippi, and the sequence was the New Madrid earthquakes of the winter of 
1811-1812. Their described impacts on the land and the river were so dramatic as to 
produce widespread modern disbelief. However, geological, geophysical, and historical 
research, carried out mostly in the past two decades, has verified much in the historical 
accounts. The sequence included at least six (possibly nine) events of estimated moment 
magnitude M = 7 and two of M ~–  8. The earthquakes occurred on preexisting faults of the 
Reelfoot rift, beneath the saturated alluvium of the river valley, and their violent shaking 
resulted in massive and extensive liquefaction.  The largest earthquakes ruptured at least 
six (and possibly more than seven) intersecting fault segments, one of which broke the 
surface as a thrust fault that disrupted the bed of the Mississippi in at least 2 (and possibly 
four) places.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
A sequence of powerful earthquakes struck the mid-Mississippi River Valley, central United 
States, in the winter of 1811 and 1812.  The two largest probably exceeded the size of any 
continental western U.S. earthquake.  No fewer than 18 of these events were felt on the Atlantic 
seaboard or in Washington D.C. (Nuttli 1987), at least 1000 km east, which implies moment 
magnitude M >~  6.0-6.5 (Table 1).  Over time, this earthquake series has taken the name of the 
small riverboat town New Madrid, which lay at the heart of the epicentral zone and which in 
1811 was the largest settlement on the river between the Ohio River and Natchez.  The name has 
proven apt, for New Madrid by happenstance marks the intersection of three of the six fault 
segments currently illuminated by microseismicity and believed to be rupture planes of the 
principal 1811-1812 earthquakes. 
A comprehensive scientific assessment of the effects of the New Madrid earthquakes was not 
made until a century after their occurrence.  Myron Fuller (1912), provides a thorough account of 
the geomorphic changes on the upper Mississippi Valley wrought by the earthquakes and a 
summary of the principal historical accounts.  Placement of the earthquakes in the modern 
scientific framework of plate tectonics and seismic magnitude was achieved in the seminal 
papers by Burke & Dewey (1973), Ervin & McGinnis (1975) and Nuttli (1973).  These papers 
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initiated a 20-year period of concentrated research on the New Madrid seismic zone (Johnston & 
Shedlock 1992) that was spurred by the development of nuclear power generation in particular 
and seismic hazard concerns in general.  Much of this work concerned the crustal structure in the 
vicinity of the 1811-1812 earthquakes, but there has been little additional study of the events 
themselves, probably because of the dearth of quantitative information. 
 
Constraints on the faulting that took place during the 1811-1812 earthquakes comes primarily 
from three sources: (a) historical accounts, including far-field intensity data and eyewitness 
reports from the epicentral zone (Figures 1 & 2); (b) seismological effects remaining from the 
earthquakes, such as preserved liquefaction features and present-day seismicity in the rupture 
zone (Figure 4); and (c) the physical structure of the faults and crust of the 1811-1812 fault zone.   
 
 
 
 
Historical Setting 
 
For the researcher trying to gain a modern understanding of the earthquakes, the timing and 
location of the New Madrid sequence is both fortuitous and frustrating.  European settlement of 
the North American interior was well underway, and by 1811 the Mississippi River was already 
fairly heavily traveled.  All river traffic was by unpowered flatboat, barge, or keelboat, but the 
first steamboat on the Mississippi River completed its maiden voyage from the Ohio River to 
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New Orleans between the first principal earthquake on 16 December 1811 and the second on 23 
January 1812.  Settlements west of the Mississippi were so few that virtually all our information 
is limited to the river or points east (Figure 1).  Had the New Madrid earthquakes occurred a 
century or so earlier they would have been included in the realm of paleoseismology; had they 
occurred a century or more later, millions of people would have been at risk, and abundant 
instrumental and macroseismic data would be available.  However, they occurred in the 
transition, the crease in history, when the Mississippi River was for a brief period the western 
frontier of a new nation.  Data useful for assessing the earthquakes in modern terms are available 
but fragmentary, and as a result legends and myths and scientific disbelief have proliferated 
concerning these events. 
A historical perspective is important for assessing both the near- and far-field effects of the 
New Madrid earthquakes.  Figure 1 shows that the epicentral region was on the forward edge of 
European settlement.  Kentucky and Tennessee became states in 1792 and 1796 respectively; 
they were the only two states of the Union with territory in the meisoseismal zone, which lay 
primarily in what would become the states of Missouri (1821) and Arkansas (1836).  The 
restricted population distribution (contoured in Figure 1) is a major problem in estimating the 
earthquakes' sizes from far-field isoseismal data. 
Total population of settlements on the Mississippi River in the main disrupted zone—roughly 
from the mouth of the Ohio River to present-day Memphis, Tennessee—was less than 4000 with 
perhaps one-half living in or near New Madrid (Penick 1981).  (The number of Native 
Americans, although greater, is unknown).  Other estimates place New Madrid's population at 
only several hundred.  Communications between the populous East and the river frontier were 
slow and unreliable.  Not until months after the earthquakes did it become clear that they all 
originated in the New Madrid area. 
The earthquakes began with what was probably the largest shock of the entire series at 02:15 
on 16 December 1811. (All times are local with probable ±30 minute uncertainty.)  There were 
no known foreshocks. The mainshock isoseismals are shown in Figure 1. Note that no felt limit 
is included; given the early morning origin time and the limited population distribution, it has to 
date proven impossible to determine.  Table 1 lists the major earthquakes of the ensuing 
sequence.  The three principal shocks of 16 December 1811 (02:15), 23 January 1812 (09:00), 
and 07 February 1812 (03:45) are designated D1, J1, and F1.  Major aftershocks are numbered 
sequentially after their mainshock.  As Table 1 shows, a number of aftershocks were major 
earthquakes in their own right and thus cannot be neglected in fault rupture scenarios. 
The main sequence duration spanned eight weeks, although the epicentral zone has remained 
active to the present and produced two additional large earthquakes in 1843 (M~6.4) and 1895 
(M~6.8).  Most authors (Nuttli 1973, 1983;  Nuttli et al 1979; Street 1982; Street & Nuttli 1984) 
designate the third principal event F1 as the largest, in contrast with Johnston (1996c) and this 
review.  It should be noted, however, that the magnitudes of the three principal events D1, J1, 
and F1 each lie within the uncertainty bounds of the other two, making their sizes all statistically 
equivalent, clustered about M8.0 (Johnston 1996c).  In addition to differences in size, variation 
in faulting mechanism and epicentral location can account for the reported differences in severity 
among D1, J1 and F1. 
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The most important of the near-field historical accounts are geographically located in Figure 2  
Nearly all are first-hand accounts taken largely from the compilations of Nuttli (1973), Street 
(1982, 1984), and Street & Nuttli (1984). Many of the second-hand, summary accounts are 
cumulative for all the shocks and make it impossible to discriminate among D1, J1, and F1 
effects, a problem that also frustrated Penick (1981). 
The remarkably few extant first-hand accounts from people who were caught in the 1811-
1812 earthquakes are an irreplaceable resource. In this brief review, we cannot present the 
descriptions in detail but can only touch on highlights. For the D1 sequence the accounts from 
the small flotilla of flatboats, keelboats, and barges tied up for the night along the Mississippi 
River (north to south: La Roche 1927, Bedinger 1812, Pierce 1812, Davis 1812, and Bradbury 
1817) make it clear that the most severe vibration and liquefaction was in the Little Prairie 
vicinity and that it was more intense for the D1 aftershocks (Table 1) than for D1 itself. For 
example, only Pierce and Bedinger recount large waterspouts on the river or explosive cratering. 
A large wave (and perhaps a temporary retrograde current) was noted only upriver of Little 
Prairie (Bedinger, Bryan (1848), and La Roche) and was followed by a rapidly rising river level 
and swifter current downstream from approximately Bedinger's location (Bedinger, Davis, 
Pierce, Bradbury). These latter events are consistent with the large volume of ground water that 
must have been expelled by liquefaction. Tremendous noise, fissuring, splintering and toppled 
trees, and extensive caving of river banks were reported by all. 
 
We shall apply these historical observations and others as constraints on plausible faulting 
scenarios for the D1, J1 and F1 sequences. However, other constraints come from the 
seismological and geophysical setting of the faulting and the size of the earthquakes, and we 
must therefore first examine the current scientific understanding of these aspects. 
 
 
Size of the Principal Events 
On the basis of the extensive macroseismic effects including massive liquefaction, fissuring, 
subsidence or uplift of landforms, violent disturbance of the river, and destruction of extensive 
tracts of forests, both Davison (1936) and Richter (1958) considered the principal New Madrid 
events to be 'great' earthquakes.  In Richter's case, this presumably means a Richter magnitude 
MR = 8, although he never explicitly assigned a magnitude value.  In Davison's case, this put 
New Madrid in the class of the famous 1755 Lisbon, 1897 Assam, 1906 San Francisco, and 1891 
Nobi earthquakes, among others.  Both authors' estimates were based on the work of Fuller 
(1912) and consisted more of informed judgment than quantitative analysis. 
All useful analysis of the New Madrid earthquakes—from their recurrence intervals to 
dynamic fault-rupture modeling to present-day seismic hazard assessment—hinges on their size.  
In modern seismology 'size' equates to the scalar seismic moment Mo, which defines moment 
magnitude M = (2/3)log(Mo) – 10.7 (Hanks & Kanamori 1979).  [The symbol M conforms to the 
usage in the formal Hanks & Kanamori definition; for average stress drop, M is equivalent to the 
seismic energy magnitude Mw of Kanamori (1977).]  Previous magnitude estimates for the 1811-
1812 events (Nuttli 1973, 1983; Nuttli et al 1979, Street 1982, Street & Nuttli 1984) were in 
terms of the short-period magnitudes mb or mbLg, not easily related to scalar moment or moment 
magnitude. 
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There are a wide variety of analytical techniques to directly recover Mo from instrumental 
seismic-wave data. For non-instrumental, historical events like New Madrid, a direct estimate of 
Mo is possible only if the rupture is well expressed at the surface. But the scalar moment's 
physical definition (Mo = ?  
–d  A , where ?  is the rigidity,  –d   is the average rupture displacement, 
and A is the fault area) is dependent on both average slip and rupture dimensions.  The New 
Madrid ruptures evidently were well masked or at least not preserved by the thick alluvial 
sediments of the Mississippi River Valley, except for the relatively short Reelfoot fault segment. 
Because of this lack of instrumental or surface-rupture data, the seismic moments of the New 
Madrid earthquakes must be estimated indirectly from historical accounts.  Notwithstanding a 
sensitivity to source and path effects, the best type of data for this estimate is seismic intensities, 
which in North America are mostly standardized to the modified Mercalli (MMI) scale.  Extent 
and severity of liquefaction (Youd et al 1989) and landsliding (Keefer, 1984) can also provide 
useful constraints.  All these effects were employed by Johnston (1996b,c) to obtain seismic 
moments with specified uncertainty bounds for the principal events D1, J1 and F1 and the largest 
aftershock D4 of the New Madrid sequence. This effort followed on the pioneering work of 
Nuttli (1973) with subsequent refinements (Nuttli et al 1979, Nuttli 1983, Street & Nuttli 1984) 
using intensity data to obtain the sizes of these events in terms of the short-period regional 
magnitude mbLg (see Table 1). However, because mbLg has no direct relation to fault rupture 
parameters, size measured by Mo or M is more useful for our purposes here. 
Johnston (1996c) relied on a set of regressions of instrumental Mo on isoseismal area (felt 
through VIII) developed for stable continental region earthquakes (Johnston 1996b, Johnston et 
al 1994). These regressions are summarized in Figure 3. To these basic relations, corrections 
were applied for North America's extremely low anelastic attenuation to the northeast of New 
Madrid and for the considerably higher attenuation to the west (Singh & Herrmann 1983). The 
isoseismal areas of event D1, calibrated in this manner, are added to Figure 3. With data 
weighting, the outer isoseismals have the lowest uncertainty and dominate the best weighted 
average, Mbest. Hence the low AIV value more than compensates for the high AV and AVII 
values, yielding Mbest = 8.1. The  one-standard-deviation uncertainty is ~±0.3 M units. At this 
uncertainty level M8 earthquakes can be clearly discriminated from M7 or M9 events if 
isoseismal data are adequate; discrimination from M7.5 or 8.5 is marginal. Similar M-estimates 
(Table 1) were made for the J1, F1 and D4 events using the isoseismal data of Street (1982) and 
Street & Nuttli (1984). 
Several aspects of the size analysis in Figure 3 and results in Table 1 deserve further 
comment. Beyond an isoseismal area radius of ~100-150 km (shaded band, Figure 3), the 
anelastic attenuation of the continental Lg wave controls seismic ground motions; within ~100-
150 km, geometrical spreading is the dominant control parameter (Hanks & Johnston 1992, 
Frankel 1994). The New Madrid D1 isoseismal areas are huge—among the largest known in the 
world—and even the outer radius for the onset of structural damage (MMI VIII) is in the regime 
of Lg attenuation, not geometrical spreading. This means that for very large earthquakes (M >~  
7.5) such as event D1, damage areas in eastern North America may well be significantly larger 
than those in the West. Conversely, this may not be the case for earthquakes smaller than M7.0-
7.5 (but for a counterview see Bollinger et al 1993). 
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Second, there are insufficent data to determine a reliable felt area (MMI I-III) for the New 
Madrid sequence principal shocks.  From Figure 1 it is evident that a felt area determination 
would require a comprehensive examination of historical records from French and British 
Canada, Spanish Mexico (Texas) and Florida, and the unsettled but explored American West. 
Such a study has not been undertaken.  Well-constrained felt limits could significantly reduce the 
uncertainties in the sizes of the principal 1811-1812 earthquakes. 
Finally, from Table 1, the total seismic moment release of the 1811-1812 sequence is an 
estimated Mo(total) = 3.6x1028 dyne-cm, equivalent to a single great M8.3 earthquake. How 
such a large moment release could occur on fault segments of the dimensions defined by current 
seismicity and the Bootheel lineament becomes a question of primary importance. For example, 
if coseismic slip is limited to = 10 m and occurs at depths of = 20 km (depth maximum of current 
NMSZ hypocenters), a total minimum fault length exceeding 500 km is required for normal 
upper crustal rigidity. The total fault length of the 7 fault segments that we believe participated in 
the 1811-1812 ruptures is ~350 km. This ~150 km discrepancy can be resolved in at least four 
ways.  1. Reduce the estimated seismic moments of the D1, J1, and F1 earthquakes (e.g. 
Gomberg 1992).  2. Allow unprecedentedly large coseismic fault displacements ( –d  >~  15 m).  3. 
Allow rupture to depths significantly greater than the hypocentral depths of current seismicity.  
4. Allow rupture on fault segments not identified by crustal structure studies or current 
seismicity. 
A significant reduction in size of the 1811-1812 principal events leads to irresolvable difficulties 
in accounting for both the severe and extensive near-field effects and the great distances of far-
field effects. Johnston (1996c) expressed the belief that the estimated seismic moments of events 
D1, D4, J1, and F1 (used in Table 1) were more likely to be in error by underestimating rather 
than overestimating size. The large displacement hypothesis also has numerous difficulties. 
Aside from exceeding known average displacements for all earthquakes except M > 9 
subduction-zone ruptures, it implies very high static stress and strain drops, which in turn imply 
relatively short rupture duration times. Multiple independent historical accounts in the near field 
indicate durations approaching one minute to several minutes, not seconds. Moreover, the 
abundant historical and physical evidence of massive liquefaction, which needs many vibrational 
cycles to develop fully, would argue for longer, not shorter, source time functions. The fourth, 
the unidentified coseismic fault segment(s) hypothesis, is a possibility that cannot be dismissed, 
but it amounts to special pleading with no supporting theory or data, and therefore we do not 
consider it further.   
Johnston (1995c) has presented the case for the third possibility, that of deep coseismic 
rupture. The argument applies to thick, 'average' cratonic crust with abundant quartz and feldspar 
minerals. Earthquake nucleation is limited to crust cooler than the quartz brittle-plastic transition 
(bpt) temperature, ~300-350°C. However, fully plastic behavior does not occur until the feldspar 
bpt is reached, at ~450°C. Earthquakes cannot nucleate in the brittle-plastic transition zone 
between the quartz and feldspar bpts, but coseismic fault rupture can propagate there, driven by 
strain energy release at shallower depths in the seismogenic zone.  For plausible New Madrid 
crustal temperatures, this could be at depths exceeding 30 km and could explain the large 1811-
1812 seismic moments without the need to appeal to unknown active fault segments of the 
NNSZ. 
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Liquefaction Earthquakes before 1811-1812 
 
Was the New Madrid earthquake sequence of 1811-1812 a fluke of geological history, a one time 
event?  Or have large earthquakes occurred repeatedly in the NMSZ in the recent geological 
past?  This question is important, not only for assessing the earthquake hazard of the New 
Madrid region, but also for understanding the long-term process of tectonic strain accumulation 
and release. At first glance, the Mississippi River and its surrounding expanse of nearly level 
flood plains would seem to be evidence of a region that is tectonically and seismically dead.  
However, seismological, geodetic, and most paleoseismological data suggest a surprisingly short 
recurrence interval for major earthquakes in the NMSZ, on the order of a thousand years or less, 
with deformation rates comparable to those at plate margins.  If the largest of the 1811-1812 
events each produced 8 to 10 meters of slip (Johnston 1996c), then repeated earthquakes of such 
a magnitude would clearly result in major disruption of fluvial systems, as well as the landscape 
in general.  Yet, other data, particularly the low regional relief, indicate that the rapid rates of 
crustal strain implied by such magnitudes and repeat times cannot have been maintained for 
geologically long periods of time Schweig & VanArsdale (1996). 
 
The most extensive and dramatic present-day evidence that survives from the 1811-1812 
ruptures is not the current seismicity but the sandblow and fissure liquefaction features preserved 
in the alluvial soils of the upper Mississippi embayment. A comprehensive mapping of these 
features was carried out originally by Fuller (1912) and then in much more detail by Obermeier 
(1988, 1989).  Obermeier's zone, depicted in simplified form in Figure 4, encompasses only the 
areas of most intense liquefaction where 1% to >25% of land surface is covered. Reports of 
significant outlying liquefaction episodes far removed from this zone include White County, 
Illinois and a region near St. Louis, ~250-300 km north of the NMSZ (Berry 1908, Obermeier 
1988), to the south to below the mouth of the Arkansas River (La Roche 1927), about 250 km 
from the NMSZ. 
 
The area of Obermeier's severe liquefaction zone exceeds 10,000 km2 and Fuller's zone 
encompassing all types of ground failures, as modified by Street & Nuttli (1984), covers ~48,000 
km2. These rank among the largest earthquake liquefaction and ground deformation fields ever 
documented, perhaps surpassed only by those produced by great Himalayan front earthquakes in 
the Ganges alluvial plain of India (Richter 1958).  Moreover, the New Madrid liquefaction zone 
obviously was restricted by loess-mantled upland areas of low-to-negligible liquefaction 
potential to the west (Crowleys Ridge) and to the east (the river's eastern bluffs). The New 
Madrid liquefaction zone encompasses all the linear epicentral segments of the NMSZ (except 
the eastern extreme of its central segment that extends beneath the loess bluffs), strongly 
suggesting that both the seismicity and the liquefaction are linked to the same set of source 
faults. 
 
Figures 4 and 5 summarize the published results of paleoseismology studies in the fault zone 
area of the 1811-12 earthquakes.  Not included is recent preliminary work indicating 
paleoearthquake liquefaction to the north and west of the seismic zone.  The diagram shows the 
allowable ranges of earthquake events, and the ranges preferred by the individual investigators. 
The simplest interpretation of these results is that, in addition to the 1811-1812 events, there 
were at least two strong ground-shaking earthquakes in the past 2000 years.  Evidence for one of  
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these, which likely occurred between A.D. 800 and A.D. 1000, is clear at Reelfoot scarp and 
north of New Madrid.  There is also evidence for liquefaction of this age near Marked Tree, 
Arkansas to the south, and at several sites near Blytheville, Arkansas.  Evidence for a 
liquefaction-producing event between A.D. 1400 and A.D. 1600 is found in the Blytheville area 
and may be present in the Reelfoot area and at the northernmost sites.  Moreover, there is 
evidence, presently inconclusive, of liquefaction ages both younger than (~ A.D. 1600) and older 
than (prior to A.D. 600) these two age ranges.  
 
Thus 1811 was not the first time in the Holocene that the New Madrid region experienced 
strong ground shaking.  The data all are consistent with as few as two and as many as four 
earthquakes in the 2,000 years prior to 1811.  What were the magnitudes of the causative 
earthquakes?  The only known post-1812 earthquake in the New Madrid region large enough to 
have caused liquefaction is the M6.8 1895 Charleston, Missouri, earthquake, which caused 
liquefaction over an area 16 km across (Obermeier 1988).  Schweig & Ellis (1994) estimated 
that, when the severity of liquefaction is taken into account (Youd et al 1989), an M~8 
earthquake would be required for an event to have caused the liquefaction at the northern sites 
and the southern Blytheville sites, separated by about 100 km.  And since the distribution of A.D. 
900 earthquake is represented at the northernmost and southernmost sites exceeding 250 km 
separation, a multiple event scenario similar to the 1811-12 sequence may be required. 
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Fault Rupture Scenarios 
 
As if the earthquake triplet of 1811-1812 was not sufficiently complex, Street (1982) and Street 
& Nuttli (1984) demonstrated that some aftershocks of D1 and F1 were major (M = 7) events in 
their own right (see Table 1), requiring the accommodation of nonnegligible fault areas. These 
authors, in fact, considered event D4 to be a fourth principal shock. Moreover, the Bootheel 
lineament investigations, beginning with Schweig & Marple (1991), have raised the strong 
probability that fault segments not illuminated by present-day seismicity ruptured in the 1811-
1812 sequence. The upshot of both these bodies of research is that a fault-rupture scenario for 
1811-1812 must incorporate a minimum of seven fault segments (Figure 6) and six M >~  7 
earthquakes (Table 1). 
 
Our faulting scenario begins with the moment magnitudes of the 1811-1812 sequence listed in 
Table 1. These yield a cumulative moment Mo(equival.) = 3.6 x 1028 dyne-cm (M=8.3). 
Whatever coseismic ruptures are adopted must sum to this cumulative Mo. Previously we 
considered but rejected alternatives to this requirement; its adoption here means that ruptures 
extend into the crustal depth zone between the quartz and feldspar brittle-plastic transition 
temperatures (possibly 30 km or more). If then coseismic displacements are limited to <~ 10 m to 
keep stress and strain drops reasonable, the fault lengths of the D1, J1, and F1 principal events 
must be on the order of 110-150 km, 40-70 km, and 60-90 km, respectively.  
 
Other general constraints are that coseismic ruptures must largely be contained within the 
intense liquefaction region described by Obermeier (1989) (Figure 4) and must include all the 
fault segments illuminated by current seismicity. We do not adopt the more severe constraint that  
coseismic ruptures must be limited to these illuminated segments; hence the Bootheel lineament 
is not excluded from the rupture scenarios. 
 
Figure 6 summarizes three possible fault-rupture scenarios for the 1811-1812 New Madrid 
sequence. Others are certainly possible; the ones highlighted here, however, mostly meet other 
constraints from the historical accounts and structural data previously examined. In rough 
priority of their importance and strength of evidence to support them, the historical constraints 
are: 
 1.  The F1 rupture must include the Reelfoot fault (RF) segment. 
 2.  The D1 rupture must include the Blytheville arch (BA) segment. 
 3.  The D1 aftershocks were stronger than the D1 mainshock at Little Prairie. 
 4.  Both the D1 and F1 principal events were larger than event J1. 
 5.  The D1 and F1 aftershocks were major events, requiring tens of kilometers of  
 fault length. 
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The candidate fault segments and their lengths are (Figure 9): 
 1.  BA—Blytheville arch segment, axial fault, ~70 km 
 2.  BFZ—Blytheville fault zone segment, axial fault, ~55 km 
 3.  BL—northern Bootheel lineament, ~70 km 
 4.  NN—New Madrid north fault + seismicity continuation, ~60 km 
            5. NW—New Madrid west seismicity trend, ~40 km 
 6.  RF—Reelfoot Fault, ~32 km; and 
 7.  RS—Reelfoot south seismicity trend, ~35 km. 
Of the seven segment candidates, only one (RF) has structural expression at the surface. One 
other (BL) has secondary surface evidence in the form of aligned fissures and liquefaction 
features. Two segments, NW (strike slip) and RS (dip slip) are defined only by seismicity 
concentrations. At least five segments (BA, BFZ, BL, RF, NN) can be identified in the 
subsurface on seismic-reflection profiles, but their subsurface characteristics differ greatly. Some 
segments (RF, RS, BA) appear to lie wholly or partially within magmatic crustal intrusions.  
Two segments (NW, NN) are outside the Reelfoot graben, although probably within its 
northwest margin zone. 
Given the faulting constraints and candidate fault segments listed above, numerous faulting 
scenarios for 1811-12 may be envisioned. We restrict our considerations to three (Figure 6), all 
of which satisfy the rupture size–fault length general constraint and all of the historical 
constraints (except that S#2 violates constraint number three).  In outline form for M = 7, the 
scenarios are: 
S#1:  D1 on BA + BL.  D4, D6 on BFZ 
  J1 on NN 
  F1 on RF + NW.  F3 on RS; 
S#2: D1 on BA + BFZ.  D4, D6 on BL (?) 
  J1 on NN 
  F1 on RF + RS.  F3 on NW;  or 
S#3: D1 on BA + BL.  D4, D6 on BFZ 
  J1 on NW 
  F1 on RF + RS.  F3 on NN. 
Because we intend S#1–S#3 to illustrate possibilities given the initial constraints of this section, 
we do not go into the pros and cons of each scenario except to point out several fault-mechanics 
reasons in favor of S#1. If event D1 ruptures BL, then the J1 event on NN becomes an almost 
on-strike extension of D1. If J1 is dextral strike slip, then it and the D1 aftershocks on the BFZ 
would compressively load the left-step thrust fault RF for failure in the F1 event. No other 
scenario accommodates the logical sequence of loading fault segments and still satisfies the third 
historical constraint at Little Prairie.  
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An 1811-1812 Scenario 
We conclude this review with what we believe happened in the winter of 1811-12.  This is the 
S#1 scenario of the previous section; it’s components range from confidently established to 
speculative.  There are probably few earth scientists who will agree with all its aspects.  It will be 
interesting to revisit this summary after a decade or two and see how well it stands the test of 
time and additional research. 
At 02:15 (local) on 16 December 1811, a mild (~45°F) Indian-summer night, a great 
earthquake (D1) nucleated on the axial fault of Reelfoot rift, near the intersection of the 
Blytheville arch (BA) and the Bootheel lineament (BL). It ruptured bilaterally, in dextral strike-
slip motion, southwest along the arch and north-northeast along the less structurally developed 
BL for a total fault length of ~140 km.  Average slip approached 10 meters.  Seismic moment 
release exceeded 1028 dyne-cm, corresponding to about 8 x 1023 ergs of seismic strain energy 
release.  Fissuring, fountaining, and other aspects of severe liquefaction of the saturated river 
flood plain were intense along the rupture length and up to about 50 km from it. The river towns 
Little Prairie, New Madrid and Point Pleasant were shaken at MMI IX-XI.  Intensities at the 
fourth Chickasaw bluff (future Memphis, Tennessee) reached at least MMI IX.  The seismic 
waves, principally Lg, were felt as far as 2000 km away (Quebec) and caused damage (MMI VII) 
over an area greater than 500,000 km2.  Major aftershocks (low M7s) at 08:15 on 16 December 
and 12:00 on 17 December completed the rupture of the BA along the BFZ for ~60 km to the 
Mississippi River and produced the massive liquefaction that caused the abandonment of Little 
Prairie by its inhabitants. 
The Mississippi River was strongly affected by these earthquakes (but not to the degree of 
the impending F1 event).  A large river tsunami or seiche was produced upriver in the Kentucky 
bend area, whereas downriver of Little Prairie, tremendous volumes of groundwater squeezed 
out by liquefaction drained into the river and caused a rapid rise in level and a much swifter 
current than normal.  Certain reaches of the river from Little Prairie to the fourth bluffs were 
clogged with tree trunks, branches and roots, some uprooted by vibration, liquefaction, and 
failing river banks and others brought from the riverbed to the surface by the intense, prolonged 
shaking or liquefaction of the riverbottom sediments. 
For the next five weeks a vigorous aftershock sequence continued to shake the region.  
Extremely cold weather set in and froze the Ohio River so that by the third week of January 1812 
there were few if any travelers on the Mississippi River. The D1 earthquake was very large but it 
and its aftershocks released only ~50% of elastic strain energy stored in the Reelfoot rift crust. 
The mainshock rupture stopped not because it depleted all available strain energy but because 
structural barriers halted it—probably the termination of Blytheville arch to the south and 
possibly igneous intrusions to the north. 
An additional ~16% of the available strain energy was released at ~09:00 on 23 January 1812 
when the J1 principal shock ruptured the New Madrid north (NN) fault. Static strain from the D1 
rupture had loaded NN with enough additional shear stress to induce failure. The right-lateral 
strike-slip rupture propagated northeastward on NN to near present-day Cario, Illinois-
Charleston, Missouri. In New Madrid it was "as violent as the severest of the former ones" 
(Bryan 1848), but the reported far-field intensities nearly everywhere were distinctly less than 
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those for D1 and F1.  The ~8 meters of right-lateral strike slip in this M7.8 earthquake formed a 
left stepover with the right-lateral D1 aftershock faulting on the BFZ, compressively loading the 
32-km-long Reelfoot fault (RF) in the stepover zone.  
The Ohio River icejam broke up at Louisville falls just at the time of event J1 [Nolte (1854) 
reports that earthquakes "loosened the ice"], and many boats that began the trip to New Orleans 
at the falls had reached New Madrid and tied up for the night of 6 February 1812. At 03:45 on 7 
February the main dip-slip event of the entire sequence nucleated on the RF thrust fault plane in 
the left stepover that splays to the surface as Reelfoot scarp. The rupture was not contained by 
the RF, however, and continued thrust rupture on the Reelfoot South (RS) fault segment and—
perhaps—onto the New Madrid West (NW) as a left-lateral strike-slip rupture. The F1 sequence 
released the final third of the seismic strain energy available to drive the 1811-1812 earthquakes. 
The M8.0 mainshock was probably a complex multiple event with both dip-slip and strike-slip 
subevents, averaging perhaps as much as 10 m displacement. 
The RF thrust subevent of the F1 mainshock created one waterfall or rapids and two barriers 
to flow on the Mississippi River's Kentucky bend; an additional falls may have formed on the 
bend's western limb by deformation in the hanging wall.  The hanging wall of RF rose beneath 
the river during F1 from ~12 km to ~17 km upstream of New Madrid. This created an uplift that 
obstructed flow near island #10 and a downdrop falls or rapids downstream of the island. This 
combination was the most severe river disruption; it generated the great upstream wave and 
retrograde current so graphically described by Speed (1812) and the "patron," (Shaler 1815) but 
both travelers' flatboats would survive being swept over the falls. The second intersection of RF 
with the river was immediately downstream of the town New Madrid (within 1 km). It uplifted 
the riverbed by one-to-several meters, accounting for the large wave and retrograde current at 
New Madrid, independently described by Bryan (1848) and Nolte (1854). 
The riverbed from New Madrid to island #10 and the lakebed of to-be-formed Reelfoot Lake 
were on the footwall of a great thrust earthquake. Elastic rebound then accounts for their 
permanent subsidence by several meters relative to their pre-earthquake levels. Similarly, 
Reelfoot scarp's hanging wall was permanently uplifted.  This combination of subsidence and 
uplift accelerated the town's takeover by the river and created the new lake. 
The F1 principal event, with its coseismic faulting of the Mississippi riverbed on RF and 
large aftershocks on RS, was the culminating episode of the 1811-12 New Madrid sequence. 
Evidently the huge reservoir of elastic strain energy was finally depleted. Just how and why and 
at what rate the tectonic strain accumulation took place—and is taking place—is currently 
unknown. Understanding this process will be the research frontier of the coming decade with 
global-position-system measurements and improved knowledge of crustal composition, structure 
and rheology the principal tools. 
We have presented a faulting scenario for the 1811-1812 New Madrid earthquakes that is 
consistent with the available historical, geological and seismological evidence.  This evidence—
compiled primarily within the past two decades—to a large measure confirms the past anecdotal 
reports of the dramatic effects of the earthquakes on the land and the river of the central 
Mississippi Valley. The seismic moment release of this earthquake series probably equals or 
exceeds one total of the continental western United States in historic times.  How this can be 
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when the New Madrid seismic zone lies deep within the stable midplate crust of North America 
remains an enigma. 
Addendum.  The above faulting scenario in not consistent with the recent results of Newman et 
al. (1999) “Slow Deformation and Lower Seismic Hazard at the New Madrid Seismic Zone” 
[Science, vol. 284, p. 619-621, 23 April 1999] who used six years of Global Positioning System 
(GPS) measurements to infer lower magnitudes and/or longer recurrence times—hence lower 
hazard—than estimated here. Their data’s uncertainties, however, were too large to resolve the 
true deformation rate in the NMSZ. Moreover, they model the NMSZ as an infinitely long plate 
boundary, which would distribute and dilute the expected strain concentration within the NMSZ. 
Until the uncertainties are reduced significantly, GPS studies such as Newman et al. provide 
little useful constraint regarding ‘What Really Happened in 1811-1812 and Could It Happen 
Again?’. 
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Summary 
Yes! 
Introduction 
Earthquake loss estimation is hardly an exact science! The reason is simple - the lack of 
experience.  
 
The state-of-the-art for earthquake loss estimation maps expected ground shaking into loss 
through an inventory of affected structures. This simple statement of the process glosses over the 
lack of knowledge inherent in the procedure.  
 
The estimation of earthquake ground motion has advanced significantly since the inception of 
the NEHRP program 2 decades ago. Better instrumentation, accumulated recordings of ground 
motion, better understanding of earthquake physics and the expected recurrence rates of 
earthquakes have permitted improved estimates of expected ground motion in terms of peak 
acceleration, velocity or response spectral ordinates. The confidence in these estimates permits 
detailed mathematical modeling of structural response and inference of damage thresholds. The 
improved estimates are also accompanied by an awareness of what is not known because of the 
lack of data.  
 
The mapping of ground motion into damage is imprecise. One current approach is to map 
quantitative ground motion expectations into the qualitative intensity value. This is appealing 
since the intensity measure describes damage. The Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) scale 
from I-XII is used in the United States, with an intensity VI indicating the threshold of structural 
damage and VIII indicating significant damage. The vagaries of earthquake ground motion is 
that many levels of ground motion may be associated with a given intensity level (Wald et al , 
1999) because of local site perturbations of ground motion, physics of elastic wave generation at 
the source and its propagation over long distances to the site, and of course the specifics of the 
structure affected. Bollinger (1977), for example, observed that there is no simple relation 
between observed intensities as a function of distance from the source - the observations as a 
function of distance form a distribution with a mean and a variance. This observation is 
important if regional historical intensity data are used in a loss estimation model - use of 
published isoseismals (contours of intensity limits) may be biased toward overestimating the 
effect of shaking.  
 
The last aspect of the process is that of inventory. This may be the most sophisticated component 
of current loss estimation. GIS techniques can easily incorporate local site conditions, building 
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inventory, and permit rapid computation of loss given the estimate of shaking and mapping that 
shaking into damage. However, the numbers arising from the procedure are a function of these 
caveats. In addition the use of overlays for estimating local site effects is a non-linear process 
that may not be valid.  
 
Earthquake loss estimation is not an exact science!  
 
1996 NEHRP Maps 
Work by Frankel .et al. (1996) are the basis of current recommended NEHRP provisions for 
seismic design (FEMA, 1997). The probabilistic seismic hazard maps are a synthesis of current 
knowledge on ground motion scaling with distance and earthquake size and expectations of 
earthquake locations and repeat times. The products so developed are readily available from  
 
http://geohazards.cr.usgs.gov/eq/ 
 
The maps and tabular data made available by the U.S. Geological Survey are to be used with 
FEMA-273 (FEMA, 1997) to define response spectral shapes for evaluation of structures. 
Procedures are given to adjust the map values for local geological site conditions. Because these 
are a national level mapping effort, regional variations in seismic hazard can be focussed upon 
for further study.  
 
Because of the differences between previous maps and the current 1996 maps in the central 
United States, the Mid-America Earthquake (MAE) Center is examining the assumptions that 
went into the current maps.  
 
Sensitivity Studies 
The 1996 NEHRP estimates of expected ground motion in the central United States makes 
critical assumptions about the earthquake process and ground motion propagation. The issues 
affecting expected motions are as follow, in order of approximately decreasing importance:  
 
· Deep soil effects  
· Maximum magnitude earthquake for New Madrid  
· Repeat times of large earthquakes  
· Spectral scaling of earthquakes  
· Regional seismic wave propagation  
· Completion of earthquake catalog  
 
 
Deep soil effects:  
 
Deep soil deposits are not unique in the United States, but the relatively flatness of the deposits 
in this region have only a few analogs inthe nation. Figure 1 indicates the thickness of deep 
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fluvial deposits in the region. The effect of the deep soils is a result of two competing features: 
low material strength will increase the surface motion but the greater thickness of the soil 
column absorbs more energy. FEMA-273 (FEMA, 1997) has correction factors to be applied to 
the 1996 NEHRP maps, but cautions for site specific studies for very deep soil sites.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Prototype deep soil thickness map for the Mississippi Embayment. Thickness in meters. 
 
Figures 2 - 5 illustrate these tradeoffs. Figure 2 gives the 1996 NEHRP peak ground acceleration 
values with a 2% in 50 year expectation of being exceeded while Figure 3 gives the motions for 
the prototype deep soil model. The slight differences outside of the Mississippi Embayment are 
due to the fact that the 1996 NEHRP map as a uniform soil and Figure 3 has hard rock. At a site 
within the Embayment, such as Memphis, the deep soils reduce the peak acceleration. In 
addition, the pattern of iso-acceleration is no longer as symmetric.  
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Fig. 2. 1996 NEHRP Peak acceleration map for 2% in 50 year exceedence. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Prototype Peak acceleration map for 2% in 50 year exceedence. 
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Figure 4 gives the 1Hz pseudo-acceleration spectra values for the 1996 NEHRP maps while 
Figure 5 gives the corresponding values for the deep soil model. In this case the deep soil column 
amplifies low frequencies more.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4. 1996 NEHRP 1.0 Hz Pseudo-acceleration for 2% in 50 year exceedence. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Prototype 1.0 Hz Pseudo-acceleration for 2% in 50 year exceedence. 
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Maximum magnitude  
 
The sizes of the 1811-1812 earthquakes is controversial because they are indirect estimates from 
the intensities or from liquefaction effects. The sizes of the large earthquake matter because they 
control the expected motion for annual probabilities on on the order of the repeat times of these 
large earthquakes. Thus the effect will be seen strongly on the 2% in 50 year maps. The current 
1996 NEHRP maps assume a Mmax = 8.0 for the repeat time of the characteristic 1811-1812 New 
Madrid earthquakes. To illustrate this effect, Figures 6 and 7 present the results of using the 1996 
NEHRP parameters, changing only the value of Mmax = 8.0 for the characteristic New Madrid 
earthquake to the low value of 7.0.  
 
 
 
Fig. 6. 1996 NEHRP PGA for 2% in 50 year exceedence and Mmax=7.0. 
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Fig. 7. 1996 NEHRP 1.0 Hz Pseudo-acceleration for 2% in 50 year exceedence and Mmax=7.0. 
 
Comparing Figure 6 to Figure 2, we see that the effect of drastically decreasing the size of the 
maximum New Madrid earthquake is to reduce the peak acceleration at Memphis by about a 
factor of 1.5. The level of motion is still high enough to cause damage. On the other hand, for 
locations a large distance from New Madrid, such St. Louis, there is no change. This is because 
the peak acceleration is typically controlled by nearby earthquake sources.  
 
For the 1.0 Hz spectral acceleration, the motions at Memphis are reduced, as are those at St. 
Louis, by a factor of about 1.5.(comparing Figures 4 and 7). At this hazard level, the size of the 
New Madrid earthquake affects the entire region.  
 
Other factors  
 
The repeat times of major earthquakes, scaling of earthquake ground motion with earthquake 
size, differences between propagation to large distances between that assumed in the the NEHRP 
maps and the completeness of the earthquake catalog are other factors that affect the hazard 
maps. The MAE Center has projects addressing these issues and will work with USGS 
researchers in refining these parameters.  
 
Relevance 
The MAE Center probabilistic seismic hazard maps are meant to carefully evolve from the 1996 
NEHRP maps. All steps will be documented so that deviations from the 1996 maps are justified.  
 
The efforts of the MAE Center are directed toward reducing uncertainty. In addition the MAE 
Center efforts complement the internal and external USGS research programs in the New Madrid 
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Seismic Zone. This task is not taken lightly, since the numbers resulting from these computations 
have economic significance.  
 
The MAE Center is aware of the needs of the insurance community. Certainly cooperative 
efforts are required. Additional work is required to address the weak points in loss estimation - 
the relation between ground shaking and damage, especially for the midwest. Within the lifetime 
of this Center, a significant earthquake will occur in the region whose effects should be 
extensively documented.  
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Abstract 
 
With the anticipated publication of the International Building Code (IBC) in January, 2000, cities 
and other jurisdictions in the United States will have a single model building code available for 
adoption for the first time.  An historic meeting of the memberships of the three building code 
organizations will take place in St. Louis from September 12th through September 18th, at when 
the International Building Code is to be approved for publication.  The existing three building 
codes, the National Building Code (NBC) published by the Building Officials and Code 
Administrators (BOCA), the Standard Building Code (SBC) published by the Southern Building 
Code Congress (SBCC) and the Uniform Building Code (UBC) published by the International 
Conference of Building Officials (ICBO), will no longer be updated or promulgated. 
 
The seismic design provisions of the existing three existing codes are also divergent, with the 
UBC based on the "Blue Book" published by the Structural Engineers Association of California 
(SEAOC), and the NBC and SBC based on earlier versions of the National Earthquake Hazard 
Reduction Program (NEHRP) Design Provisions published for the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) by the Building Seismic Safety Council (BSSC). 
 
With the publication of the IBC-2000, seismic design provisions will be based on the latest 
edition of the NEHRP Provisions adapted for regulatory use. 
 
These design provisions represent the "state of the art" and incorporate new calculation methods 
and design maps. "Soil factors" have a major impact on the new designs, and the first new 
seismic maps in 25 years are a critical element in the use of the code. 
 
Communities such as St. Louis and Memphis with potential for significant ground motion and 
having large areas of poor soils will be required to improve construction practices, while large 
portions of the United States with relatively good soils and low seismicity will have lesser 
requirements. 
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Introduction 
The enforcement of a code requires that it be adopted as a legal document setting forth the 
minimum legal requirements for construction to satisfy the health, safety and general welfare of 
the public. It is therefore desirable to briefly review some of the historical background of code 
development and a few of the forces that have influenced code development in the past and will 
probably continue to do so. This paper will also look at the use of performance based experience 
in other portions of the building codes and learn from the successes and failures.  Since 
administration and enforcement of codes depends very heavily on accountability and 
responsibility of the project participants, there is a need to take a look at the responsibilities of 
the participants in the total building process from inception to long range maintenance of the 
constructed project. 
 
 
History 
 
The use of codes dates back to about 1700 BC, when the Code of King Hammurabi in 
Babylonian stated performance in an extremely simple and blunt manner -- build a house strong 
enough to avoid killing its owner, or die! 
 
Noah was instructed to build the ark in a very prescriptive manner.  Gopher wood was specified 
as the basic material, while the dimensions, exits; light and ventilation were clearly prescribed. 
 
The collapse of a wooden amphitheater in Rome in about 27 AD, resulted in the banishment of 
the designer from Rome and all of Italy.  New regulations were adopted for places of assembly. 
 
Thatched roof fires and highly combustible construction in London in 1189, inspired Lord Fitz-
Elyne to enact strict prescriptive roof covering and firewall requirements.  Lack of enforcement 
allowed the "great fire" of 1666 to destroy the city. 
 
Following a fire in Boston in 1630 that ignited neighboring homes, the Governor issued an order 
prohibiting the construction of chimneys made of wood and of thatched roofs. 
 
Theater fires in New Orleans and Chicago resulted in prescriptive requirements for curtains and 
for periodic fire inspections. 
 
The Triangle Shirt Waist fire brought specific exiting and panic hardware rules. 
 
The Coconut Grove nightclub fire demonstrated the need for flame spread restrictions as well as 
enforcement of exit regulations. 
 
Simply passing a law seldom makes anything change!  Regulations must be accompanied by 
responsible enforcement! 
 
 
 
 75 
Code Development 
 
The International Building Code was developed by several sub-committees consisting of equal 
membership or the three existing code organizations.  Each sub-committee was responsible for 
specific topics as follows: 
 
General Subcommittee – Administration, Interior Environment, Electrical, Mechanical, 
Plumbing, Elevators, Special Construction and reference Standards 
Fire Safety Subcommittee- Fire resistance of materials, fire protection, Plastics 
Means of Egress Subcommittee – Egress and Accessibility 
Occupancies Subcommittee – Use and Occupancy, Special Uses and Height and Areas 
Structural Subcommittee – Structural design, Loads and Properties of Materials of 
Construction 
 
 
Development Process 
 
Each Subcommittee developed a draft document based primarily on existing code text in one or 
more of the existing codes.  Where text conflicted, the committee resolved the conflicts, usually 
by majority vote.  In selected cases, drafts were submitted, by invitation, by either material 
interests or by coalitions of design experts. 
 
The draft seismic provisions were, by invitation, developed by the Code Resource Development 
Committee (CRDC) of the Building Seismic Safety Council with funding from the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency.  The CRDC was created from representatives of the 
development team that published the 1997 edition of the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction 
Program (NEHRP) Design Provisions, building officials from the three existing code groups, the 
Structural Engineers Association of California and the American Society of Civil Engineers. 
 
The draft code provisions were submitted to several public hearings, where the various 
Subcommittees heard testimony, made revisions to the draft for subsequent hearings.  The last 
hearings were held March 15 to 26, 1999 in Costa Mesa, CA.  The final reports of the 
committees were published in April 1999 with a deadline for public comments of June 18, 1999. 
 
The final consideration for the 2000 edition of the code will be conducted in St. Louis on 
September 12 to 17, 1999. 
 
The code is expected to be published and ready for adoption in early 2000. 
 
 
Adoption 
 
The adoption of a code is a political process.  The typical citizen gives little or no thought to the 
details of construction of the structures, in which he and his family live and work.  The 
presumption is that everything must be safe, or it would not be allowed to be built.  Only after 
failures do the citizens become conscious of building safety and demand to know who "let this 
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happen".  That awareness diminishes in proportion with time following an event.  A subdivision 
constructed on poor soil in Anchorage, Alaska was devastated by an earthquake thirty years ago.  
Memories are short and the subdivision is now being rebuilt in the same location. 
 
Elected officials respond to public reaction to disasters by passing stringent laws so that "it will 
never happen again".  Often, regulations hastily enacted in time of stress are not sufficiently 
researched and are unreasonably restrictive.  Since these reactions are driven initially by the loss 
of life and property, they tend to focus on fixing the problems at hand.  Some examples are 
banning the use of a specific material such as unreinforced masonry in high risk seismic zones, 
or mandating the installation of certain safety devices such as fire sprinklers in high rise build-
ings. 
 
The published model code is simply a book until it is legally adopted by a jurisdiction.  The 
jurisdiction may be any unit of government from an entire state to a small village or fire 
protection district. 
 
The process usually requires the jurisdiction to prepare an adoption ordinance which enumerates 
the specific model document to be adopted, specific design loads selected from the model maps 
or tables appropriate to the geographical location, any administrative amendments appropriate to 
local or state law, and if deemed necessary by the local community, amendments to technical 
provisions. 
 
Public hearings are conducted and the legislative body enacts the required ordinance to adopt the 
model code. 
 
Some local amendments are necessary and beneficial, such as communities located where the 
national maps designate a "Special Hazard area" due to local conditions such as heavy snow, 
canyon winds and wild fire hazards. 
 
Other local amendments are due to pressures from material suppliers such as a brick factory, a 
cement plant or other source of local employment.  Some communities are subject to pressures 
from developers, unions or other politically powerful interests. 
 
Such local amendments are the source of frustration to design professionals who work nationally 
or across jurisdictional boundaries. 
 
My observation after 25 years as a local building official is that few citizens respond to notices 
of the public hearings and that the vested interests frequently are successful in influencing the 
adoption process.  Insurance interests – either as individual citizens or as an industry –are 
missing an opportunity to influence the quality of construction (and the extent of risk) in each 
community. 
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Performance Based Codes 
 
Design professionals have for years advocated greater use of "performance codes" in contrast to 
the more common "prescriptive codes".  
 
The International Code Council has created a Building Performance Code Committee and a Fire 
Performance Code Committee to develop a "Performance Code" which can be used as an 
alternate to the International Building Code.  They have published the Intent, Scope and 
Performance structure for developing performance provisions.  They have developed structure 
and linkage between topics and objective standards.  They have accepted numerous objectives, 
functional statements, and performance requirements have published "Guidelines for Use of ICC 
Performance Code. 
 
The committee is basing their proposed Seismic Provisions on "Vision 2000" developed by the 
Structural Engineers Association of California, and the designer will be expected to: 
 
Specify Performance Requirements 
Define Earthquake Hazard Design Levels 
Define Performance levels 
Define Seismic Hazard Exposure Group 
 
The committee continues to meet about every 60 days and intends to hold Update and Comment 
Sessions on the Performance Code in mid November 1999 
 
 
Previous experience with performance based regulations  
 
Many efforts that began with a goal of implementing performance based requirements stumbled 
over the ability to measure performance and to know when the goal had been achieved.  For 
example the performance goal of keeping "smoke controlled" in the new covered mall shopping 
centers in 1975 soon became measured in prescriptive numbers of air changes.  Control of 
"flame spread" became measured by the use of tested components with restrictions on the classes 
of flammability allowed in various areas in the building.  The predicted building performance in 
a fire is assumed from the use of many tested and listed components and assemblies.  The 
construction of each of those "assemblies” is very carefully prescribed from the results of 
detailed and extensive testing.  The use of "heavy timber" construction is prescriptive in detail 
since experience has shown that the structural frame of such buildings retains a safety margin of 
strength while it is slowly being consumed.  Thus, while it is not "one hour rated" construction, it 
is permitted to be used in most instances where one hour ratings are required, entirely due to its 
proven performance. 
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Existing authority to use alternate methods and materials. 
 
All of the current model building codes have provisions for acceptance of alternate methods of 
construction or approval of engineered systems which follow very specific and generally easy to 
follow procedures. 
 
Section 105 of the Uniform Building Code contains the following language, which is similar to, 
if not exactly the same language found in the Standard Code and the National Code: 
 
"The provisions of this code are not intended to prevent the use of any material or method of 
construction not specifically prescribed by this code, providing any alternate has been approved 
and its use authorized by the building official. 
 
The building official may approve any such alternate, provided he finds that the proposed design 
is satisfactory and complies with the provisions of this code and that the material, method or 
work offered is, for the purpose intended, at least the equivalent of that prescribed in this code in 
suitability, strength, effectiveness, fire resistance, durability, safety and sanitation. 
 
The building official shall require that sufficient evidence or proof be submitted to substantiate 
any claims that may be made regarding its use.  The details of any action granting approval of an 
alternate shall be recorded and entered in the files of the code enforcement agency." 
 
To assist in the evaluation of products and assemblies, the Underwriters Laboratories was created 
by the insurance industry to provide a non-profit, non biased and credible source of data. 
 
Other insurance interests created the Factory Mutual system to research, test and evaluate 
products, systems and designs for fire safety. 
 
The model code organizations have established "Evaluation Services" to evaluate new products, 
assemblies and technical services to respond to the need of their member jurisdictions. 
 
These provisions are not the same as those setting forth procedures for "variances" or "appeals".   
A variance may also be utilized when it becomes necessary to involve an appointed group of 
citizens sitting as a Board of Appeals and functioning as a safety valve for the building official. 
 
Most of the exciting and unusual structures constructed are the result of collaboration between a 
confident and talented professional design team and a competent building official who is willing 
to judge peer reviewed calculations and quality assurance plans utilizing these provisions for 
alternate methods. 
 
The designers of most of the routine construction projects do not and will not in the future have 
any interest in performance based provisions. 
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Measurability 
 
Given the public safety duties and responsibilities previously described, the task of measuring 
expected performance is one of the most daunting tasks resulting form "performance based" 
design.  City attorneys and building officials must have solid data to justify any departure from 
the prescriptive provisions of the code.  Building Officials are, in fact, paid by our citizens to be 
skeptics! 
 
When I reflect on my nearly 50 years of experience in the construction industry (half in the 
private sector designing buildings and half as a building official), I often have "second thoughts" 
about the hundreds of alternate methods and engineered systems for which I have issued permits.  
Many of these systems I strongly encouraged and sometimes recommended to the Appeals 
Board. The Board serves as a forum to generate a full discussion of the merits, and their decision 
is arrived at publicly and a permanent record is generated.  The minutes of the Board meeting 
endure as a permanent record long after the files for a specific building or project have been 
relegated to permanent storage.  I have been gratified when one of those systems experiences an 
actual emergency and it really works!  Unfortunately, some of them do not!  It is the review of 
the failures that guides us in judging future practice. 
 
 
Define the Performance to be achieved 
 
At the conclusion of a seven year project, FEMA published in October 1997, the NEHRP 
Guidelines for the Seismic Rehabilitation of Buildings, (FEMA 273).  A selection from varying 
performance objectives for the rehabilitation of existing buildings is now possible.  The 
guidelines offer the owner, designer and the public an informed choice for the extent of 
rehabilitation, recognizing that triggers in existing codes frequently do not require rehabilitation.  
Calibration of these new guidelines is now underway through case studies of over 30 existing 
buildings by a variety of structural engineering firms.  Adding to the results of this calibration, 
we should track the use of the guidelines on actual projects to confirm the validity of the 
conclusions proposed by the guidelines. 
 
The 1997 edition of the NEHRP Recommended Provisions for Seismic Regulations for New 
Buildings has begun the process of offering similar choices for new buildings.  As the Provisions 
move through the standards process and become consensus based recommendations to Building 
Code, co-ordination must be maintained with the IBC Performance Code Committee to assure a 
seamless integration of provisions as legal minimum levels of safety are determined for adoption 
in the code. 
 
 
Define the Qualifications of the Design Professional 
 
Performance based design requires more analysis and demands many more decisions by the de-
signer than conventional design.  Every designer holding a license is not necessarily qualified to 
perform this type of project and the Building Official needs guidance to judge qualifications.  A 
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method of certification similar to specialties in the medical profession may be shown to be a 
practical approach. 
 
 
Define Designer Responsibilities 
 
The design team has a much broader responsibility to deal with the systems approach of per-
formance based projects.  It must be clearly understood from the very beginning of the project 
exactly who is responsible for every facet of the design and execution. 
 
 
Define required documentation 
 
From the eyes of a building official, documentation for the use of a non prescriptive method or 
system must meet the intent of the tests set out by the current code language for "Alternate 
Materials and Methods of Construction previously quoted.  Those procedures rely heavily on the 
credibility of the calculations, test results of laboratories and the performance history of similar 
assemblies or systems.  A major limitation to this process is that it requires replication for each 
project and each jurisdiction. 
 
Australia and the United Kingdom have for several years been working to develop "design 
practice" documents as guides for achieving specific design goals.  The guidelines for seismic 
rehabilitation of existing buildings developed by NIBS/BSSC/ATC/ASCE and recently 
published as FEMA 273 referenced above, may evolve into just such a design practice document 
after validation by the trial design process.  Similar guide manuals for the design of new 
buildings may also be a possible tool in the future. 
 
Proper documentation is essential in performance based design to clearly identify the objectives 
of the analysis, the approach taken, the use of computer tools and techniques and the substan-
tiation of how the objectives are deemed to have been met. 
 
While each project will be unique, consensus should be developed setting forth minimum levels 
of documentation of such items as soils, site hazards, calculations, proposed testing, computer 
tools including degrees of uncertainty, and criteria for peer reviewers.  Design practice manuals 
and educational tools must be developed and validated for training programs. 
 
 
Test Protocols 
 
From a review of the acceptance criteria and evaluation procedures currently in use for products 
and systems, and looking back at how UL and Factory Mutual were created, it would seem that 
an expansion of those techniques to serve the proposed performance design goals can be 
envisioned. 
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Quality Assurance 
 
Criteria should be agreed upon to measure the quality assurance plan and identify enhancements 
needed by this more complex construction process.  Observed deviations from construction 
documents may have more far reaching effects on performance objectives than on conventional 
construction. 
 
 
Building Maintenance 
 
Lessons from our failures in the past point out the difficulty of sustaining the validity of the 
original premises of acceptance.  Getting special details constructed as designed and drawn is a 
major challenge in today's construction practice. 
 
Maintenance of special methods and systems is increasingly difficult, if not impossible.  How 
many life safety systems (pressurized stairwells, emergency generators, smoke control systems, 
voice fire alarm systems, etc.) will perform as designed 5 years and longer after acceptance?  For 
example, what reliability can we expect from the elastomeric materials in base isolation systems 
after a few years? 
 
How we mandate and achieve maintenance levels to assure that designs and systems will 
function as designed over long time periods must be developed.  The use of deed restrictions, 
qualified certificates of occupancy and renewable certificates of occupancy should be explored. 
 
 
Change of Occupancy 
 
When assumptions are made during performance based design about the type of occupancy 
expected during the life of the building, do we become skeptics and insist on the worst case 
scenario -- thereby defeating the incentive to use economical assumptions?  This has already 
been a problem with some high rise buildings designed as offices when a change of use to health 
care is later proposed. 
 
If we design for a specific performance goal, how will we document those restrictions for future 
generations of building owners and building officials?  A walk through a fifteen year old mall 
shopping center reveals that most of the original conditions of acceptance have long been 
abandoned, and the mall is no more than additional retail display space. 
 
 
Repair, Alteration or Addition 
 
Many of the problems associated with change of occupancy discussed above are of equal con-
cern for repair, alteration and additions. 
 
Building additions are generally easier to track and regulate than alterations, since permits are 
harder to avoid when visible additions are undertaken. 
 82 
 
Multitudes of repairs and many alterations are undertaken by maintenance employees with in-
adequate engineering knowledge to understand the unexpected consequences of repairs and 
alterations.  Architects who design tenant finishes from franchise headquarters often unknow-
ingly compromise carefully designed structures and systems by failing to coordinate with the 
designer of record. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The principles of performance based codes have been recognized as very desirable for centuries, 
but the execution of such design and construction has been measured by prescriptive or "deemed 
to comply" regulations. 
 
The reasons for failure to achieve performance based design and construction are plentiful, but 
usually fail due to a legal need to determine when the minimum code levels of safety have been 
attained. 
 
I do not pretend to have solutions to the many problems and pitfalls I have described.  My 
reflections are the result of many years of experience on both sides of the building process.  My 
early career required the submission of alternate methods of construction and design calculations 
for prefabricated steel buildings long before design practices such as the AISC Plastic Design 
Manual were published.  My later career as a building official exposed me to all levels of design 
and construction from the ridiculous to the sublime.  It is hard not to become a cynic when 
exposed to some of the atrocious building practices that occur on a frequent basis.  As stated 
earlier, the most exciting part of the job was working with creative designers and enlightened 
owners to produce unusual and imaginative projects.  Many times I was expected to go out on a 
limb to allow some “unique” design or system.  I consistently refuse to go there alone.  The 
designer must be ready, willing and able to go out on that limb “arm in arm” with the building 
official. 
 
I believe strongly in the need for performance based design, but my practical side tell me that the 
few projects that will use the new process are similar to the projects already using the current 
alternate procedure methods. 
 
Regardless of my skepticism, Performance Codes are here to stay and will be used extensively in 
the future. 
 
The Insurance Industry should take careful note of the potential consequences and work 
cooperatively to solve the problems related to subsequent changes of occupancy or lack of 
maintenance. 
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Abstract 
 
 
 While recent building codes (last 15 – 20 years) have been revised extensively in an 
effort to address performance problems associated with seismic resistance, they have primarily 
focused on new building construction rather than existing construction.  One reason for this is 
that new construction is easier to regulate, change, and construct in ways that provide improved 
performance at a “reasonable” cost.  However, the huge volume of existing construction also 
should be retrofitted when possible to improve the life-safety of the structure and reduce damage 
associated with seismic events.  The cost of loss of life, repair and expenses associated with loss 
of use can be astronomical when compared to the cost associated with retrofitting buildings to 
improve performance.  While it is politically unattainable to require the retrofit of all buildings 
with significant seismic risk, many buildings should be considered for retrofit from a pure 
economic standpoint, while others should be considered from a societal or safety concerns.  This 
paper investigates the issue of retrofitting existing buildings for improved seismic performance, 
along with what type of knowledge we currently have and what knowledge necessary for 
effective retrofitting is still missing.  The paper also discusses projects that will help increase the 
knowledge base for retrofit that are currently underway or planned, along with a projection of 
projects that may be needed to continue to improve the technology available for retrofitting 
buildings. 
 
 In 1997, the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP) completed the 
Guidelines for the Seismic Rehabilitation of Buildings and the associated Commentary.  These 
Guidelines were a significant departure from the previous efforts to write and update the 
Recommended Provisions for Seismic Regulations for New Buildings and Other Structures.  
With the success of having the 1994 Provisions adopted by all of the model building codes, and 
the adoption of the 1997 Provisions as the basis for the International Building Code (IBC) and 
International Residential Code (IRC), NEHRP has now begun to focus on the larger problem of 
addressing the seismic risk of existing buildings.  This paper attempts to outline the major 
differences between the NEHRP Guidelines and Provisions.  While related in some ways, the 
two methodologies are fundamentally different in a) their goal, and b) the process to achieve the 
goal.  Finally, the paper discusses some of the issues related to the development of the IRC and 
the potential for retrofitting residential buildings. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 Recent building codes (last 15 – 20 years) have been revised extensively in an effort to 
address performance problems associated with seismic resistance.  The motivation for these 
revisions was 1) loss of life and damage experienced during various seismic events, 2) the 
economics associated with displaced people, loss of industrial infrastructure, and loss of 
municipal services resulting from earthquakes, and 3) a presidential order that all buildings 
associated with the federal government (owned, leased, or insured) be designed and constructed 
in a seismic resistant manner.  Several groups have contributed to the effort.  Originally, the 
Structural Engineers Association of California (SEAOC) lead the process by publishing the 
“Blue Book”.  A second effort was initiated by the Applied Technology Council (ATC).  This 
second effort evolved into the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP) 
Recommended Provisions for Seismic Regulations for New Buildings and Other Structures.  The 
Provisions result from an effort to provide a wider perspective on seismic issues, and includes 
input from experts from all geographic regions of the United States, and a balanced committee 
structure including experts from industrial organizations, academics, and designers.  The 
Provisions have been adopted as the basis for seismic design by all three model building codes, 
and the 1997 Provisions as the basis for the International Building Code (IBC) and International 
Residential Code (IRC). 
 
 While these efforts have had a significant effect on the design and construction of new 
buildings over the past 20 or so years, they have had a minor effect on the rehabilitation of 
existing construction.  The reason is these documents have primarily focused on new building 
construction rather than existing construction.  One reason for this is that new construction is 
easier to regulate, change, and construct in ways that provide improved performance at a 
“reasonable” cost.  However, the huge volume of existing construction also should be retrofitted 
when possible to improve the life-safety of the structure and reduce damage associated with 
seismic events.  The cost of loss of life, repair and expenses associated with loss of use can be 
astronomical when compared to the cost associated with retrofitting buildings to improve 
performance.  While it is politically unattainable to require the retrofit of all buildings with 
significant seismic risk, many buildings should be considered for retrofit from a pure economic 
standpoint, while others should be considered from a societal or safety concerns.   
 
 A second reason that previous efforts have focused on new construction is that existing 
buildings were designed under several different methods, and trying to apply the design methods 
used for new construction does not always result in acceptable designs.  Our understanding of 
how existing structures function is not as advanced as our abilities to model and design new 
structures. 
 
 In 1997, NEHRP completed the Guidelines for the Seismic Rehabilitation of Buildings and 
the associated Commentary.  This effort was managed by the Applied Technology Council for 
the Building Seismic Safety Council, and was a process that span six years.  These Guidelines 
were a significant departure from the previous efforts to write and update the Recommended 
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Provisions for Seismic Regulations for New Buildings and Other Structures.  With the success of 
having the Provisions adopted by all of the model building codes, and the basis for seismic 
design in the IBC and IRC, NEHRP has now began to focus on the larger and more complicated 
problem of addressing the seismic risk of existing buildings.  
 
 
Goals and Procedures 
 
 
 While related in some ways, the two methodologies of analyzing existing buildings and 
designing new buildings are fundamentally different in a) their goal, and b) the process to 
achieve the goal.  The NEHRP Provisions primarily address seismic design using a goal of 
uniform margin of failure against a maximum earthquake level, and uses Linear Static 
Procedures to determine the adequacy of the design.  (Linear Dynamic Procedures and other 
advanced analysis are allowed, but Linear Static Procedures are the principle analysis tools.)  
The Guidelines use a suite of analysis procedures to analyze the building, and a combination of 
applied loads and estimates of deflections are used to determine the adequacy of a building.  In 
addition, the Provisions adopted a general risk of 2% chance of exceedance in 50 years for the 
Maximum Considered Earthquake, with the design earthquake having an amplitude of 2/3 the 
Maximum Considered Earthquake.  In contrast, the Guidelines adopted the same definition of the 
Maximum Considered Earthquake for the seismic event for which collapse is prevented.  A 
second earthquake with a 10% chance of exceedance in 50 years was adopted by the Guidelines 
as the seismic event for which life safety concerns are considered. 
 
 The Guidelines also consider several design objectives ranging from limited to enhanced 
performance improvement.  Figure 1 illustrates three alternative rehabilitation objectives 
considered by the Guidelines.  Limited objectives include simply making the building better than 
before rehabilitation and may simply be designed to prevent collapse and partial life safety.  
Basic Safety is intended to provide a low risk of endangerment of life safety for any seismic 
event likely to affect the building.  Enhanced objectives intend to provide a low risk of 
endangerment of life safety for any event likely to affect the building, and to further protect the 
building and contents against some level of damage.  These goals can be further divided into 
additional groups depending on how refined the definition of desired performance is.  
 
 After the performance level is defined, the rehabilitation design then follows a procedure to 
define the seismic events to be used in the design, determine the structural integrity of the 
existing structure, and determine the structure’s load and displacement capacity.  Acceptance 
criteria are then compared to determine how much strengthening the structure requires and the 
location of the additional work.  Many times the need to strengthen a will be due to the original 
structure’s inability to sustain the large inelastic deformations associated with seismic loadings.  
A flowchart showing the process for designing a retrofit for seismic strengthening a building is 
provided in Figure 2. 
 
 Finally, cost will always be of concern in retrofitting a structure.  While the added cost 
associated with seismic design in new construction is relatively small when compared to the  
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Figure 1.  Alternative rehabilitation objectives use in the NEHRP Guidelines. 
 
overall cost of the project. Rehabilitation of existing structures with today’s technology is almost 
always expensive.  This is due to the inability to access the structural components and add 
effective ductility of continuity to the structure.  Also the higher the performance demanded, the 
higher the associated cost usually will be.  Figure 3 illustrates the concept of how cost is 
associated with intended performance level.  The Guidelines then require the designer and client 
to jointly determine what level of performance the retrofit will use as its objective. 
 
Missing Information 
 
 
 While our society has come quite a long way in developing technology and design tools that 
have improved our ability to design and construct new buildings that perform well in seismic 
events, there is a large void of understanding how existing structures behave and how various 
proposals for retrofitting buildings will improve or harm building performance.  Research in the 
general area of earthquake engineering has primarily focused on large structures such as high-
rise buildings and bridges.  This is due to the perception of importance of high cost structures 
justifying significant investigation to ensure good performance and the perception by academics 
that these large structures are interesting.  However, a parameter that is not often acknowledged 
is that large structures are generally more repetitive in how the structure is planned and therefore 
easier to analyze with existing tools.  Larger structures have also been given priority when 
instrumented for strong motion measurement.  Together, these historical precedents have 
resulted in a better understanding of how large steel and concrete frame buildings perform, but a 
virtual void of understanding of how low-rise masonry and light-frame buildings perform.  In 
addition, most of the seismic design procedures are based on the response of high-rise buildings, 
which may not be indicative of the response of low-rise buildings.  When one considers the  
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Figure 2.  Rehabilitation Design Process Flow Chart.
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Figure 3.  Relation between rehabilitation goal and associated costs. 
 
 
volume of construction completed in the United States each year for low-rise construction when 
compared to high-rise construction, the effort expended to date on these two types of 
construction seem out of line. 
 
 Substantial research has been performed to investigate the seismic response of individual 
components, with associated improvements in design and construction.  However, how the 
different sub-assemblies or components interact and function as a three-dimensional system is 
not understood well, and as a consequence, the seismic performance of low-rise structures is 
primarily based on the wall performance.  Interelement connections, the effect of flexible 
foundations associated with upper stories, relative stiffness of diaphragms and shear walls, and 
the effect of folded diaphragms such as roofs all need to be quantified in order to move design 
from the component stage to the system stage.  In addition, how elements of dissimilar materials 
respond when forced to act in unison needs to be quantified.  Currently, dissimilar material 
response is not allowed to be considered as additive, and therefore, many of the retrofit methods 
can not take full advantage of the materials used.  This research is required in order to improve 
either design of new buildings or for retrofit of existing buildings. 
 
 Currently, there is one major project underway to investigate the seismic response of low-
rise construction.  The CUREe – Cal Tech Wood Frame project is a multi-milion dollar research 
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project with the objective to mitigate seismic losses in wood frame construction.  This project 
will include the experimental study of components and full-scale buildings under cyclic and 
seismic loadings.  The project will also begin to develop three-dimensional analytical tools that 
are validated with the experimental results, and has a duration of three years.  Hopefully, this 
project will provide information on systems other than those typically used in new construction. 
 
 Another project is the SAC project for steel framing.  While this project is not explicitly 
directed toward low-rise construction, the results of the project continues to provide significant 
information on the seismic performance of steel structures, and will improve the understanding 
of steel structural systems and improve analytical tools for design. 
 
 A major shortcoming in the current design procedure is in the way the design forces are 
determined.  Currently, the seismic accelerations are modified by a structural response factor, or 
R-factor.  This factor has traditionally been set using engineering judgment and post event 
investigations on the performance of structures.  However, there is virtually no scientific 
background to this factor and it could as easily be considered as a calibration factor rather than a 
rationally determined variable.  The Building Seismic Safety Council has funded a small 
preliminary effort to develop a rational procedure for determining the R-factor.  They have 
developed a proposal that will be forwarded to FEMA and NSF in an effort to obtain funding for 
a 3 year project to quantify the method and refine it.  Current R-factors could easily be to high 
and the relative values for different systems are also probably not correct.  Hopefully, this effort 
will provide the science needed in the one part of the process that has not had scientific input. 
 
 A second effort that is currently being proposed to the National Science Foundation is the 
establishment of a National Engineering Research Center on Integrated Systems in Housing.  
This effort will develop design tools that provide a three-dimensional, integrated environment to 
analyze building performance for light-frame construction.   The project will investigate the 
interaction of different materials and composite systems to achieve improved performance in 
terms of structural response and other criteria.  The effort is lead by the Center for Integrated 
Systems in Housing at Virginia Tech. 
 
 Currently, there is not coordinated effort to investigate the design and/or retrofit of 
unreinforced masonry structures.  While this type of structure makes up one of the larger 
segments of the current building stock, they also have a reputation of poor performance in 
seismic events.  Little is known on how to retrofit these structures to improve the life-safety and 
other performance parameters, and there is a real need to begin investigating economic retrofit 
strategies.  This is especially evident when the buildings located in the New Madrid seismic area 
are considered. 
  
 
Future Direction of Seismic Design 
 
 
 In the near future, seismic design will continue to be primarily a linear static procedure.  
With the exception of the R-factor values, the procedure has been effective and will continue to 
be used by the engineering community for quite a few years to come.  The NEHRP Provisions is 
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currently adding non-linear procedures in the 2000 edition for comment.  They are currently 
proposed to be added as an appendix, and will be reviewed and updated in the 2003 revision 
cycle. 
 
 Long-term, there are two efforts to change the design procedures for seismic design 
underway.  These include a move to a displacement-controlled method and another is based on 
energy methods.  New Zealand and the NEHRP Guidelines both include displacement demand 
criteria for design, and several of the parties involved in the NEHRP Provisions effort have 
indicated a desire to move the Provisions in that direction.  Since seismic response is a 
displacement driven phenomena, this move has some benefits in insuring ductile response.  
 
 Energy-based methods for seismic design are in their infancy.  A few of the materials 
groups have begun to fund research on defining parameters for design on an energy basis.  The 
intent is to account for the energy dissipation qualities of some types of construction and to try 
and account for event duration.  Generally, the more ductile and redundant systems will benefit 
from this type of design, while the brittle materials will not be able to take advantage of the 
procedures as effectively. 
 
 
Building Codes 
 
 
 The International Building Code and International Residential Code both use the 1997 
edition of the NEHRP Provisions as the basis for seismic design.  The IBC is intended for 
engineered construction, while the IRC is intended for prescriptive construction.  While the IBC 
is a step forward, it is not drastically different from any of the three model building codes 
currently in use.  However, the IRC is a dramatic step forward in the area of seismic design. 
 
 For the first time the model prescriptive building code will have an engineering basis for 
the seismic design requirements.  The predecessor (CABO One- and Two-Family Dwelling 
Code) virtually neglected seismic design requirements, and this was the primary reason many of 
the seismicly active regions of the Western United States did not adopt this code.  The IRC 
adopts the 1999 NEHRP requirements with a few modifications.  First, the basis for the seismic 
loading is the same as the NEHRP Provisions, except the default soil condition is D class rather 
than B class.  The seismic maps have also been redrawn to eliminate as many contours as 
possible and include the soil factor in the map.  This allows the designer to simply locate the 
building site on the map and directly determine the Seismic Design Category.  Another change is 
that the irregularities outlined in the NEHRP Provisions for restricting conventional construction 
have been adopted.  If a building design is outside of these irregularity requirements, the 
irregularity will have to be engineered to ensure the forces are properly accounted for.  Finally, 
weight limitations have been incorporated in the IRC, and one- and two-family detached 
buildings in locations with Seismic Design Categories A, B, and C are exempt from the seismic 
requirements. 
 
 Providing an engineering basis for the prescriptive building code will help improve the 
quality of code changes in the future.  The rationale for future structural code changes will have 
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to show how the code is deficient in addressing the loading requirements and how the change 
addresses the change effectively. 
 
 How future code changes are made and whether the seismic provisions will remain in the 
codes or referenced standards or other documents is yet to be decided.  There are arguments for 
both options and both options have benefits and disadvantages.  For the near future, seismic 
provisions will continue to be included in the building code.  Changes to the NEHRP Provisions 
will be promoted to the IBC and IRC by the Code Resource Support Committee.  This is a 
committee funded by FEMA, and consists of representatives from Building Seismic Safety 
Council, the American Society of Civil Engineers, the Structural Engineers Association of 
California, and a couple of other organizations.  The intent is to have proposals for change in 
seismic provisions made to a group of experts from a variety of organizations and provide 
discussion from a broad body of interested parties.  This allows for a more in-depth discussion of 
individual proposals and allows issues to be discussed and changes made prior to the short and 
intense arguments at the building code technical hearings. 
 
 The IBC/IRC drafting process highlighted some of the weaknesses in understanding of 
structural behavior.  One of the big areas of misunderstanding is how different materials effect 
each other.  Building construction has evolved through a process of in-kind replacement of 
elements and components.  This process has allowed individual systems and products to optimize 
their product without regard to the effects on the overall structure.  Examples include light-
weight floor systems that resulted in safe floors with annoying vibrations, and external insulation 
systems that resulted in moisture problems in wall systems.  In addition, the drafting process 
highlighted how some of the codes actually conflict in how they try to achieve their respective 
goals.  An example is the energy and structural codes.  The energy code provides motivation to 
replace structural sheathing with sheathing that provides higher insulation characteristics, while 
the structural code provides motivation for higher amounts of structural sheathing for improved 
structural performance.  There are other issues that require investigation and solutions found, but 
they are to many in number to address in this format. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 While there are dissimilarities between the NEHRP Guidelines for the Seismic 
Rehabilitation of Buildings and Recommended Provisions for Seismic Regulations for New 
buildings and Other Structures, both documents provide guidance in designing buildings to resist 
earthquakes.  The Provisions have begun to mature and have been adopted by the model building 
codes, while the Guidelines are still in their infancy.  However, both efforts would be more 
widely applied if incentives rather than mandates were made for their use.  Retrofitting buildings 
can reduce the risk of damage or collapse of buildings, and while quantifying the change in risk 
might be difficult, insurance is one of the potential motivation tools.   
 
 In addition, while our understanding of component response is quite good, there is a real 
need to investigate the system response in order to quantify the building performance effectively.  
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Effects of multi-story buildings on component response and the behavior of discontinuous load 
paths need to investigated in order to reach a level of understanding that will allow seismic 
design to be effective in reducing risk of damage and loss of life. 
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The Insurance Industry's Role in Building Codes and 
Loss Mitigation Advocacy 
 
 
By David Unnewehr, AICP 
  
Policy Development & Research  
 
American Insurance Association 
 
 
Background 
 
Passage and rigorous enforcement of comprehensive statewide building codes has 
significant potential for reducing both catastrophe and more routine property losses.  Currently, 
only 23 states in the U.S. mandate a model code or state code to cover all buildings and 
occupancy classifications.  Twenty states do not have state-mandated building codes covering 
the entire state, but generally have codes governing building activity in larger cities. An 
additional eight states mandate building codes for commercial and institutional property, but 
exempt one and two-family dwellings which are typically much more vulnerable to wind, hail, 
and other sources of loss. A number of states in hurricane-prone areas including Texas, 
Louisiana and several other Gulf coast states and earthquake-prone areas such as Missouri still 
have no widespread or statewide building code requirements. Missouri, in fact, has a legislative 
prohibition on the ability of all but its largest jurisdictions to enact and enforce a building code.  
 
Insurers are also concerned about ongoing non-catastrophic losses from fires and other 
perils that cause damage to life and property.  In addition to codes provisions relating to high 
winds, hail, and seismic activity, life safety and property protection provisions of building and 
fire protection codes are an essential area of focus. How codes address smoke alarms, residential 
sprinklers, the safety and performance of alternative building materials, problems associated with 
ice damming are topics in which insurers have a keen interest.  Building codes provisions and 
amendments are generally researched, proposed, debated and passed by three model code 
organizations: 
 
· Building Officials and Code Administrators International Inc. (BOCA) 
· Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc. (SBCCI) and  
· International Conference of Building Officials (ICBO) 
 
There are also other organizations that formulate more specific provisions fire protection 
and for one and two-family dwelling units. Often these are adopted or referenced by the three 
model codes. The National Institute of Standards, an agency within the Department of 
Commerce, also plays a role in the development of building codes by defining engineering 
standards for wind, snow, seismic loads, and other features that define building strength and 
design. 
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BOCA generally serves Midwestern and Northeastern states, SBCCI is prominent in the 
South, while ICBO is the predominant organization in the West. These three organizations are 
cooperating on the compilation of a unified International Building Code (ICB) that should 
include the best features of each of the three codes. However, the three model code organizations 
will continue to exist for the time being as research and development, service, and training 
organizations for code enforcement officials after the ICB is officially adopted in 2001 or 2002.  
 
In many other states, codes are inadequately enforced due to a variety of factors ranging 
from understaffing to lack of training.  There have been a number of studies that have 
documented the importance of code enforcement, including those comparing the generally good 
performance of North Carolina coastal codes through severe hurricanes in the 1980s and 1990s 
with hurricanes of similar strengths affecting other states.  Estimates are that inadequate 
enforcement of Dade County building codes caused Hurricane Andrew insured losses to be at 
least 25% ($4 billion) greater than they would have been with proper adherence to the code. This 
additional damage impacted insurance capacity and availability, rendered more people homeless, 
ruined irreplaceable possessions, and increased the burden on taxpayers, government agencies 
and charities.  Better staffing and training of local building departments will help improve 
building code enforcement in catastrophe prone areas.  
 
New York currently follows an outdated building code that needs to be updated to 
include, among other things, higher wind speed requirements to reflect the hurricane risk on 
Long Island. South Carolina and Florida have recently enacted and are in the process of 
implementing comprehensive statewide building codes.  Texas implemented a new code for its 
hurricane-exposed coastal counties with strong support and input from AIA.  However, Texas is 
one of 20 states that has no state-mandated building codes which has major implications for 
homeowners and insurers in non-coastal counties in the states.  
 
Other mitigation strategies can also help to reduce catastrophe exposures, such as 
educational programs and publicity that encourages homeowners to invest in cost-effective home 
improvements or retrofitting.  
 
In recent years, insurers, planners, architects, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) and other groups have begun to focus on the role of land use policies and 
planning that could limit building in very hazardous areas, or areas subject to repeated losses 
from natural hazards. FEMA has recently begun to purchase and convert to parkland properties 
that are subject to repeated flood losses, and following the 1993 Mississippi floods, the federal 
government relocated an entire town that had been subject to multiple floods. A combination of 
land use policies and very strict building codes can help to reduce catastrophe exposures in areas 
at great risk such as coastal barrier islands, or at least help to encourage quality building that can 
withstand the risk. 
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AIA Position 
 
 AIA supports enactment of statewide comprehensive building codes in all states. State-
wide codes have the advantage of uniformity and clarity that help to promote training and better 
understanding of code provisions by developers, builders, sub-contractors, building materials 
manufacturers, and building officials. These attributes ultimately will lead to better compliance 
and enforcement than currently exists. Comprehensive and uniform codes often help lower costs 
and increase efficiency for builders who can deal with one document rather than a confusing 
patchwork of regulations from one jurisdiction to the next.  However, it is critical within the 
context of a statewide code to permit local counties or municipalities to enact specific 
amendments that address high hazard areas of a state. Often the comprehensive codes 
automatically handle higher hazard areas through maps that call for more stringent provisions in 
specific high-hazard zones. Examples include regions subject to greater hurricane risk such as 
Florida and other states with coastal areas along the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico, seismic 
zones, and other geographic areas especially prone to high wind and hail. Building codes are 
important for inland areas as well.  A statewide code, if properly crafted, can include stricter 
hurricane provisions, for example, for South Florida and other coastal counties in the state, while 
maintaining a largely uniform code for with respect to other code provisions for the State of 
Florida as a whole.  
 
 Although passage of statewide building codes should lead to some immediate 
improvement in enforcement and compliance with building codes due to the factors mentioned 
above, AIA also believes that the state and local governments need to continue to make rigorous 
enforcement a high priority. The insurance industry should also continue to encourage 
improvement in community building code enforcement, staffing, and professionalism through 
implementation of the Insurance Service Offices’ Building Code Enforcement and Grading 
System (BCEGS). 
 
 AIA supports land use planning as an effective loss mitigation tool that can help people, 
insurers, local communities, and disaster agencies by limiting building in very hazardous areas 
subject to repeat losses, or ensuring that areas with higher risks are subject to higher standards of 
protection. 
 
 AIA also supports a rate structure that encourages homeowners to undertake steps to 
mitigate losses. State insurance department should allow insurers to use higher deductibles for 
customers that do not take steps to mitigate losses.  The insurance industry should also seek ways 
of involving the mortgage lending industry in strategies to encourage mitigation such as lower 
cost loans for homeowners who undertake retrofitting or those building or purchasing homes 
with superior construction with respect to life safety and property loss reduction. 
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Activity Status  
 
In 1997, the insurance industry formed an informal coalition (Insurer Building Code 
Coalition) to lobby for comprehensive statewide codes that includes AIA, other trades, and 
several insurers. This group is also looking for ways to bring insurers back into the model code-
making process on code provisions that impact safety and property protection. Code hearings 
tend to be dominated by home builders, building officials, and materials manufacturers. Where 
key debates impact important aspects of property protection and life safety, insurers need to 
participate.  Three major building code-making organizations which in the past have published 
their own model building codes are in the process of creating a uniform model International 
Building Code (IBC). Thus the next several years will be an important period of time for 
industry input. AIA is also working with the Institute for Business and Home Safety (IBHS) 
which conducts ongoing research on the value of code enforcement and other mitigation 
strategies. IBHS has produced a number of publications raising the visibility and importance of 
mitigation strategies for retrofitting existing buildings, stronger wind resistance, seismic safety, 
and better roofing products.  With regard to FEMA, AIA and member companies are looking at 
opportunities for involvement with FEMA’s Project Impact, a program to encourage local 
counties and communities to undertake actions to make themselves more resistant to natural 
disasters. 
 
Currently, there are a number of important building code issues and objectives that AIA 
and the industry are monitoring or actively supporting in key states: 
 
1. Florida: Recent passage of a comprehensive statewide building code should have overall 
positive implications for quality construction, better training of builders and building officials 
and enforcement of building codes. However, Florida has chosen the Southern Standard 
Building Code as the model code for the state. It is less stringent on all-important hurricane 
resistant provisions than the South Florida Code, which was upgraded significantly following 
Hurricane Andrew. In addition, homebuilders are using the statewide code process to attempt 
to overturn stricter wind resistant provisions including wind-born debris protection, stronger 
anchoring, and roof protections. AIA and the industry will continue to advocate for strong 
wind resistant provisions as the statewide building code is debated and implemented over the 
next year. 
 
2. Missouri:  Insurers achieved a major step forward in Missouri in 1999 where legislation was 
passed by the legislature authorizing a Governor’s Study Commission on whether there is a 
need to adopt a model statewide building code. Current law prohibits the majority of 
Missouri counties, including most in the New Madrid earthquake region, from adopting a 
building code. AIA and the industry coalition will support the work of the commission and 
the enactment of a statewide code. 
 
3. New York: Although New York has a statewide building code, it is considered by many 
experts to be substantially out of date and it is not based on national model code.  The 
Governor and a number of elected officials are supporting adoption of an update statewide 
code, based on one of the current national models, or the planned International Building 
Code. In supporting adoption of a modern statewide code, key issues for AIA will be 
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ensuring that there are adequate windstorm resistant provisions for Long Island and other 
coastal counties and seismic provisions in those areas of the state subject to earthquakes. 
 
4. Pennsylvania:  Working together, insurers and homebuilders have come very close to 
passage of a statewide building code during the last two sessions, but legislation has fallen 
short due to opposition by key legislators who want to keep more stringent provisions now in 
effect in some local codes. AIA and the coalition will continue to work with key interest 
groups and legislators to achieve legislation. 
 
5. Texas: Although the state took an important step forward in 1997 when the Texas Insurance 
Department implemented a much more stringent building code for coastal counties, many 
other areas of the state still lack building codes. 
 
6. California: In a state subject to multiple natural hazards, including earthquakes, flooding, 
mudslides, and wildfires building codes and land use policies are especially critical. After 
every major earthquake, the state and local communities have generally done a good job of 
updating building codes to reflect the latest technical understanding of the risk. However, 
enforcement can be improved and building in hazardous areas subject to wildfires and 
mudslides is still a major problem. More attention must be paid to identifying specific code 
improvement needs for California. 
 
7. Arkansas, Louisiana: The Arkansas Insurance Commissioner and others have expressed 
interest in working toward statewide building codes following passage of legislation aimed at 
increasing the percent of property owners purchasing earthquake insurance. In hurricane-
prone Louisiana, interest in statewide building codes surfaced following a study regarding 
the need and feasibility of a catastrophe fund. 
 
8. Wisconsin, Iowa: These two states have indicated an interest in adopting statewide building 
codes but are waiting for completion and adoption of the International Building Code (IBC) 
which combines features of the three current national model codes. 
 
AIA and industry coalitions should continue to look for opportunities for increasing the 
number of states with statewide building codes and for improving existing codes and 
enforcement. 
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Building Code Effectiveness Grading Schedule 
 
Ralph Dorio 
Technical Coordinator 
ISO 
 
Abstract 
This report provides a brief overview of Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO) and explains the 
development of the Building Code Effectiveness Grading Schedule (BCEGS). The report also 
reviews and interprets the results of recent BCEGS evaluation of communities in the New 
Madrid Seismic Area and compares those findings with BCEGS data from the Western States 
Seismic Area and from the rest of the United States. 
 
ISO in the property/casualty insurance industry 
Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO) is the premier source of information about property and 
liability risk.  ISO provides statistical, actuarial, underwriting and claims information and 
analyses; consulting and technical services; policy language; and information about specific 
properties.  The company offers services for a broad spectrum of insurance lines and maintains 
one of the largest private databases in the world.   
 
Each year, ISO collects some 1.2 billion detailed records of insurance premiums collected and 
losses paid.  At any one time, ISO’s statistical database contains more then 5.5 billion records.   
For commercial lines, the data represents almost 75% of the industry’s premium volume, and for 
personal lines, the data represents nearly one-third of all written premiums.   
 
ISO professionals analyze insurer statistical data and turn it into meaningful information. ISO 
develops advisory prospective loss costs (projections of average future claim payments and loss 
adjustment expenses) for various lines of insurance.  The company also submits summaries to 
insurance regulators, to help regulators evaluate the price of insurance in each state.   
 
BCEGS evaluates communities’ building-code enforcement 
The building Code Effectiveness Grading Schedule (BCEGS) assesses the building codes in 
effect in a particular community as well as how the community supports and enforces those 
codes. ISO has developed the BCEGS program in conjunction with the three national model 
code groups, the Institute for Business and Home Safety, information from 1,500 building code 
officials and pilot testing in 154 communities.  BCEGS particularly emphasizes building code 
requirements designed to mitigate losses from natural hazards.  The result is a rating and 
underwriting tool based on a building code classification developed for each community.  It is 
not intended to analyze all aspects of a comprehensive building code enforcement department.  
The BCEGS concept is similar to that used for public protection classification, which classifies 
municipal fire suppression capabilities and has been used by insurers for decades.  
How the program works 
ISO distributes detailed questionnaires to the building officials of all municipalities in a state. 
Upon receiving a completed questionnaire from a city or town, ISO arranges for a trained field 
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representative to meet with the building code official. The ISO field representative and building 
officials review and verify the community’s capabilities, and the ISO representative seeks 
clarification and obtains supporting documentation as necessary. The review may include a visit 
to construction sites by the ISO representative and building official. 
 
The ISO field representative evaluates the community utilizing to a point system detailed in the 
grading schedule, then they tabulate the points to determine a numerical classification from 1 
(exemplary building-code enforcement) to 10 (minimal code enforcement). ISO designates 
departments that fail to meet minimal BCEGS requirements (detailed below) as Class 99. ISO 
publishes community classifications and makes them available to all ISO participating insurers. 
 
The BCEGS program works like ISO’s Public Protection Classification (PPC) program, which 
helps insurers evaluate municipal capabilities for fire suppression. The major difference between 
the two programs is the portion of the community affected by the evaluation.    A community’s 
PPC classification affects the rating of insurance for all properties in that municipality, while a 
BCEGS classification affects only buildings built after the grade went into effect. The survey 
questionnaire and grading schedule for the BCEGS program produce a snapshot in time of a 
jurisdictions building-code enforcement department. Buildings constructed before a 
community’s most recent BCEGS survey are subject to the classification in effect when those 
buildings were built.   
 
An example helps to clarify this principle. If Sampletown has a BCEGS classification of 3 when 
ABC Complex is built, the complex will always be eligible only for Class 3 credits. Subsequent 
changes in the community’s classification — good or bad — will not affect ABC Complex’s 
eligibility for BCEGS classification credits. 
 
The BCEGS program does have a provision allowing for a building to receive an individual 
classification; if the building’s construction followed the natural-hazard provisions of nationally 
recognized code. Under that provision, a registered design professional must certify that the 
building was designed and constructed according to the nationally recognized code. In such a 
case, the building will receive the highest possible classification and associated credit, regardless 
of the surrounding community’s BCEGS grading. 
 
The Building Code Effectiveness Grading Schedule is equally applicable to all communities —
large and small. This versatile schedule can be applied to all code enforcement departments that 
meet the following three minimum conditions. 
 
BCEGS requirements for code enforcement 
ISO applies BCEGS to code-enforcement departments that meet three minimal requirements: 
 
1. The department must be a permanently organized unit, established under applicable state or 
local laws and must serve an area with definite boundaries.  The organization should include 
one person responsible for operation of the department (usually with the title Building 
Official), though the Building Official may also serve in other capacities.  If a jurisdiction 
does not have a building department operated solely by or for the governing body of that 
jurisdiction, the building department providing such service must do so under a legal contract 
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or resolution.  When a building department’s service area includes two or more jurisdictions, 
the department should execute a contract with each jurisdiction served. 
 
2. The department must enforce codes that require buildings to have the structural strength and 
stability necessary to provide resistance to natural hazards common to the community’s 
geographic region. 
 
3. The department must review construction documents and monitor building construction for 
compliance with the adopted building codes. 
       
Three criteria for the grading schedule 
BCEGS examines building-code enforcement departments according to three categories of 
criteria: 
 
1. Administration of codes — This criterion focuses on the jurisdiction’s support for code 
enforcement.  The criterion emphasizes adopted building codes and modifications to the 
codes through ordinances; code enforcers’ qualifications, such as experience and education; 
zoning provisions; contractor/builder licensing requirements; public awareness programs; the 
department’s participation in code-development activities; and the department’s 
administrative policies and procedures. 
 
2. Plan Review — This criterion examines the jurisdiction’s plan-review function to assess the 
staffing levels, personnel experience, performance-evaluation schedules, review capabilities, 
and review of construction documents for compliance with the adopted building codes. 
 
3. Field Inspections — This criterion evaluates the department’s field-inspection function to 
determine the staffing levels, personnel experience, performance-evaluations schedules, 
review capabilities, and review of building construction for compliance with adopted 
building codes. 
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BCEGS classifications and premium credits 
ISO awards points for each criterion. A jurisdiction can score from 0 to 100 points, with 100 
being a perfect score.  Based on the point score, ISO determines a numerical classification as 
follows:   
 
                     point spreadS 
93.00 – 100.00 
85.00 – 92.99 
1 
2 
3 77.00 – 84.99 
69.00 – 76.99 
61.00 – 68.99 
51.00 – 60.99 
4 
5 
6 
7 39.00 – 50.99 
25.00 – 38.99 8 
9 10.00 – 24.99 C
L
A
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A
T
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10 0.00 –    9.99 
 
ISO has filed advisory rating programs, including rating credits for the commercial fire and 
allied lines, business owners, homeowners, and dwelling lines of insurance.  Most states have 
approved schedules of credit ranges for those lines.   
 
Under the ISO advisory plan: 
· buildings constructed under code-enforcement departments with classifications 1 through 3 
are eligible for the maximum credit in the approved schedule 
· buildings constructed under code-enforcement departments with classifications 4 through 7 
are eligible an intermediate credit in the approved schedule 
· buildings constructed under departments with classifications 8 and 9 are eligible for the 
minimum credit in the approved schedule 
· buildings constructed under departments with a classification of 10 are not eligible for credits 
 
BCEGS was developed as a credit-only program, but certain states do require negative 
incentives. 
 
Code enforcement in the New Madrid Seismic Area 
Countrywide data on BCEGS classified communities can be used to compare differences in 
regional building-code enforcement and effectiveness. Making those comparisons can help 
promote hazard-mitigation strategies and can lead to a better understanding of underwriting risk. 
Since the initial pilot program in 1994, ISO has evaluated more than 3,600 code-enforcement 
departments, including eight hundred departments from the six states in the New Madrid Seismic 
Area. (Mississippi has an Independent Rating Bureau, so ISO does not grade communities in that 
state.) ISO has also graded more than 600 departments from the Western States Seismic Area. 
(Idaho and Washington have Independent Rating Bureaus, so ISO does not grade communities in 
those states.   Alaska is currently in the process of being evaluated.).  
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Figures 1 through 5 compare BCEGS classifications in the New Madrid Seismic Area, the 
Western States Seismic Area, and the rest of the United States.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the differences in code-enforcement between the New Madrid and Western 
Seismic Areas. Forty-one percent of the people — the largest single population grouping — in 
the western states live in Class 3 communities. In the New Madrid region, 34% of the people — 
again, the largest single population grouping — live in communities that fail to meet the minimal 
requirements of BCEGS for code enforcement (Class 99). Figure 2 repeats this picture, but 
shows percentages of total communities rather than percentages of population.  
 
Figures 1 and 2 also show that code-enforcement departments graded 3 or above protect a low 
percentage of the population — and low percentage of communities — in the New Madrid 
region. Only 5% of the population in the New Madrid Seismic Area enjoy protection by such 
departments, while 53% of the population in the western states enjoy that level of protection 
 
Figures 4 and 5 compare the New Madrid region’s BCEGS classification to the remainder of the 
country.  In the New Madrid Seismic Area building code departments with classifications 1 to 4 
serve 19% of the population and only 5% of the communities. But in the rest of the country, 
departments with equal classifications serve 58% of the population and 21% of the communities.  
Figure 5 summarizes the data, and further draws out regional differences in the percentages of 
population served by code-enforcement departments classified 99 compared with those classified 
1 through 3. 
 
Public officials of communities in the New Madrid area — and of other cities and towns across 
the United States — have choices to make about the kind of communities they live in. If 
community leaders choose to invest in their building-code enforcement department, their 
communities are likely to benefit from lower property damage and losses — especially losses 
from seismic damage. Making those investments can also help reduce loss of life and the 
economic and social disruption that results from natural catastrophes.  
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New Madrid Vs. Western States 
by Classification Number 
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New Madrid Vs. Remainder of Country 
by Classification Number  
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New Madrid Vs. Remainder of Country 
by Population 
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THE NEED FOR INSURANCE SUPPORT OF SEISMIC RETROFIT 
 
Paul Devlin, Vice President and Jim Russell, Vice President 
Institute for Business and Home Safety 
 
 Do we really need to retrofit structures in seismic zones to enhance their resistance to 
vibrations?  In one word, yes.  Our country has a massive inventory of buildings vulnerable to 
but not prepared for the next earthquake and more buildings like them are coming on line very 
day.  We are not doing enough to address the problem in new buildings, much less in the 
constantly expanding inventory of existing buildings.  Most people view building codes as the 
solution to this problem.  Others might add land use planning.  Building codes and land use 
planning are important tools in any effort to correct this situation, but they do have limitations 
and they generally do not touch the buildings already in place.   
 
 
BUILDING CODES 
 
 
 Building codes are not the total solution.  They are just a part of the solution.  In a perfect 
world, every state and every community would have and enforce a code that reflects current 
engineering knowledge about the risk of earthquakes and their effects on structures.  The real 
world is a different place.   
 
 Building codes have four basic limitations as tools for addressing the existing inventory 
of seismically vulnerable structures: they are hardly universal, they are often out of date, they do 
not emphasize the protection of property from earthquake damage, and they are not always 
enforced. 
 
 Take the New Madrid seismic zone.  It reaches into Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri and Tennessee.  Three of these seven states do not require their 
communities to have any building code for any purpose.  Two others have a statewide code but 
do not require it for houses.  Here is a thumbnail status of statewide codes in these states: 
 
 Arkansas: a non-current (1991) statewide code covers all occupancies. 
 
 Illinois: no statewide code. 
 
 Indiana: a statewide code does not cover one and two-family dwellings. 
 
 Kentucky: a statewide code covers all occupancies. 
 
 Mississippi: no statewide code. 
 
 Missouri: no statewide code. 
 
 Tennessee: a statewide code does not cover one and two-family dwellings. 
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Of this group, only Kentucky has an up-to-date code covering all occupancies.  Missouri 
is at the other extreme.  It actually forbids 93 of its 114 counties from enacting any building code 
for any reason.  
 
 Even where codes are in place, they are not always current.  Better understanding of the 
earthquake risk and better understanding of how construction features react to the stresses of an 
earthquake have led to improvements in our model building codes.  Research into the failures of 
steel-frame connections in the 1994 Northridge event, for example, are now resulting in changes 
at the model code level.  But these model code enhancements can be late in getting to the states 
with mandatory codes and, naturally, may never get to other states. 
 
 Another reason why building codes are only part of the answer is that life safety is their 
primary function.  They assume that, given an agreed-upon baseline for earthquake risk, a 
building should not collapse on its occupants and kill them.  If the building is standing after the 
earthquake, the designer and builder have done their jobs.  The building may be a total loss 
because of cracked walls, crumbling mortar, and shaky connections, but at least its occupants 
survived.  While this situation is good, it not good enough for insurers. 
 
 A final difficulty with building codes is in enforcement.  The insurance industry knows 
from firsthand observation that code compliance is wishful thinking in many instances. 
 
 
LAND USE 
 
 
 Land use planning is also part of the solution.  It can reduce earthquake losses in a 
number of ways, like controlling the type and density of development in seismic zones and 
making sure that a community can handle the demands a development places on earthquake 
response and recovery.  But land use planning techniques have an even thinner penetration than 
building codes.  Of the seven states listed above, only Kentucky requires local planning, and only 
in its larger counties.  Furthermore, Kentucky does not require that its local planners take 
earthquakes into account.   
 
Mississippi is at the opposite end of this limited spectrum.  It has gone to the trouble of 
enacting a law authorizing every community in the state to ignore its neighbors when it makes 
land use decisions, in case it chooses to engage in land use planning at all.  In other words, if a 
locality decides to plan, it can coordinate with its neighbor if it wants to, but the state says it does 
not have to.  Earthquakes are perfect examples of the sort of events that have no respect for 
political boundaries and that beg for coordination among localities.  Not exactly a ringing 
endorsement of land use planning. 
 
Each of the states on the West Coast -- California, Oregon and Washington -- requires its 
localities to have land use plans that take their seismic risk into account.  The New Madrid states 
have a long way to go by comparison.  
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THE INVENTORY 
 
 
 The lack of attention to building standards in many states, to the protection of property in 
building standards where they exist at all, and to basic land use planning means that mid 
America has an enormous inventory of vulnerable buildings.  And the inventory is growing 
every day.  The National Association of Home Builders estimates that only two percent of the 
stock of detached single-family housing is new each year.  The turnover rate for other buildings 
is probably not too far off that figure. 
 
 The result is that even if we had the best building codes and land use laws in force 
everywhere with unfailing compliance, we would still need to address the inventory of building 
already in place. 
 
 
THE COSTS 
 
 
 When an earthquake hits, the property losses can be enormous.  The Northridge 
earthquake (1994) erased over 25 years of earthquake insurance premiums in California.  The 
common estimate of the insured losses from Northridge is $12.5 billion.  The IBHS paid-loss 
database, which collects actual payments by insurers over time, indicates a total insured loss 
exceeding $15 billion.  Even this figure pales in comparison to projected total losses from two 
other likely events: 
 
· Magnitude 6 in the New Madrid zone:  about $60 billion 
· Magnitude 7.8 in San Francisco:  about $200 billion 
 
These numbers stretch the abilities of insurers to pay and communities to recover.  Because 
building codes and land use planning are not going to bring the numbers down to any reasonable 
level, retrofit is a critical component of the answer. 
 
 
RETROFIT 
 
 
 Retrofit is the only way to get at our massive inventory of vulnerable structures.  
Retrofitting a home or office for seismic resistivity is fairly easy and inexpensive for 
nonstructural items like bookshelves, computers, water heaters and the like.  But it is often 
expensive and complex for the structural features of a building.  As a result, property owners are 
generally not inclined to undertake it.  The only way to succeed is to reduce the cost and 
complexity of retrofitting – as IBHS has demonstrated with residential roof sheathing in wind-
prone areas – and give property owners some incentive to act. 
 
 The first step is to identify new retrofit possibilities.  A national conference of leaders and 
experts can brainstorm to generate ideas.  The next step is to test the most promising possibilities 
in research laboratories and universities and then let people know about them.  Each of these 
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steps will take time and money, but if they result in just a few homes or businesses saved, the 
investment will be worth the cost. 
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Earthquakes in the Midwest – What do the Uncertainties do to the Insurance Industry? 
 
Anselm Smolka 
Geoscience Research Group 
Munich Reinsurance Company 
Email: asmolka@munichre.com 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The question posed in the title can most easily answered by the following graph which presents 
the results of two models offered for the region by different modelling firms. The models differ 
to an acceptable degree in the low probability range of about 0.001 p.a.. For more rare and more 
frequent events the difference becomes larger to such an extent that the average annual loss 
calculated by these models varies by a factor of three. This is hardly a satisfactory situation, but 
it clearly demonstrates the problems we are faced with in view of the uncertainties about 
earthquakes in the Midwest.    
 
 
 
 
Assessing the probable maximum loss (PML) arising from rare, large events and the average 
annual loss (AAL) related to the entire range of possible events in a certain area are the two basic 
elements for a solid underwriting policy in the field of natural hazards insurance. The PML 
serves to the primary insurer as the measure against which he has to decide on how  much of the 
risk he can retain for himself and how much is to be reinsured so as to guarantee his solvency in 
the case of a large loss. The AAL determines the net technical price he has to charge in order to 
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cope with the overall risk. The two loss curves reproduced above show us that in the Midwest 
uncertainty lies in the low and medium frequency range of the curve as well as in the high 
frequency range. In the following sections these uncertainties will be discussed in more detail. 
The discussion is organized according to the risk equation which reads in the insurance context 
as follows: 
 
risk = f(hazard, vulnerability, insured values) 
 
where hazard means the occurrence probability of an earthquake of a certain intensity within a 
certain time span, vulnerability is expressed as the expected mean percentage loss as a function 
of a ground motion parameter and insured values represent the total replacement values of the 
insured objects. 
 
 
2. Hazard uncertainties 
The main uncertainties for modelling the hazard in the Midwest arise from the following issues: 
 
Ø active earthquake sources and earthquake source zones 
Ø maximum magnitude and seismicity rates 
Ø attenuation of ground motion 
Ø source depths 
Ø stress drop 
Ø deep soil effects 
 
Active sources: Johnston and Schweig (1996) have summarized the state of knowledge regarding 
the source of the 1811/12 earthquake in the New Madrid zone.  
Notwithstanding their complete and conclusive discussion, uncertainties with regard to 
modelling the sources within the framework of a hazard model remain. Questions to be asked 
are: 
 
· Are the fault segments activated in the 1811/12 sequence the only specific faults in the area? 
There are other candidates like the Crittenden fault zone or the Crowley ridge. 
· The Bootheel enigma: According to Johnston and Schweig’s preferred model the Bootheel 
lineament was activated by the first of the three principal shocks of the 1811/1812 series. 
Today the lineament is seismically very quiet as opposed to the other fault segments which 
moved in 1811/12.  It has been suggested (Schweig, personal communication) that the reason 
for this observation is either a less favourable orientation with regard to the local current 
stress field or a possibly simple geometry of the corresponding fault, but so far these 
explanations are speculative.   
· Does the complex rupture pattern of the 1811/12 earthquake series represent a typical rupture 
mode for the zone?. According to paleoliqefaction features there is evidence for one similar 
event at about 900 A.D., but other events seem to have been smaller, i.e. not the total fault 
complex moved in these events.   
 
Maximum magnitude and seismicity rates: The evaluation of a recent GPS campaign by 
Newman, Stein et al. (1999) has revived the discussion on maximum magnitudes and seismicity 
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rates of the New Madrid earthquake zone (e.g. Pratt 1994). Their findings indicate much lower 
Mmax and seismicity rates than those reported in the Johnston and Schweig model. The 
conclusions drawn by Newman et al. are probably stricter than justified by their data at the 
present stage and will have to be confirmed by future repeated measurements. If confirmed, 
reconciling the two competing models would be a formidable task. Even without the new GPS 
data there is sufficient uncertainty about where the New Madrid source stands in its life cycle 
and if activity will continue at the same level as suggested by paleoseismological works.  
 
Attenuation of ground motion: Equations proposed to describe the attenuation of ground motion 
in the Midwest have been numerous and introduced very considerable uncertainty in older 
hazard models for the regions. The differences between the results in older, first generation 
models were much more pronounced than shown in fig.1.  In recent years progress has been 
made by means of simulating ground motions stochastically (e.g. Toro et al. 1992). There is a 
consensus now that older equations have overestimated the size of the affected areas 
considerably, although the fact remains that ground motions decrease much less with distance 
than in the Western United States. However, there is an interesting case made by Hanks and 
Johnston (1992) that this behaviour applies only to very large events of the 1811/12 style and to 
abnormally deep events (see below). Starting from the evaluation of isoseismals of 16 Western 
US (WUS) and 8 Eastern North America (ENA) earthquakes, Hanks and Johnston argue that, 
whereas felt areas are clearly larger for ENA earthquakes, this does not necessarily hold true for 
damaging intensity levels of MMI>VI. Another interesting feature in this context is the role 
played by critical reflections at the crust/mantle boundary which leads to ground motions 
levelling off at a distance range of 60-120 km. This is a critical distance for e.g. St. Louis and 
could mean that ground motion would be higher there than predicted by most attenuation 
functions which assume a continous decrease with distance. The effect has been taken into 
account by the model of Toro et al. (1992). 
 
Source depth and stress drop: ENA earthquakes can be grouped in two classes, namely 
earthquakes with shallow sources rooted some 10-15 km deep, and events with deeper sources 
(some 25 km) rupturing the whole crust. The two classes differ strongly in their attenuation 
characteristics (e.g. Hanks and Johnston 1992). For the deeper class, surprisingly small 
magnitudes suffice in order to produce comparatively large motions at great distances. An 
example is the Saguenay earthquake of 1988 (M=5.9) which produced isolated damage even in 
Montreal at a distance of 375 km. Only scarce data are available in order to determine the 
occurrence frequency of such deep events as compared to shallow ones, but the question is 
clearly of considerable relevance for modelling the hazard in the ENA including the US 
Midwest. 
 
Deep soil conditions: The role of subsoil conditions in earthquakes is generally known, but the 
problems posed by the considerable thickness of fluvial deposits together with their flatness are 
almost unique in the Midwest as discussed by Herrmann (Herrmann 1999, this volume). 
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3. Vulnerability issues 
It is well known that average Midwest constructions are less earthquake-resistive than structures 
in the WUS. The question is to what extent less? Several arguments can be put forward in this 
context: 
 
Construction style: compared to the WUS there is much more (and more vulnerable) 
unreinforced masonry and brick veneer construction on the one hand and less (and less 
vulnerable) wooden buildings on the other hand.  
 
Building regulations: Research in the framework of the Building Code Effectiveness Grading 
Schedule (BCEGS, Dorio 1999, this volume) has shown that code enforcement in the Midwest is 
much lower than in the WUS and even compared to the rest of the US including the East.  
 
Loss experience: Loss experience for significant earthquakes in the Midwest does not exist. 
Looking beyond pure buildings the vulnerability of „contents“ (ranging from simple household 
goods in dwellings to electronic equipment, machinery, installations and stock on commercial 
and industrial premises) is a particularly important topic from an insurance perspective, as it is 
loss to contents and non-structural building components which accounts for by far the greatest 
proportion of insured earthquake losses (Smolka and Berz 1988). This is a universal problem 
which tends to be neglected by structural engineers. Relevant loss statistics are hardly available 
even for regions other than the Midwest as under commercial lines buildings and contents are 
often insured under combined policies which do not break down values as to buildings and 
contents. In loss models contents vulnerability may be treated quite variably. Sometimes it is 
considered a function of building loss, sometimes more a function of the occupancy class. 
Correlating contents loss to building loss is not straightforward unless the building collapses, or 
contents are tied to building components in order to prevent it from moving around in an 
uncontrolled manner during earthquakes. In contrast to a common understanding that contents 
are less vulnerable than buildings, the opposite may well apply if contents have not been tied 
down. This is usually the case in regions where risk awareness is low and seems to be a safe 
assumption for the Midwest in view of the BCEGS survey.  
 
The role of low intensities: As shown in fig.1 the high and medium frequency portions of loss 
curves constitute at least as much a problem as the low frequency part. The question is: Where 
(in the curve) do insured losses begin to appear? Or, to put it more specifically: What is the 
average expected loss for low ground motions? This observation has a particular impact in 
modelling the earthquake risk  in the Midwest because of the large affected areas. The impact is 
twofold:  
 
· For a rare PML event MMI VI (or an equivalent ground motion level) may contribute almost 
50% to the total loss burden depending on the average loss percentage anticipated for this 
ground motion level. 
· In an analogous way small earthquakes with only moderate intensities may dominate the 
overall risk premium, i.e. the AAL. Given the earthquake history of the Midwest this seems 
at odds with observed earthquake damage which has been quite insignificant so far. 
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It is stressed here that the problems discussed under this sub-heading are of a more universal than 
Midwest-specific character, but nevertheless they are especially relevant in the Midwest for the 
reasons discussed. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
In summary it can be stated that enormous progress has been made in elucidating Midwest 
seismicity and risk in recent years. However, open issues remain which introduce considerable 
uncertainties to risk assessment: 
 
· Activity of sources other than the 1811/12 source 
· typical rupture modes (complex vs. simple events) 
· GPS measurements against other observations 
· the role of „deep“ events 
· the role of stress drop 
· the influence of deep soil deposits 
· the frequency and degree of the damaging effect of low loss events and intensities. 
 
There is a wide scope for the scientific community and a great demand from the insurance 
industry for future research aimed at clarifying these issues and at reducing the concomitant 
uncertainties.     
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The Need for Seismic Retrofit  — 
Unreinforced Masonry Basements 
 
Stephen M. Marlin, assistant vice president 
Property Claims and Catastrophe Operations, USAA 
 
Earthquake Damage Mitigation 
When the insurance industry reviews the issue of earthquake damage mitigation, the issue 
can be broken down into two basic categories: new construction and existing building stock.  
New construction issues are tied to building codes, development of stronger codes, adoption of 
codes and enforcement of codes in order to mitigate damages caused by the earthquake peril.  
Existing building stock issues relate to the need to retrofit structures to protect the inhabitants 
and reduce the amount of damage to the structure.  This discussion will focus on the retrofit 
issue. 
 
Insurance Claims Experience 
It is important to note that the insurance industry in this country has limited experience 
with earthquake.  Most of the events in recent years have been on the West Coast, California, 
Oregon and Washington.  When we compare the West Coast to the Midwest, we anticipate some 
significant differences in soil types, ground water tables and building designs.  Experience has 
taught us that rocky soils tend to reduce the amplitude of ground movement, while sandy alluvial 
soils tend to transmit the shock waves over greater distances.  Structures with foundation systems 
on bedrock tend to perform better than building constructed on backfill.  High water tables 
increase the potential for ground liguidfication, which in turn increases the potential for 
structural damage.  Building design and building materials can be a key factor in the amount of 
damage sustained by a structure.  Typically, masonry construction does not perform well during 
an earthquake.  Moreover, we have very little experience with basements as the foundation 
system.  Most of our earthquake experience has been with slab on grade or pier and beam 
foundation systems, since basements are not typically used on the seismicly active West Coast.   
 The peril of earthquake causes damage to a structure that is unlike the damage caused by 
the more common insured perils such as wind, fire or water.  The up lifting and twisting of a 
structure during an earthquake can result in damage that may go unnoticed to the untrained eye.  
As a result, we updated our training for adjusters to address this type of damage and understand 
that invasive tearout will be necessary to understand the full extent of the damage. 
 When a major event occurs in the Midwest, we anticipate that residential structures may 
not perform well owing to the soils, high ground water, extensive use of masonry construction 
and presence of basements.  In some cases, older structures may not have interior framing, and 
the load-bearing walls consist of double row brick.  Major components of the structure may not 
be tied together so that gravity may be the only thing holding the structure together.  Of greater 
concern is unreinforced masonry basements.  Since the basement is essentially the foundation 
system, failure of the basement will most likely result in greater failure of the load bearing walls, 
which in turn will drive a greater frequency of collapse. 
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Seismic Retrofit  
 The insurance industry views seismic retrofit as falling into two categories: non-structural 
and structural.  Non-structural retrofits are those actions that can be done easily and without great 
cost to the homeowner.  Examples include securing shelves, bookcases, cabinets, appliances and 
water heaters to reduce the likelihood these items may fall over during an event. 
 Structural retrofits can be more complex, with significant cost.  Examples include 
foundation work, wall systems, chimneys, garages, etc.  In many cases the homeowner may 
require the services of a construction professional or, possibly, an engineer. 
 
Unreinforced Masonry Basements 
 To date, the insurance industry has been unable to estimate the amount of existing 
building stock exhibiting unreinforced masonry basements.  It is possible that there is a 
significant inventory, especially with older building stock throughout the New Madrid area. 
 When a major event occurs, we anticipate those structures built on unreinforced masonry 
basements will suffer catastrophic failure.  The failure of the foundation system will result in the 
failure of the building with extensive collapse of structures.  The structural failures may well 
result in a higher frequency of injury and death to the occupants, particularly if the event occurs 
during evenings or weekends. 
 
The Need for Seismic Retrofit 
 There is a need for seismic retrofit for unreinforced masonry basements.  Today, nothing 
exists to help a homeowner determine if the basement is unreinforced.  There is nothing in terms 
of retrofit design to assist a homeowner in the retrofit of a basement.  Basement retrofit may be 
complex and is viewed today as probably being too costly for a homeowner to justify.  In many 
cases the homeowner may not even realize that a problem exists or comprehend the extent of 
peril for the family.  
 What is needed is research and laboratory testing of designs to effectively retrofit 
unreinforced masonry basements.  The retrofit needs to be cost-effective, yet efficient, in 
reducing the probability of catastrophic structural failure.  Saying that “nothing exists” or that 
“it’s too complicated” is not the answer. 
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Mid America at Risk: Insurance and Natural Disasters 
Walter W. Hays 
 
Senior Program Manager Technical and International Activities Division 
American Society of Civil Engineers 
Abstract 
 
Insurance against natural hazards is a business involving: accountants, actuaries, salespersons, 
brokers, claims adjusters, managers, and executives; other property casualty insurance 
companies; reinsurance companies; and state regulators.   Insurance is a product providing value 
to the insured at the cost of a premium.   In theory, insurers can offer protection to the insured 
against any risk that they can identify, as long as they can obtain reliable information about the 
frequency and magnitude of potential losses, and they have the freedom to set realistic 
premiums.  Every year, the Earth's atmospheric, geologic, and hydrologic systems generate 
100,000 thunderstorms, 10,000 floods, thousands of landslides, over 100 earthquakes large 
enough to be damaging, hundreds of wildfires, scores of windstorms (hurricanes, cyclones, 
typhoons and tornadoes), and dozens of volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, and droughts.  Fortunately, 
extreme events (e. g., 500-year floods, category 5 hurricanes, magnitude 8 or greater 
earthquakes, large-volume explosive volcanoes, large-volume landslides; tsunamis affecting the 
entire Pacific rim, wide spread, long-duration wildfires, and long duration droughts) and 
combinations of extreme events (e.g., earthquakes - tsunamis - landslides - floods -fires; or 
hurricanes - floods - landslides - coastal erosion) are rare occurrences.   
 
The bad news of the 20th century is that insured losses and overall economic losses from natural 
hazards are increasing with time. Natural hazards do not respect geographic or political 
boundaries, seasons, schedules, time of day, a business’ balance sheet, or a community’s state-
of-preparedness, losses are increasing due to rapid growth of population and the increasing 
vulnerability of cities and megacities having large concentrations of people living and working in 
disaster-prone regions and buildings surrounded by fragile infrastructure, neither of which were 
planned, located, designed, and constructed to be resilient to floods, severe storms, earthquakes, 
landslides, volcanoes, wildfires, tsunamis, and droughts.  
 
Natural disasters represent policy failures.  The financial sector, business, industry, governmental 
and non-governmental organizations, and the citizens and policy makers (i.e., mayors, city 
managers, city councils can work together as partners, as for example in the Central United 
States, to make natural disaster reduction a public value.        
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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework for thoughtful considerations by all 
community stakeholders, including insurers, of the kinds of actions that are needed to overcome 
the challenges represented by a vulnerable built environment and unacceptable risk and to 
specify   cost-effective  ways for all stakeholders to work together to make mitigation a public 
value in their communities. Mid America  is singled out for attention because of the potential for 
a catastrophic earthquake. The aim of the paper  is to provide a framework of understanding 
about  earthquakes, communities at risk, insurance, partnerships, and mitigation in the context of 
all natural hazards (e.g., floods, severe storms, hail, landslides, wildfires, volcanic eruptions, 
tsunamis, and droughts).  Natural disaster reduction is a challenge, because it requires 
coordinated actions based on consideration of the view points  of a diverse group of stakeholders 
encompassing insurers (e.g., accountants, actuaries, salespersons, brokers, claims adjusters, 
managers, and executives of  property casualty companies, state insurance regulators; and 
reinsurers) as well as their counterparts in businesses, industrial organizations, utility companies, 
academic organizations, health care organizations, volunteer organizations, architectural and 
engineering firms, and public- and private-sector professional organizations (e.g., earth 
scientists, engineers, architects, planners, emergency managers).  
 
 
What is a Community? 
 
Each community differs in size, political leadership, stakeholder composition, value at risk, 
goals, and linkages with other local, regional, national, and international communities.  Each 
community consists of many diverse stakeholders having great variability both within a sector 
and among sectors.  No stakeholder sector is homogeneous.  For example, property casualty 
insurance companies are comprised of accountants, actuaries, salespersons, brokers, claims 
adjusters, managers, and executives who have to deal with state insurance regulators; and 
reinsurers.   
 
 It might be convenient to think of a community as comprised of three distinct and diverse 
groups who make decisions concerning insurance and mitigation.  They are:   
 
1) Individual residents, perhaps the most important sector of all, the individual citizens, a highly 
diverse group of individuals who make up the political constituents for the public officials 
and who provide the pressures for changing public policies.   They are also the customers and 
employees of the local businesses and government and are the customers of the insurers and 
other stakeholders involved in local commerce.   
2) Community policy makers (e.g., mayors, city managers, city councils), who make the 
decisions concerning the adoption and implementation of public policies, but who are 
influenced by individual residents and overriding state/Federal regulators and legislatures.   
3) Community stakeholders (e.g., insurers and other private businesses, industrial organizations, 
utility companies, academic organizations, health care organizations, professional 
organizations (e.g., earth scientists, engineers, architects, planners, emergency managers), 
religious organizations, volunteer organizations, and architectural and engineering firms.   
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All of these groups have to work together if unacceptable risk to the community is to be 
mitigated, reduced, and managed over the long-term in a cost-effective manner.  
 
 
What is Risk?   
 
Risk is the likelihood of the occurrence of a damaging natural hazard with its disaster agents, 
including fire, multiplied by its potential consequences expressed in terms of economic or 
societal values such as:  economic loss, deaths, injuries, damage, and loss of function.  These 
potential consequences must be classified as either acceptable or unacceptable by the 
community’s residents, policy makers, insurers and stakeholders before realistic risk 
management can be effected.   
 
An acceptable level of risk is a threshold which varies significantly from community to 
community, depending upon an individual’s or a stakeholders level of risk aversion.  For a 
community in general, it is the threshold above which the perceived likelihood and  
consequences of an earthquake are considered so adverse that they justify public and private 
investment on a grand and sustained scale to mitigate, prevent, or reduce the potential losses to 
the community as a whole.  For the individual member of the community, whether a resident 
(owner or renter), or a business owner, or an employee, acceptable level of risk would be based 
upon that individual’s level of risk aversion.   
 
Acceptable risk and unacceptable risk for the community as a whole are established through the 
process of public consensus, with neither risk being fixed nor static.  Not unlike the variance 
among individuals and businesses within the community, acceptable and unacceptable risk varies 
from community to community and from nation to nation as a function of time, location, and 
circumstances.  
 
 
What is the Role of the Community’s Stakeholders and Policy Makers in 
Managing their Community’s Perceived Risk? 
 
 
Risk management (i.e., mitigation, preparedness, emergency response, and recovery and 
reconstruction measures and regulations) is needed when the community’s consensus, based on 
scientific, technical, administrative, political, legal, and economic considerations, is that the 
overall risk for the community is unacceptable. 
 
 
A Role for Insurers in the Central United States Partnership 
 
The Central United States Partnership (CUSP) (2) was formed informally on March 2, 1999 and 
established formally on May 27, 1999.  The goal is to develop and implement  a long-term 
strategic plan to reduce the unacceptable risk from a catastrophic earthquake in the Central 
 120 
United States (Tennessee, Missouri, Kentucky, Illinois, Indiana, Arkansas, and Mississippi). A 
catastrophic earthquake is inevitable in the Central United States (hereafter referenced as CUS). 
At present, without implementation of the strategic actions identified in this plan, a catastrophic 
earthquake would be devastating to the people, urban centers, businesses, buildings, critical 
infrastructure, and environment in the CUS.   
 
CUSP consists of public and private sector organizations, many of whom have worked together 
in the past.  They are available to provide leadership, resources, and political capital for 
implementing a comprehensive loss reduction plan throughout the CUS.  At present, CUSP, a 
unique partnership led by the Central United States Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC), is 
comprised of: the following public-private sector partners: 
 
1) three core organizations: a) the CUSEC State Geologists (CSG), b) Institute for Business & 
Home Safety (IBHS),  and c) Mid America Earthquake Center (MAE),  
2) an interim secretariat, United States Geological Survey (USGS), and  
3) eight partners:  a) Department of Transportation (DOT), b) Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA). c) Association of Contingency Planners, (ACP), d) Disaster Recovery Business 
Alliance (DRBA, e) Extreme Information Infrastructure (XII), f) Institute of Gas Technology 
(IGT), g) American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), and h) Mid Continent Mapping 
Center (MCMC) (a part of the USGS) 
 
Other public-private organization will be invited to join and help to achieve CUSP’S common 
agenda, which is to seek new and innovative ways to make earthquake loss reduction a public 
value in the CUS.  CUSP exists to enhance the long-term capability of each partner to carry out 
its basic mission and to take advantage of new opportunities for political, financial, and technical 
support of programs and activities that will reduce potential catastrophic losses to buildings and 
critical infrastructure, protect people, businesses, critical infrastructure, and communities, and 
assist “Project Impact” communities and “Showcase Communities” to reach their goals. 
 
 
The Earthquake Threat in the CUS  
 
Experts believe that catastrophic earthquakes—earthquakes whose effects are so severe that they 
cause unacceptable levels of damage to buildings and infrastructure, economic loss, mortality, 
morbidity, and adversely affect the environment, production facilities, economic markets, and 
distribution systems--are inevitable in the central United States.  They believe that it is only a 
matter of time before the CUS pays a heavy price for not   marshaling its intellectual and 
political capital to assess its hazard and built environments and  enact and implement realistic 
public policies to cope with the extraordinary threat posed by a catastrophic earthquake.  
 
The severity of a catastrophic earthquake in the CUS depends on four principal factors: 1) the 
magnitude, or “size,” and depth of the earthquake, 2) its location and proximity to urban centers, 
3) the time of day and the season of the year when it strikes, and 4) the public policies for 
mitigation and preparedness that have been implemented as “works in progress” to reduce 
vulnerabilities in the built environment of each urban center and the corresponding unacceptable 
risks.  Only one of these factors--public policies--can be controlled; the remaining three can not.     
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On the basis of what has happened in past earthquakes in the CUS and throughout the world in 
hazard and built environment analogs, along with preliminary loss modeling, it is well known 
that catastrophic earthquake leave an indelible mark on individuals, businesses, communities, 
infrastructure, insurers, and the Nation.  They adversely affect the environment, and they 
overwhelm production facilities, distribution systems, and economic markets, jeopardizing the 
financial stability of business, communities, and the Nation.  Experts believe that the economic 
losses from a catastrophic earthquake occurring today in the CUS will be in the range of $ 100 
billion.  The physical effects of such an earthquake would damage, destroy, and disrupt the 
normal functions of government, community safe havens, essential facilities, critical facilities, 
and business; disrupt local and regional infrastructure; leave tens of thousands dead, injured, 
homeless, and jobless; divert tourism, reduce the tax base; divert resources planned for health 
care, education, and other social programs; and deplete insurance and financial resources.  
 
When compared with California, Alaska, or the Puget Sound area, the central U.S. faces an 
unprecedented catastrophe because of its unique hazard environment (i.e., the geologic, 
geophysical, and geotechnical setting of the region that controls where, why, and how frequently 
earthquakes occur, how big they are, and the severity of their effects) and the vulnerability or 
fragility of its built environment (i.e., the buildings and infrastructure in urban centers at risk).  
Damaging earthquakes are inevitable in the central U.S., even though the CUS is far away from 
the geologically young and unstable seismogenic belts along the west coast in California, the 
Puget Sound area, and Alaska or the mid-Atlantic ridge in the Atlantic Ocean marking, 
respectively, the western and eastern boundaries of the North American plate.  The most likely 
locations include: a) the New Madrid seismic zone where magnitude 6.5-6.8 earthquakes 
occurred near Memphis in 1843 and near St. Louis in 1895, and four magnitude 8 or greater 
earthquakes and scores of moderate-to-large-magnitude aftershocks occurred in the winter of 
1811-1812, and b) the Wabash Valley area northeast of the New Madrid seismic zone where 
damaging moderate earthquakes have occurred.   
 
The CUS faces unprecedented unacceptable risk because of its unique hazard environment 
characterized by the New Madrid seismic zone and the Wabash Valley seismic zone, the 
vulnerability or fragility of its built environment containing buildings and infrastructure that 
were not constructed in accordance with modern codes and standards, and a flawed policy 
environment.  Each urban center within the CUS has an inventory of existing buildings and 
infrastructure that will fail because of flaws in planning, siting, design, and construction that 
occurred when they were added to the inventory. The current inventory of buildings and 
infrastructure in the CUS at risk from ground shaking and ground failure, the principal disaster 
agents of earthquakes, is valued in the trillions of dollars.  The current perceived risk to existing 
buildings, infrastructure, and people in the CUS has reached the level where it is socially 
unacceptable.  That is, there is a sufficiently high probability of loss to the elements of the built 
environment at risk as the result of the occurrence, physical and societal consequences of the 
earthquake that investments in mitigation and preparedness measures and regulations are needed 
to reduce it to acceptable levels before the earthquake occurs.  
. 
The CUS faces an unacceptable level of unacceptable risk because of flaws in public 
policies. At present, consensus public policies based on social, technical, administrative, 
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political, legal, and economic factors to cope with an inevitable catastrophic earthquake are 
lacking in the CUS.  This gap reflects the urgent need for a forum and a process for making 
decisions about plans, laws, and professional practices to reduce unacceptable risk to people, 
property, and infrastructure in the CUS’s urban centers.   
 
 
A Role for Insurers in CUSP’s Strategic Plan for the CUS  
 
CUSP’s strategic plan calls for the following coordinated actions:   
 
1) CUSP is calling for individuals, businesses, communities, insurers, professionals, and local, 
state, and Federal governments to face the inevitability of a catastrophic earthquake in the 
Central United States. They should assess the threat it represents to their homes, businesses, 
schools, hospitals, critical infrastructure, and communities, and invest in mitigation and 
preparedness, the two most cost-effective long-term public policies, while continuing to 
improve the capability for emergency response and recovery and reconstruction. Investments 
in mitigation, preparedness, emergency response, and recovery and reconstruction measures 
and regulations are urgently needed in the CUS’s urban centers.  They should be in 
proportion to their size, population, and value of the buildings and infrastructure at risk.   
 
2) CUSP is calling for the implementation of 44 strategies for: a) living with earthquakes, b) 
building for earthquakes, and c) learning about earthquakes, as shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
 
Table 1: Overview of partners and strategies in CUSP. 
 
CUSP 
(See Reference 2) 
LEARNING ABOUT 
CATASTROPHIC 
EARTHQUAKES 
(See Chapter 4) 
BUILDING FOR 
CATASTROPHIC
EARTHQUAKES 
(see Chapter 3) 
LIVING WITH 
CATASTROPHIC 
EARTHQUAKES 
(See Chapter 2) 
CUSEC 
(THE LEADER) 
X X X 
CSG X X X 
MAE  X X X 
iBHS X X X 
DOT X X X 
FHWA X X X 
IGT X X X 
XII X X X 
DRBA X X X 
ACP X X X 
ASCE X X X 
MCMC X X X 
USGS X X X 
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3) CUSP is calling for active support of all “Project  Impact” and “Showcase “Communities” in 
the central U.S.   Project Impact is a 1997 initiative of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) to build disaster resistant communities and “Showcase Communities” is a 
similar initiative of IBHS.  Project Impact challenges the Nation to create partnerships and 
initiate actions that protect families, businesses, and communities, and reduce the adverse 
consequences of earthquakes and other natural hazards through the efforts of local public and 
private sector partnerships (2).  
 
4) CUSP is calling for the establishment of CUS Seismic Advisory Council in 1999 to provide 
exert guidance for a period of at least 10 years (2). 
 
 
Insurance and Natural Hazards 
 
Natural hazards are naturally occurring phenomena having atmospheric (i. e., severe storms, 
wildfires, and droughts), geologic (i.e., earthquakes, landslides, volcanic eruptions, and 
tsunamis), and hydrologic origins (i.e., floods) which adversely impact  
Table 2: Forty-four earthquake loss-reduction Strategies to be implemented by CUSP. 
 
CATEGORY 
OF 
ACTIVITY  
 
STRATEGIES THAT WILL BE PROMOTED  
 
LIVING WIT
H QUAKES  
1) Inform all sectors of the public about the potential impacts of a 
catastrophic earthquake, 2) Promote the development of  comprehensive 
and cost-effective mitigation approaches that are CUS specific, 3) 
Increase the desire and ability to act in every individual, home, school, 
business, and community, 4) Promote the improvement of K-12 school 
preparedness and its extension to colleges, universities, businesses, and 
professionals, 5) Improve communications for everyone: individuals 
homes, schools, businesses, professionals, and communities, 6) Improve 
health care response for everyone. individuals homes, schools, 
businesses, hospitals, and communities,  7) Improve search and rescue 
capability, 8) Improve capability to collect, analyze,  and disseminate 
damage data, 9) Establish a recovery/reconstruction plan for every CUS 
urban center, 10) Improve interim and long-term housing for the 
recovery and reconstruction period, 11) Streamline the permitting and 
rebuilding process for the recovery and reconstruction period, and  12) 
Ensure accurate and timely information flow to everyone. 
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BUILDING F
OR QUAKES
 
1) Promote the provision of incentives to retrofit, 2) Promote the 
initiation of  broad educational efforts, 3) Promote the development of  
effective methodologies for mitigation, 4) Promote upgrade of  
vulnerable buildings and other structures,  5) Promote seismic safety of  
all new construction, 6) Promote the development of an integrated 
approach to seismic design, 7) Promote the adoption of  CUS-specific 
standards, 8) Promote performance based research that can be applied in 
performance based codes and standards, 9) Promote performance 
standards for infrastructure, 10) Promote an understanding of secondary 
effects,  11) Evaluate and prioritize mitigation, and 12) Promote retrofit 
of critical  infrastructure. 
 
 
LEARNING 
ABOUT 
QUAKES 
1) Promote the improved use of geoscience data, 2) Promote the 
application of consistent standards in the acquisition, analysis, and 
application of geoscience data, 3) Look for opportunities to show cost-
effectiveness of the use of geoscience data in mitigation methodologies, 
4) Promote support for ongoing research to close gaps in knowledge, 5) 
Promote the establishment of an integrated  program of risk assessment 
and risk reduction, 6) Look for ways to demonstrate the applicability of 
research and technology to risk reduction, 7) Look for ways to 
demonstrate the benefit of the research and technology, 8) Foster 
coordination of  ongoing research, 9) Promote competency of 
professionals, 10) Increase public awareness,  11) Inform public officials, 
12) Promote the establishment and expansion of K-12 programs, 13) 
Look for ways to demonstrate cost-effectiveness of mitigation and 
preparedness, 14) Look for ways to develop incentives; and remove 
barriers, 15) Promote adoption of  standards for protection of property  in 
codes, 16) Promote protection of infrastructure, 17)  Promote 
incorporation of  earthquake hazards data in general plans, 18) Promote 
the development of seismic zonation techniques,19) Promote the 
development of advanced mitigation techniques, and 20) Promote the 
protection of the land. 
 
 
people, property, infrastructure, resources, and the environmental quality in a community.  
Natural hazards do not respect geographic or political boundaries, seasons, schedules, time of 
day, a business’s balance sheet, or a community’s state-of-preparedness, and they are 
transformed into disasters when the stricken community is unable to respond in a timely and 
effective manner as a consequence of the nature and degree of disruption to essential social 
structures and functions in the community.  The severity of a natural disaster is typically 
measured in terms of: economic loss, deaths, injuries, damage, loss of function, homelessness, 
joblessness, loss of resources, adverse environmental impact on air, water, and soil, and the time, 
resources, and international assistance required for response, recovery, and reconstruction.   
 
Natural hazards are inevitable, but natural disasters are not (6,7).  In many cases, they can be 
prevented, or at least their impacts can be minimized (1).  Every year, the Earth's atmospheric, 
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geologic, and hydrologic systems generate 100,000 thunderstorms, 10,000 floods, thousands of 
landslides, over 100 earthquakes large enough to be damaging, hundreds of wild fires, scores of 
windstorms (hurricanes, cyclones, typhoons and tornadoes), and dozens of volcanic eruptions, 
tsunamis, and droughts.  Fortunately, extreme events (e.g., 500-year floods, category 5 
windstorms, magnitude 8 or greater earthquakes, large-volume explosive volcanoes, large-
volume landslides; tsunamis affecting the entire Pacific rim, wide spread, long-duration 
wildfires, and long duration droughts) and combinations of extreme events (e.g., earthquakes - 
tsunamis - landslides - floods -fires; or hurricanes - floods - landslides - coastal erosion) are rare 
occurrences.  
Natural Disasters represent policy failures in the community, region, and nation. The root cause 
is lack of anticipation and inadequate integration of the social, technical, administrative, political, 
legal, and economic factors of the community., which affect where, when,  and how the 
community at risk plans and prepares for the consequences of the inevitable natural hazard. 
Policies to make the community’s development sustainable and resilient to natural-hazards must 
be based on the available scientific and technical knowledge on  the location, severity, and 
frequency of each inevitable natural hazard and the nature, distribution, and extent of the likely 
damage and societal impacts.  
 
The bad news of the 20th century is that insured losses and overall economic losses are 
increasing rapidly with time due to rapid growth of population and the increasing vulnerability of 
cities (and megacities) having large concentrations of people living and working in disaster-
prone buildings surrounded by fragile infrastructure, neither of which were planned, located, 
designed, and constructed to be resilient to floods, severe storms, earthquakes, landslides, 
volcanoes, wildfires, tsunamis, and droughts. Natural disasters worldwide have claimed over 3 
million lives and adversely affected the lives of nearly 1 out of every 4 people in terms of 
economic, health, and impact on the environment.   
 
Even worse is the fact that we keep relearning the same scientific, technical, and policy lessons 
from each natural disaster while continuing unwise use of scarce and inadequate economic 
resources to respond, rebuild, and recover without correcting the policy failures (1,3,4). 
 
The good news which was highlighted during the decade of the 1990's is that loss of life is 
decreasing with time.  This accomplishment represents a return on capital investments by 
communities and nations to: 1) improve forecasts of eminent hazardous events, 2) implement 
effective warning systems and evacuation programs to alert people and to get them out of harm's 
way, 3) prevent mortality, morbidity and loss of function in modern building by adopting and 
enforcing effective regulations for new construction and land use, and 4) strengthen existing 
buildings and infrastructure to protect inhabitants and function. 
 
The most vulnerable locations in every community are:1) close to the water's edge, 2) on 
unstable slopes, 3) in the flood plain of rivers, 4) in or adjacent to an active fault zone, 5) on soft 
and/or unstable soil, 6) on the flanks of an active volcano, and 7) near an urban-wilderness 
interface.  Development at these locations should either be avoided, or require more stringent 
land use planning and engineering.  
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Earthquakes 
 
Earthquakes threaten the environment, quality of life, and the economic stability of communities, 
businesses, and the insurance industry in nine earthquake-prone regions of the United States and 
in many countries throughout the world.  Small earthquakes occur daily throughout the world.  
Although relatively infrequent, large-magnitude earthquakes have a greater sudden-loss potential 
than floods and severe storms.  Earthquakes are dangerous because they can trigger disasters in a 
minute or less. are unpredictable and strike without warning, forecasts of their physical effects 
are ambiguous, and estimates of losses are uncertain.  Submarine earthquakes can also generate 
tsunamis affecting nearby as well as distant locations.  Communities and community 
development in or adjacent to active fault zones, on soft and/or unstable soil, on unstable slopes, 
and near the water's edge are especially vulnerable to ground shaking, permanent ground failure, 
surface faulting, earthquake-triggered fire, aftershocks, seiches, and tsunami flood waves (3,4).   
 
Some of the notable earthquake disasters include: 
 
· The Kobe, Japan earthquake disaster of January 17, 1995.--This M 6.9 earthquake which 
struck at 5:46 a. m. caused the world's worst earthquake economic disaster---an estimated $ 
140 billion.  Centered 20 km (12 miles) from Kobe, the earthquake destroyed 200,000 
homes, triggered 600 fires, knocked the Port of Kobe out of operation, severely damaged the 
elevated Hanshin Expressway, and left 6,000 dead and 34,000 injured. 
· The Northridge, California earthquake disaster of January 17, 1994.--This M 6.8 earthquake 
which struck at 4:31 a. m. adversely affected 3.5 million people and resulted in the highest 
earthquake insurance payment in history--an estimated payment of over $ 13 billion for 
claims.  Centered 20 km (12 miles) from downtown Los Angeles, the earthquake caused 
economic losses exceeding $ 40 billion, damaged portions of the elevated freeway system, 
and left 50,000 homeless and 15,000 injured, but only 61 dead. 
· The Tangshan, China earthquake disaster of July 28, 1976.--This M 7.8 earthquake, which 
struck at 3:42 a. m. while most of the 1 million people who lived and worked in this 
industrial and coal mining center of northern China were sleeping , was totally unexpected.  
The result was a catastrophe.  The earthquake ground shaking devastated the city comprised 
mainly of unreinforced masonry buildings.  It left at least 240,000 dead and an estimated 
800,000 injured.  Reconstruction and recovery took over ten years. 
 
 
Floods 
 
Floods happen more frequently than any other natural hazard.  They occur annually and in every 
season of the year, primarily in river flood plains and as flash floods caused either by extreme 
precipitation or by rapid melting of ice and snow.  Coastal communities and those near the 
water's edge and in the flood plain are most vulnerable.  Floods cause damage, social disruption, 
health care problems, and environmental impact from inundation, excessive discharge, soil 
erosion, soil scour, and pollution.  Some of the notable flood disasters include: 
 
· The flood disaster in the Midwest in April 1997 and the Eastern United States in January, 
1996.-- Heavy snowfall followed by rapid thaw of the snow and ice combined with heavy 
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rain caused flooding in North Dakota in 1997 and in the Eastern United States along rivers 
from New York to Philadelphia to Virginia in 1996.  More than 100,000 people and entire 
communities were evacuated.  Economic losses exceeded $ 2 billion, mainly from damage to 
buildings, infrastructure, dams, and bridges. 
· The Mississippi River flood disaster in July 1993 in the Midwestern United States,--Swollen 
by as much as 75 cm of rain in a three month period, flooding streams inundated more than 
20 million acres of farmland in nine states.  Economic losses reached an estimated $ 15-20 
billion.  Only forty-eight died. 
· The flood disaster of July 1935 on the Huang He River, China.  A total area of 16 million 
square kilometers was inundated and several million homes were washed away.  The death 
toll was beyond reckoning.  
 
 
Severe Storms   
 
Severe storms (i.e., hurricanes, cyclones, typhoons, and tornadoes):, like floods, occur annually, 
but they are seasonal and more restricted geographically than floods.  Coastal communities near 
the water's edge are most vulnerable.  They cause damage and social disruption from high 
velocity winds, floods from storm surge, extreme precipitation, beach and coastal erosion, 
lightning, and hail.  Some of the notable severe storm disasters include: 
 
· Tropical cyclone in Bay of Bengal in 1970.--An estimated 500,000 were killed in 
Bangladesch from the storm surge and high velocity winds.  
· The flood disaster in Bangladesch on April 30, 1991.--Flooding from an 8-meter storm surge 
generated in a tropical typhoon reached the city of Chittangong after midnight on April 30, 
affecting over 15 million people.  More that 1.5 million buildings were damaged, leaving 10 
million homeless and an estimated 200,000 dead and 139,000 injured.  The success of the 
early warning system, evacuation, and cyclone shelters helped to lessen the losses from those 
of 1970.  
 
 
Landslides 
 
Small-to large-volume landslides on unstable slopes occur daily throughout the world.  
Communities and community development on unstable slopes are especially vulnerable to the 
permanent ground displacements caused by falls, topples, slides, spreads, and flows of soil and 
rock which can be generated either as a result of extreme precipitation or earthquake ground 
shaking.  A large-magnitude earthquake can trigger tens of thousands landslides.  Notable 
landslide disasters include: 
 
· The earthquake/landslide disaster of May 31, 1970.--The M 7.6 earthquake centered 25 km 
(15 miles) off the coast of Chinbote in the north of Peru caused the largest 
earthquake/landslide disaster ever recorded in Latin America.  A mass of ice at the 5,500-
6,000 m level (17,200-18,800 feet) level on Mount Huascaran fell, slid on a glacier, and 
dropped and additional 10 km (6 miles) before reaching Yungay and Ranrahirca three 
minutes later.  It buried these towns,  killing all but 400 of the 20,000 inhabitants.  In 
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Chinbote, ninety-six percent of the adobe houses were destroyed by ground shaking and 
more than 1,000 were killed. 
 
 
Volcanic Eruptions 
 
Eruptions of the World's 500 active volcanoes occur much less frequently than occurrences of 
the other natural hazards, but volcanic eruptions can have far reaching and devastating 
consequences when they occur.  Communities near an active volcano are especially vulnerable to 
the effects of ash clouds (which can be a serious threat to aviation), lateral blasts, tephra, 
pyroclastic flows, lava flows, and lahars.  A large-volume explosive volcanic eruption can 
impact the climate on a global scale.  Notable volcano disasters include: 
 
· The eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippine Islands in June 15-16, 1991.--The largest 
volcanic eruption of the 20th century, the 15-hour eruption sent ash 30 km (18 miles) into the 
atmosphere and triggered pyroclastic flows and lahars.  Over 200,000 people, including 
Clark Air Force base, were evacuated --the largest evacuation in history before a volcanic 
eruption.  The effects of typhoon Yunya  passing 50 km (30 miles) north added to the 
disaster.  The death toll was only 320 because of the successful evacuation, but the region 
was devastated economically.  Strategic military alliances were irreversibly changed by the 
eruption. 
· The eruption of Nevada del Ruiz in Colombia on November 13, 1985.--After being dormant 
for 140 years, Nevada del Ruiz erupted during the afternoon and night of November 13.  Hot 
pyroclastic material melted the ice cap rapidly, triggering lahars (i.e., debris flows) which 
traveled at an average speed of 30 km/hour (18 miles/hour) along the channels of four rivers.  
The lahars reached the towns of Armero and Chinchina around 10:30 p. m., burying the 
towns, destroying 5,680 homes, and leaving 24,740 dead and 5,485 injured. 
 
 
Wildfires 
 
Thousands of wildfires occur annually throughout the world.  Communities located along 
wilderness-urban interfaces  are especially vulnerable.  Many occur as a consequence of hot, dry 
summers, with lightning being the principal causative agent.  Others are caused  by fires ignited 
by lava flows or triggered during earthquakes.  Some are the result of arson.  Notable wildfire 
disasters include: 
 
· The Great Khingan Range, China wildfire disaster of May 6, 1987.--Fanned by strong winds 
over a period of 20 days, the fire consumed 750,000 cubic meters of forests in an area 
covering one million hectares, 13 percent of the forest.  This loss represents approximately 
20 percent of the annual wood production.  The death toll was 191.  
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Tsunamis 
 
Tsunami flood waves are generated mainly by submarine earthquakes.  Tsunamis can travel 
across oceans with the speed of a jet airliner, impacting coastal communities with high-velocity 
flood wave having vertical heights in excess of 30 meters (100feet).  Coastal communities are 
especially vulnerable to flooding from the wave run up and the impact of the high-velocity 
waves.  Notable tsunami disasters include: 
 
· The Valdiva, Chile earthquake/tsunami disaster of May 22, 1960.--This M 9.5 submarine 
earthquake, which occurred at 3:05 p. m., caused a catastrophe.  This earthquake caused 
damage along 1,000 km (600 miles) of Chile's coastline, destroying an estimated 400,000 
houses, and leaving over 5,000 dead.  It produced strong ground shaking that lasted 3 1/2 
minutes, caused subsidence of up to 2 meters (7 feet), triggered extensive liquefaction, and 
generated several tsunamis having flood wave run up of up to 10 m (33 feet).  Tsunamis 
affected every Pacific rim country, damaging ships, flooding coastal areas, and destroying 
buildings and factories.   
 
 
Droughts 
 
Drought episodes are caused by lack of precipitation and vary greatly in frequency throughout 
the world, ranging in from annual occurrences to once every several years.  Droughts can last 
several years or more, causing a loss of agricultural productivity, desertification, and adverse 
environmental impacts. Notable drought disasters include: 
 
· Drought disaster in the Sahel, Africa, 1969-1973.-- Beginning in 1968, a long-term drought 
in western Africa resulted in the rapid southward spread of the Sahara desert in the Sahel 
countries of Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Niger, Burkina, Faso, and Chad.  This drought was 
no worse than many previous droughts, but its effect on humans and livestock culminated in 
a catastrophe.  Approximately 250,000 people died and millions of refugees poured into 
cities during the drought.  Millions of head of cattle died.  Agricultural production dropped to 
20 to 70 percent of the pre-drought production. 
· The "Dust Bowl" drought disaster of the 1930's in the United States.--The drought of the 
1930's was widespread, encompassing the entire Great Plains from North Dakota to Texas 
and lasting ten years.  In addition to the dry weather and the dust storms, severe 
environmental problems occurred. Average wheat and corn yields dropped by 50 to 75 
percent.  Hundreds of thousands were forced to relocate from the Great Plains to other states 
in the western United States.  
 
 
 
Property Casualty Insurance 
 
 
Property casualty insurance companies are the main source of insurance against natural hazards 
throughout the Nation, and therefore, the business bearing the greatest share of insured losses 
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after a disaster.   In 1996, the property casualty insurers in California had a total premium 
income of $32.6 billion for all coverages.  Of this total, approximately $ 1.5 billion was for 
residential and commercial earthquake insurance (8).   
 
A property casualty insurance company’s book of business typically is comprised of singlefamily 
dwellings, commercial properties, and the related coverages for contents, business interruption, 
and workers compensation and other lines.  Insurance is a business involving: accountants, 
actuaries, salespersons, brokers, claims adjusters, managers, and executives; other property 
casualty companies who are competitors; state insurance regulators; and reinsurers.  Insurance is 
a product having value to the insured, as well as a cost, the premium.  The cost to the insurer is 
determined only after the product is sold and claims are paid out to the insured following a 
disaster (8).  Most insurance policies have some form of deductible, which means that the 
insured and the insurer share in the loss.  An additional choice is for the insurer to have 
reinsurance, which provides the same kind of protection for the primary insurer that the 
insurance policy provides for the policyholder. 
 
Insurers manage the business of insurance through two processes: underwriting and rating.  
Underwriting determines the price to charge the insured for insuring the risk.  Rating determines 
the proper amount that can be charged per $ 1,000 of coverage, given the characteristics of the 
risk for the particular peril.  The underwriting process must consider the natural hazards (or  
“perils”) to be insured against and “the amounts of coverage (values)” to be provided (5).   
Included in this underwriting process, as used by Kunreuther and Roth (5), is not only the 
selection criteria by which risks are insurable but also the actuarial soundness of the rates 
charged for the risk. In theory, property casualty insurance companies can offer protection to the 
insured against any risk that they can identify, and for which they can obtain information about 
the frequency and magnitude of potential losses, as long as they have the freedom to set 
premiums at a realistic level.   Insurance is an economic institution that allows the transfer of 
financial risk from an individual or a pooled group of risks by means of a two-party contract.  
The insured obtains a specified amount of coverage against an uncertain, low probability-high 
impact event (e.g., an earthquake) for a smaller, certain payment (i.e., the premium)  (5). 
 
The principal natural hazards that property casualty companies insure single family dwellings, 
apartments, condominiums and commercial structures against are described below.  The key 
questions for the underwriter are:1) “Where will the natural hazards occur?” 2) “ How often will 
they occur?”  3) “How severe in space and time will the societal and economic consequences of 
the disaster agents generated by each natural hazard be?” and 4) “How vulnerable to damage and 
subsequent loss of use are the personal residences, business structures, critical public facilities, 
and the community’s infrastructure?”   For the insured, the key questions are:  1) “How much 
will it cost?  2) “What is covered?”   3) “What is not covered?” and 4) “What is the claims 
handling process if I have a claim after a catastrophe?” 
 
 
Insurance Considerations Against Earthquake  
 
Insurance against earthquake-induced damage from ground shaking can be included, but is not 
automatically included, in homeowners’ insurance policies for an additional premium, except in 
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California.  In California, the California Earthquake Authority has a unique role in making 
insurance available (8).   
 
The disaster agents (i.e., the physical effects that cause societal disruption) of an earthquake 
include: ground shaking exceeding damage and collapse thresholds that are a function of the 
building’s characteristics during various exposure times; ground liquefaction and lateral 
spreading, including sustained creep; landslides, surface fault rupture; regional tectonic 
deformation; flooding caused by tsunami wave run up or seiches, conflagration; and aftershocks, 
which can trigger a repeat of all of  the above.   
 
A typical residential earthquake policy insures for loss against structural damage, damage to 
contents, and loss of use.  Commercial property earthquake insurance policies generally provide 
indemnification to the policyholder for direct damage to insured structures, building contents, 
and business personal property as well as indirect damage incurred by an insured outage of their 
business.   
 
The direct damage to insured structures and business personal property includes payment for the 
repair or replacement of the damaged property in accordance with the coverage stated in the 
policy.  Loss of net income and continuing expenses from the interruption of  business can also 
be insured.    A business can insure the following types of personal property: 1) building 
structures, 2) other structures, and 3) furniture, fixtures, equipment, supplies, machines and 
machinery, and stock (raw, in-process, and finished).  Most commercial property insurance 
policies exclude:  foundations and other underground property (e.g.,  pipes and drains); grading, 
excavations, and filling; plants, lawns, trees, shrubs, growing crops, and land; paved surfaces, 
roads, bridges, piers, wharves; detached signs, antennas, fences, and other outdoor items; 
building glass; retaining walls that are not a part of a building; vehicles licensed for road use, 
watercraft, and aircraft.  Coverage for excluded items is often covered by endorsement.   Some 
confusion may occur from the fact that all buildings are structures; but all structures are not 
buildings.  Examples of non-building structures include silos, water towers and tanks, swimming 
pools, oil tanks, wharves and piers, bridges, covered bridges and enclosed walkways.   
 
Earthquakes threaten the environment, quality of life, and the economic stability of communities 
throughout the United States.   Small earthquakes occur daily in most states throughout the 
Nation.   Although relatively infrequent, large-magnitude earthquakes have a greater sudden-loss 
potential as individual events than floods and severe storms.  Earthquakes are dangerous because 
they can trigger disasters in a minute or less, they are unpredictable, and they strike without 
warning.  Forecasts of their physical effects are ambiguous, and estimates of losses are uncertain.  
Submarine earthquakes can also generate tsunamis affecting nearby and distant coastal 
communities.  Communities having development and infrastructure located in or adjacent to 
active fault zones, on soft and/or unstable soil, on unstable slopes, and near the water's edge are 
vulnerable to ground shaking, permanent ground failure, surface faulting, earthquake-triggered 
fire, aftershocks, seiches, and tsunami flood waves.  
 
At present, insurers are seeking high benefit/cost solutions for: a) Strengthening unreinforced 
masonry and concrete, b) Adequate and continuous load paths, and c) Nondestructive evaluation 
methods to evaluate existing structures, three of the “Ten Most Wanted Improvements.”  
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Insurance Considerations Against Floods  
 
Since 1968 when congress created the National Flood Insurance Program, insurance coverage for 
floods is available on a nationwide basis through the cooperation of the Federal government and 
private insurers.  Floods happen more frequently than any other natural hazard.  They occur 
annually and in every season of the year, primarily as riverine and flash floods caused either by 
extreme precipitation or by rapid melting of ice and snow.  Coastal communities and those near 
the water's edge and in the floodplain are most vulnerable.   Some of the notable flood disasters 
include the Mississippi River flood disaster in July 1993 in the Midwestern United States, in the 
Eastern United States along rivers from New York to Philadelphia to Virginia in 1996, and 
flooding in North Dakota in 1997. 
 
The disaster agents include: extreme precipitation, inundation after dams or levees are breached, 
high-velocity peak discharge, scour, water-borne debris, and erosion. 
 
At present, insurers are seeking high benefit/cost solutions for: a) Buildings elevated in flood-
prone areas, one of the “Ten Most Wanted Improvements.”  
 
 
Insurance Considerations Against Severe Storms   
 
Hurricane wind damage and windblown water damage are included as part of the basic wind 
coverage in most property insurance p09licies.  Flood damage, resulting from hurricanes is not 
included in property insurance policies, but can be purchased separately under the National 
Flood Insurance Program.  Severe storms: (i.e., hurricanes, and tornadoes), like floods, occur 
annually, but they are seasonal and more restricted geographically than floods.  Coastal 
communities near the water's edge are most vulnerable to hurricanes, whereas interior states are 
most susceptible to tornadoes.  Both cause damage and social disruption from high velocity 
winds, floods from storm surge, extreme precipitation, beach and coastal erosion, lightning, and 
hail.  The most notable hurricane disaster is Hurricane Andrew, which struck South Florida in 
the pre-dawn hours on Monday, August 24, 1992 before continuing westward to strike 
Louisiana. 
 
The disaster agents include: flood waves from storm surge, high velocity wind fields, wind-
blown and water-borne debris, effects of extreme precipitation or the runoff from heavy snow 
melt, beach and coastal erosion, lightning, and hail. 
 
At present, insurers are seeking high benefit/cost solutions for: a) Secure roof coverings, b) 
Secure building envelope, and c) Glazed openings protected from wind-borne debris, and d) 
adequate attachment of commercial roof edge metal flashings. four of the “Ten Most Wanted 
Improvements.” 
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Insurance Considerations Against Hail  
 
Hail, a product of thunderstorms, is insured in residential and commercial policies nearly 
everywhere in the United States. 
 
The disaster agents include: the size, velocity, and distribution of the hail stones. 
At present, insurers are seeking high benefit/cost solutions for: a) hail-resistant roofs, one of the  
“Ten Most Wanted Improvements.” 
 
 
Insurance Considerations Against Landslides  
 
Landslides are normally not considered an insurable peril by private insurers.  Small-to large-
volume landslides occur daily on unstable slopes throughout the Nation.  Community 
development on unstable slopes is especially vulnerable to the permanent ground displacements 
caused by falls, topples, slides, spreads, and flows of soil and rock which can be triggered either 
as a result of earthquake ground shaking or extreme precipitation.  The Loma Prieta earthquake, 
in 1989, and El Nino, in 1997-1998, triggered tens of thousands of landslides in California.  
 
The disaster agents include: falls, topples, slides, spreads, and flows of soil and rock. 
 
 
Insurance Considerations Against Volcanic Eruptions  
 
Damage caused by volcanic eruptions is included in most property insurance policies.  Eruptions 
of the United States’ 70 active volcanoes occur much less frequently than occurrences of the 
other natural hazards, but volcanic eruptions can have far reaching and devastating consequences 
when they occur.  Communities near an active volcano are especially vulnerable to the effects of 
lateral blasts, tephra, pyroclastic flows, lava flows, lahars, and ash clouds (which can be a serious 
threat to aviation).  A large-volume explosive volcanic eruption can impact the climate on a 
global scale.  Notable volcano disasters in the United States include the eruption of Mount St. 
Helens in Washington state at 8:32 a m on May 18, 1980.   
 
The disaster agents include: ash clouds, which can affect global climate change, tephra, 
pyroclastic flows, lava flows, lahars, lateral blasts, poisonous gases, fire, and flooding from 
breached dams or levees. 
 
 
Insurance Considerations Against Wildfires 
 
 
Wildfires can be included in most property insurance contracts.  Thousands of wildfires occur 
annually in the United States.  Communities located along wilderness-urban interfaces are 
especially vulnerable.  Many occur as a consequence of hot, dry summers, with lightning being 
the principal causative agent.  Others are caused by fires ignited by lava flows or triggered 
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during earthquakes.  Some are the result of arson.  Notable wildfire disasters include the 
Oakland, California wildfire of October 20, 1991, which at that time was the worst wildfire in 
the history of the United States, and the wildfires in Florida in July 1998.  
 
The disaster agents include: incineration, smoke, and increased susceptibility to erosion.  
 
At present, insurers are seeking high benefit/cost solutions for: a) Non-combustible roofs, one of 
the “Ten Most Wanted Improvements.” 
  
 
Insurance Considerations Against Tsunamis  
 
Tsunami flood waves are generated mainly by submarine earthquakes.  Tsunamis can travel 
across oceans with the speed of a jet airliner, impacting coastal communities with high-velocity 
flood wave having vertical heights in excess of 30 meters (100feet).  Coastal communities are 
especially vulnerable to flooding from the wave run up and the impact of the high-velocity 
waves.  Notable tsunami disasters include those that struck Mayaguez, Puerto Rico in 1918, 
Crescent City, California in 1964, and Hawaii, many times. 
 
The disaster agents include: high-velocity waves, flooding, coastal inundation, and coastal 
erosion.  
 
 
Insurance Considerations Against Droughts  
 
Drought episodes are caused by an extreme lack of precipitation.  They vary greatly in frequency 
throughout the United States, ranging from annual occurrences to once every several years to 
decades.  Droughts can last several years or more, causing a loss of agricultural productivity, 
desertification, and adverse health and environmental impacts. 
 
The disaster agents include: loss of agricultural productivity and insect infestation.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
We have pointed out that there is a potential role for every stakeholder and policy maker in 
reducing and managing their community’s risk, and that everyone--ranging from insurers to 
local, state, and Federal governments and their agencies, to individual businesses, to individual 
citizens--can forge partnerships, such as CUSP, and contribute   to making their community safer 
from natural hazards, and in the long-term, nattural-hazard-resistant.  Accountants, actuaries, 
salespersons, brokers, claims adjusters, managers, and executives; other property casualty 
insurance companies; reinsurance companies; and state regulators all have roles.   So do the 
insured.    In theory, insurers can offer protection to the insured against any risk that they can 
identify, as long as they can obtain reliable information about the frequency and magnitude of 
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potential losses, and they have the freedom to set realistic premiums (5) Finding the points of 
intersection of the interests of community stakeholders, individually and collectively, and the 
interests of community policy makers is the key to success. 
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Prologue 
 
Mitigation, in the sense of selecting where to build and how to build stronger, safer structures in 
which to live and work, should be the goal of all the stakeholders: 
 
· Owner – has a financial interest in preserving the value and usability of the structure, its 
contents, and in maintaining its functionality.  
· Occupant – has an emotional and financial interest in preserving personal safety and that of 
loved ones and pets, possessions, and in not having his or her comfortable surroundings and 
routines disturbed during the time a severely damaged home or business is restored or 
replaced; in the case of a business, the main goal is to preserve business continuity. 
· Insurer – as a recipient of a transferred portion of a covered loss and as a partner with their 
insureds in helping them manage the risk each faces, it has a financial interest in minimizing 
the damage and loss of functionality of each of their insured risks and a desire to help its 
insured know the risks and what can be done about them; and in the aggregate sense, it is 
interested in achieving a reasonable spread of risk, an efficacious use of available capital and 
its resources, and a reliable stream of reasonably stable future earnings to enable it to be 
financially strong  in a healthy market-driven and competitive environment that maximizes 
availability and affordability to the extent possible. 
· Reinsurer – as an assumer of a transferred portion of a covered loss for an individual or 
portfolio of risks from one or more insurers, it has a financial interest in minimizing the 
damage and loss of functionality of an aggregation of all the risks on which a transfer is to 
take place. 
· Others  involved with competing transfer mechanisms, such as securitized risk instruments 
[like Cat Bonds] - as an assumer of a transferred portion of a covered loss from an event or 
series of events that affects large sections of the population, it has a financial interest in 
minimizing the damage and loss. 
· Government – actually there are three levels of government who hold a stake:  Federal, State 
and Local. 
Ø Federal – has a financial interest in reducing the need for federally funded disaster 
assistance; and if federal legislation to set up federal reinsurance program is passed, it 
would have a similar interest to that discussed above for reinsurers.  
Ø State – has a financial interest in reducing the need for disaster assistance; an interest in 
maintaining a sustainable population, development and a safe environment; an interest in 
sustained and financially sound business environment; and it has a broad legislative and 
regulatory interest. 
Ø Local – has a financial interest in sustained community and the safety of its inhabitants 
and sustainability of its services, its businesses, and its citizens’ places of residence, etc.;  
and it needs to have critical facilities that can remain functioning after the worst disasters 
to take of the victims. 
 
If the interests and perceived benefits of the many stakeholders are so obvious and the solution is 
simply a matter of carefully choosing where and how to build stronger, safer structures, why 
aren’t there more structures being built or retrofitted to make them stronger and safer to protect 
the inhabitants and their possessions?  Is there some way that the research community, perhaps 
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the MidAmerica Earthquake Center or others, can partner with stakeholders to encourage 
individual owners and occupants to take steps to strengthen and make safer their homes and 
businesses and therefore to mitigate damage from future earthquakes?  What information and 
analytical tools are available today and what might be missing to further this worthy objective? 
 
In the remainder of this paper, I will provide a general outline of what analytical tools exist today 
and how additional research can improve or cause them to be used more effectively to do 
benefit/cost analyses as respects different mitigation scenarios. 
 
What is the problem?  Don’t the historical loss records tell the story?  Can’t they be used to 
support incentives to mitigate? 
 
The short, simple answer is “no”.   
 
 
The Frequency and Severity Challenge of Earthquakes in the Midwest 
 
Earthquakes are of such high severity, low frequency events and it would take thousands of years 
of loss history to gain a reasonable data base from which to estimate future expected losses from 
earthquakes in the Midwestern United States.   Most insurers’ historical earthquake loss records 
probably go back no more than twenty five or thirty years, a time during which no damaging 
earthquakes have occurred in the Midwest.  The last great destructive earthquake for the region 
was a series of three very strong quakes over a three month period at the end of 1811 and the 
beginning of 1812.  These were the great quakes along the New Madrid fault and they were 
strong enough to make the Mississippi run backward and to ring church bells as far away as 
Boston. 
 
 
Changing Mix of Where and How Structures Were Built 
 
Even if such a long historical record of the frequency and severity of earthquakes were to exist, 
there would the problem of a constantly changing mix and composition of structures built in 
harm’s way.  Over time, more and more people settled in the area and the construction materials 
and methods have changed continually throughout the time period.  So if historical loss records 
existed for the 1811/1812 quakes, the losses expected from a repeat of that event would be 
significantly different, (significantly more severe), because of more structures, greater values 
over time, and different structural vulnerability dependent upon how they were built and with 
what materials.   
 
 
 
 
Impact from an Evolving Science and Technology 
 
Roughly twenty years ago, a physical scientist theorized that the known history of earthquake 
activity could be explained by the earth’s crust being made up of a fractured outer surface shell, 
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whose huge slabs floated over a molten rock core of magma.  And so plate tectonics was born as 
a theory.  That scientist found few supporters for his theory among his contemporaries and died 
without knowing that his theory would become so commonly held by his peers as it is today.   
 
Today, we all seem willing to accept that the boundaries of these free floating continental and 
oceanic plates are the site sources for most of the earthquakes, volcanoes, and seismically created 
tsunamis around the world.  Why?  Because the scientists have been able to extensively study the 
visible faults through a variety of means, including ground based and satellite instruments 
throughout the world.  They have mapped historical earthquakes and we can use them to 
visualize the plate boundaries by where they continually occur, such as the much publicized 
“Ring of Fire” that so graphically defines the Pacific Ocean Plate boundaries. 
 
But scientific exploration and new theorizations haven’t stopped.  Scientists have coined new 
sciences such as paleoseismology to describe explorations of areas in which a longer term record 
of major earthquakes can be mapped from a study of the effects such earthquake had on the 
environment.  Once such method is trenching along known fault boundaries and studying the 
evidence of past earthquakes, such as large sand blows or violent uplifts of large slabs of earth 
and rock that could only occur in such events.  These are then dated by carbon-dating the 
materials found in that same strata being observed.  These new pioneers are discovering ancient 
earthquakes and filling in more of the puzzle.  New theories are formed to explain more about 
the way earthquakes act along different types of faults and still more scientific exploration results 
as the scientists attempt to explain what happened in the past or in a new earthquake that happens 
in a location heretofore not thought to contain a fault or acts so differently from what previous 
earthquakes had.   
 
Each new earthquake during the last two decades has brought new learnings as experts, structural 
engineers and seismic scientists and others, have studied what happened and tried to explain 
why.  In California, this has led to building code enhancements, focused primarily on life safety, 
that has caused new structures in that state to be built stronger and safer than those built in times 
past.   
 
 
The Emergence of Catastrophe Simulation Modeling Technology 
 
Another advancement came with the technology revolution that saw cumbersome and expensive 
mainframe processing and data base systems replaced with plentiful powerful and inexpensive 
personal computers and more efficacious relational databases and cheap storage.  From that 
revolution came the ability to store, process, and retrieve millions of pieces of information 
cheaply and efficiently.  And it fostered a separate explosion of new data processing tools for the 
end user and specialty modeling firms that sprang up to take advantage of the new capabilities.  
It changed our companies and it changed the capabilities of scientists, academicians, and other 
researchers and its reverberations continue to be felt in the physical and other sciences.   
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Out of this new world came a synthesis of different disciplines initially by new catastrophe 
modeling firms like Applied Insurance Research, Inc. (AIR), E.W. Blanche, Inc. (EWB), Risk 
Engineering International, Inc. (REI), and Risk Management Solutions, Inc. (RMS).   Joined by 
still more such as AON Corporation, Applied Research Associates, Inc. (ARA), Earthquake 
Engineering International, Ltd. (EQE), and others, these firms have sought to continually gather 
the following types of data and information and to make use of the continually changing and 
improving “state-of-the-earthquake-science” and the exponential increased capability and speed 
of new computing and storage technologies.  
 
It should be noted that much of the publicly available data, research, and other needed 
information would not have been possible without the financial and human and equipment and 
technology investment that the government has made in the study of earthquakes.  This author 
believes that future advances are needed and that governmental support must continue to 
promote continued advances in this field, especially for areas east of the Rockies, such as the 
New Madrid and Wabash Valley seismic areas in Mid-America and in the Charleston, SC 
seismic area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EARTHQUAKE MODELING
- Generalized Information Flow
• Hazard and Exposure Data
• Vulnerability Assessment
• Financial Risk Assessment
 141 
Input Data for Catastrophe Simulation Modeling 
The first of the three sections involves the input section of the model and includes both historical data on 
earthquakes, but also insured exposure information.  
 
 
 
· Historical inventory of earthquakes in the United States and throughout the world, along with 
the best available information, (whether instrument-calculated or estimated by experts), about 
the likely energy release, the epicenter location, the fault involved, the rupture length, the 
attenuation (or decreasing shaking intensity as the shock waves travel through different 
surface mediums), the damage pattern observed or theorized for different structural types, the 
impact of site conditions such as evidence of differences by soil type, landslide-prone areas, 
liquefaction, etc. 
· Historical inventories have been supplemented with new or better information as new 
earthquakes have occurred since the original inventory was created and by studying highly 
correlated parts of the environment to discover better information and/or to discover the 
existence of older pre-inventory earthquakes. 
 
· Geographic positioning to better pinpoint locations on the globe so that layering of related 
and crucial information can be accurately overlaid on locations of exposed structures.  
Various data layers that may be useful in the resultant earthquake simulation modeling might 
include: 
 
Ø Locations of exposed structures. 
Ø Location, length, depth, orientation and type of faults. 
Ø Site conditions such as the type of surface media, (i.e., soil is sand, compressed sand, 
aluvium or other sediment, rock, etc.); presence of water and loose particulate matter in 
the soil that could become liquefied; elevation because hilly terrain is more susceptible to 
landslide; etc. 
E A R T H Q U A K E  M O D E L I N G
Hazard and Exposure  Data
Model  Components
• Exposure Inventory
• Geocoding Information
• Fault Locations
• Hydrology
• Topology
• Surficial Geology
Reflected in the Model
• Distance to Fault
• Soil Conditions
• Collateral Sources
• Attenuation of Seismic
Energy
• Result  = Local  Shaking
Intensities
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Ø Historical inventory of quakes recorded for each fault, since this leads to an estimate of 
either a series of likely earthquakes (a fairly open-ended distribution both severity and 
frequency of occurrence) or possibly a conclusion of the experts that the distribution is 
capped at a characteristic earthquake (much like a tuning fork would settle out at a certain 
vibration when struck with sufficient force); expert opinion on the shaking intensity felt 
at varying distances from the epicenter and fault rupture in past earthquakes; etc. 
Ø Collateral sources at risk, such as water, gas, and other utilities that could impact an area 
hit by an earthquake and any conflagration that ensued. 
Ø Brush fire areas or presence of vegetation that might suggest greater danger of 
conflagration. 
Ø Infrastructure and essential services that might impact how rescue and mitigation of 
further damage by aftershocks or fire following or loss of use after an earthquake. 
Ø In order to estimate damage impacts on individual structures from the full theoretical 
distribution or one or more of a set of the historical earthquakes’ shaking and any 
accompanying conflagration in the historical inventory, the following kinds of 
information on the exposed structures is needed: 
q Location and orientation on the property. 
q Replacement value of the structure. 
q Construction type and any other available information on the way the particular 
structure is built. 
q Age and the building code in effect when the structure was built suggests how the 
particular structure should have been built and what might be hidden from view. 
q Insurance coverages, limits, and deductibles applicable for each exposed structure. 
q Existence of any per risk reinsurance that might apply to the structure. 
 
Simulation Modeling 
 
The modeling firm staff usually include professionals with expertise in the following disciplines:  
seismic and structural engineering; data processing; actuarial; etc. so that they can create a model 
that attempts to run theoretical simulations of next year events that run the full gamut of 
possibilities for at least the most significant variables that can be estimated.    
Modeling Stochastic Earthquakes 
 
Since a model is essentially a set representation of dynamic events, each of which are 
defined by what can and does happen in the assumed reality, the modelers attempt to 
model a reasonably complete set of possible events by: 
 
· Identifying the most important variables present in historical and theoretical earthquakes 
and then associating a theoretical distribution of possible values for each such variable.  
An example would be the energy release possible along a given fault could range from 
very small to very large, depending on how much energy had built up and how much is 
released.  By letting this variable range from very small to very large, the impact of such 
variation along the fault can be reflected in the model. 
· By defining all important variables and their likely distribution and upper and lower 
limits, based on the most up-to-date scientific information available, a tremendous 
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number of combinations of variables is possible, and taken together in randomized 
selection from their respective distributions, a wide range of possible earthquakes can be 
simulated.   
· Using current “state-of-the-science” probabilities of different variables occurring for each 
known or hypothesized fault location that the scientific community has established as 
most likely, then each simulated possible earthquake can be associated with its likelihood 
of occurring.  The different models estimate these earthquake probabilities a little 
differently, but all can be successful in estimating a best guess estimate of the 
probabilities. 
· Refinement of the distributions for the important variables is possible from studying what 
happened in recent earthquake. 
  
Modeling Deterministic Earthquakes 
 
If one wants to then pre-determine the value of the important parameters to either 
replicate a historical earthquake or to examine the impact of the maximum likely or other 
wise determined earthquake on a specific fault, then the model can be run for such an 
event by simply fixing each of the variables to pre-set values.  
 
So the 1811/1812 earthquake can be replicated by setting the variables in the model to 
those listed in the historical inventory and running a single earthquake on the New 
Madrid fault in the same location and with the same rupture length, energy release, etc.  
 
But it would also be possible to run out the full theoretical distribution of likely future (next 
year) events along with their probability of occurring.  Essentially, this is the stochastic set 
described in the previous section. 
 
Vulnerability Analysis in the Model for the Exposed Structures 
 
EARTHQUAKE MODELING
Vulnerability Assessment
Model Components
• Predicted Shaking Intensity
– Modified Mercalli  Scale
– Attenuation of Shaking
• Collateral Hazards
– Landslide
– Liquefaction
– Sustained Creep
• Expected Losses
• Structure/Site Specific
Shaking Damage
• Significant Research
– Post Disaster Reports
– Engineering Studies
– Seismologic Studies
• Result = Property Damage
and Time Element Losses
Reflected in the Model
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The model goes beyond simply estimating the energy release and the physical shaking intensity 
at different locations away from the epicenter and fault rupture to estimate how different 
structures in different locations are likely to be affected by the simulated event (in the case of a 
deterministic earthquake) and by the full distribution of simulated events (in the case of 
stochastic earthquakes). 
  
The models usually include primary structure characteristics, which are the ones most likely to 
be determined from the insurance company’s policyholder records.  In addition, if the insurance 
company can determine more of the structural characteristics, the models can reflect them as 
secondary structure characteristics.  Obviously, the more information on the structure, the better, 
in determining how it would respond to the shaking and other characteristics of the modeled 
earthquake(s). 
 
Here too, the advances in science are continually being reflected in the models.  A good example 
would be the movement away from the use of categorizing shaking intensity at a site for a 
building based on a subjective interpretation of the observed damage in accordance with the 
moment magnitude index (MMI) scale.  In addition to being subjective, the resulting 
distributions used to estimate damage in the models were based on a somewhat flawed set of 
distributions based on the expert opinions from ATC13 (Applied Technology Council) by 
structural engineering experts using the Delphi method to arrive at a consensus opinion of the 
mean damage and the variance around that mean.   
 
Most models today are using spectral acceleration of the structures at the site related to the peak 
ground acceleration expected to occur at that site for each simulated earthquake.  Essentially, this 
will more properly take into account the structure’s likely response to the energy that reaches it 
at that site on the kind of soil and other factors associated with it. 
  
Of course, a frame structure will perform differently from an unreinforced masonry structure and 
from a reinforced masonry structure.  Also, the footprint of the building and the number of 
stories are important.  The models attempt to model the relative differences in how these 
drastically different performing structures will respond to the shaking intensities of the vertical 
and horizontal ground motions expected from the different simulations. 
 
This component of the modeling determines the damage expected from each of the simulated 
earthquakes.  Now we must turn to how that translates into insured loss and a distribution of the 
damages to the different parties who share in that loss. 
  
 
Financial Distribution Modeling of “Who Pays What, Given The Expected Damage?” 
 
For each insured structure, the damage must be divided such as follows: 
 
· Portion that the structure owner is responsible for due to not having any insurance. 
· For the insured owner, the portion retained is determined by the deductible carried, 
the limits and any co-payment provisions within the policy. 
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· The direct insurer’s portion is the remainder less that portion transferred to a reinsurer 
under a facultative reinsurance program or through some quota share reinsuring 
arrangement. 
 
After making adjustments such as shown above on a policy by policy basis, the next step is to 
aggregate all the insureds into a portfolio of risks, for which further division of the responsibility 
may be necessary, such as: 
 
· Portion of the aggregate losses transferred to a reinsurer(s) 
· Portion transferred through one or more securitized instrument, such as catastrophe 
bonds 
The model must reflect these different parties’ responsibilities in accordance with contractual 
agreements that have been shared with the modeler or the modeler will simply model only the 
individual policy conditions and leave the transference steps to the client.  I suspect that either 
and both are done as a matter of practice. 
 
  
Making Necessary Adjustments - Underlying Exposure Base Changes 
 
If the model has been run at an earlier time and the exposures used were from an earlier time 
frame and have changed significantly in the meantime, then the modeled output must either be 
rerun or adjusted to account for those significant changes in exposure numbers or mix.  This 
could occur because of significant growth or decline of the numbers or values insured or because 
of a change in the distribution of that business relative to the risk of loss from earthquakes. 
 
Often, adjustments must be made for changes in the exposure that will take place because of 
some actions being taken by the company, such as a roll-on of deductibles, a change in the 
underlying policy coverages or limits, or because of some exposure management program being 
implemented.  Any of these that can be expected to have an impact on the overall modeled 
results should be reflected by either rerunning the model with a new exposure file reflecting the 
changes or the output adjusted for those changes in a manual or additional modeling process. 
 
Often in responding to rating agency inquiries or to prospective reinsurers or financial 
institutions to obtain rate quotes or to evaluate such rate quotes for risk transfer proposals, 
modeled results for some future period of time is necessary, such as projected to the current 
yearend or to the end of a roll-on period.  In using modeled results for such purposes, a projected 
exposure file will need to be run through the model or adjustment made for the anticipated future 
exposure changes. 
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Mitigation Benefit/Cost Study 
 
 
Using Catastrophe Modeling to Measure “What-If’s” for Mitigation Alternatives 
 
In order to measure the benefit to an insurance company of one or more mitigation alternatives, it 
is necessary to first define the steps to be taken in the mitigation alternative, a benchmark 
situation, and then run the model three times: 
 
· To determine the full expected future loss distribution for the exposures insured “as currently 
built”, being careful to retain loss detail for each structure and for the aggregation of all 
insured structures.  The expected annual losses would be usable for ratemaking purposes and 
various layers of losses would be usable for exposure management purposes. 
· To determine the same detail of information for the same exposures for a selected benchmark 
class, say for a structure of this type built with no assumed mitigation features, i.e., “no 
mitigating features”. 
· To determine the same detail of information for the same exposures for each set of mitigation 
alternatives for which expected losses will be estimated.  Suppose there was an interest in 
only estimating the value of a mitigation alternative that called for bracing the cripple walls 
on houses built over crawl spaces.  Then the model would be run for any house for which this 
mitigation alternative was possible as though the cripple wall had been braced in a specified 
fashion.  
· If creating a classification system, like that filed recently by the Florida Wind Underwriting 
Association, the modeled results for each mitigation alternative (or classification) would be 
measured relative to the benchmark class, perhaps the “no mitigation features” alternative.  
So this class would be set at 1.00 and then lower relativities would be established based on 
how much lower were the modeled expected lossess for the mitigation alternatives.  If 
bracing the cripple walls would mean 20% lower modeled expected losses, then the relative 
factor for this class would be .80.  The same procedure would be followed for each 
mitigation classification. 
· Though treated in the rules differently, essentially a set of discounts for a variety of 
mitigation alternatives is a form of classification plan, only with just a few classifications. 
 
 
Picking From Among Different Possible Mitigation Possibilities? 
 
Most insurers do not employ structural engineers who can provide them with expert opinion 
about what steps should be taken to strengthen and make a structure safer in the event it is 
subjected to the full range of future earthquakes.  So there needs to be a methodology to follow 
that identifies the more effective of the different possible mitigation alternatives: 
 
· Understanding the shaking and other stresses to which structures will have to be strong 
enough to withstand, structural experts will need to be consulted about what would be the 
most effective mitigation alternatives to consider.  This might involve testing using scale 
models on shake tables or expertise formed from years of observing what did and did not fail 
during previous earthquakes.  Regardless of how it occurs, there is a need for expert opinion 
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about what mitigation alternatives should be researched and its impact on expected losses 
measured.  
· Next that expert opinion as to how different structures will respond under a non-mitigated 
and as mitigated using a given alternative must be codified in such a way that it can be 
incorporated into the catastrophe models. 
· Once that has been done, then the different mitigation alternatives can be run through the as 
model discussed above. The financial Benefit for the insured is simply then the absolute 
dollar amount or relative reduction in the expected future losses from taking the mitigation 
action being evaluated.  Of course, this stream of future savings could be discounted back to 
a present value over the perceived life of the structure or for the period of ownership assumed 
to add a degree of sophistication to the process.  Regardless of the process used, it must result 
in a measurement of the estimated Benefit that can be properly compared to the Cost 
associated with the same mitigation action.  This reduction in expected losses would likely be 
reflected in a lower rate level charged the customer, so it does not simply flow to the bottom 
line of the company as some would suggest.  The real financial Benefit to the insurance 
company would be in the efficiency gain in its utilization of available capacity, allowing it to 
grow and stabilize earnings. 
· The financial Cost to the insured is the cost of doing the mitigation steps, less any financial 
incentives that his or her insurer or other stakeholders might provide for their taking the 
responsible action to mitigate future expected losses.  The financial Cost to the insurance 
company would include the expense of implementing a process to gather the necessary 
additional information on the structures it insures, verifying that the mitigation steps had 
actually been taken, the cost of revising their internal data processing and other systems, etc.   
· For each such stakeholder, a comparison of the Benefit/Cost relationship of different 
mitigation alternatives should be made to decide if the effort is cost-justified to be considered 
as part of the ultimate decision as to whether to take the considered action or not.  Of course 
there are also non-financial considerations as well, but this paper is only dealing with the 
financial part of the decision the stakeholder must make. 
 
 
Without Having a Benefit/Cost Study That Justifies The Mitigation Action, Is It 
Reasonable to Assume Widespread Proliferation of Mitigation Incentives By  
Insurance Companies? 
 
A Benefit/Cost Study is certainly not a necessary and necessarily sufficient pre-condition for an 
insurance company or any other stakeholder to decide on offering an incentive for a structure 
owner who significantly strengthens his structure against future strong earthquakes.  Some such 
companies may choose to make that decision on the basis of other than financial reasons.  But it 
is much more likely that a profit-motivated business will seek to build a strong financial business 
case and a solid Benefit/Cost Study will be needed to meet that need.  So, in order to encourage 
widespread availability of mitigation incentives for property owners, it is suggested that certain 
actions should be taken to make Benefit/Cost studies easier for insurance companies to perform 
and to reduce the level of uncertainty in the models that are used therein: 
 
· Access to more information on individual structures that can be used to improve the estimate 
of expected future earthquake losses for each structure as built currently and to make it 
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possible to do sufficiently detailed Benefit/Cost analyses of “what-if?” mitigation 
alternatives.  
· Additional research be funded by the government and others to continue to advance the 
“state-of-earthquake-science” to further improve the technology that underlies catastrophe 
modeling. 
· That the levels of uncertainty within current catastrophe modeling be identified and efforts 
made to reduce the uncertainty in each of the components of the model that contribute to the 
overall uncertainty of the model, including the following: 
Ø The inputted data layers that have been used in the models, including the historical 
earthquake inventory and the associated details for each, the expected frequency and 
severity distributions, etc. 
Ø The scientific underpinning of the simulation modeling, including the default selections 
for the variables and the choice of theoretical distributions used for the variables. 
Ø The fragility curves used for different structure types. 
Ø The way that secondary building characteristics are treated in the model. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Stakeholders such as insurance companies will most likely require that Benefit/Cost studies be 
completed in order to begin to provide a widespread offering of financial incentives to their 
customers.  These studies could be accomplished if a process for collecting the necessary 
detailed structural information for specific structures could be devised.  Then using this 
information along with the existing catastrophe models to do the analyses would enable 
stakeholders such as the insurance companies to gather the information they are likely to need to 
financially justify the offering of mitigation incentives. 
 
It is also clear that the insurance industry needs and could benefit from better performance data 
on single family residences and for smaller commercial structures during predictable large 
shaking events in the more heavily populated seismic regions east of the Rockies.    
 
It is the author’s belief that the MAE Center could potentially improve the Benefit/Cost analysis 
that would serve to encourage insurance companies or other stakeholders to provide mitigation 
incentives by:   
 
1.) Improving the models through focused research that reduces the uncertainty inherent 
in the catastrophe models in use today. 
2.) Promoting ways for gathering more construction information on each individual 
structure so that a more specific estimate of the expected losses for a specific 
structure could be determined. This would be instead of using default or average 
structural characteristics to do the estimating for the “as is built” condition and for 
certain mitigation “what-if?” alternatives.  
3.) Conducting the actual benefit/cost analysis for representative structures, (both with 
and without being built stronger and safer), under likely catastrophe shaking 
scenarios and for different soil or other site-specific conditions.   
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But if these actions by the MAE Center are not done, it will not necessarily preclude individual 
companies from completing their own Benefit/Cost analyses and then to offer mitigation 
incentives based on analysis tools already available to them. 
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